



THE
PHILOSOPHY OF BHEDĀBHEDA

By the same Author

RAMANUJA'S IDEA OF THE FINITE SELF

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THE
PHILOSOPHY OF BHEDĀBHEDA

BY

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PREFACE

THIS book is an amplification of the Honorary Readership Lectures on "The Philosophy of Bhāskara" delivered by me under the auspices of the University of Madras. The Philosophy of Bhedābheda claims, like all other Vedāntic schools, the authority of immemorial tradition ; but it has become a forgotten chapter in the history of Vedāntic thought. Bhedābheda exhibits two distinct types represented mainly by the systems of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa. It is midway, logically and chronologically, between the Advaita of Śaṅkara and the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja. It is not in line with the accepted expositions of Vedānta and is rejected mainly on the ground that it is a system built on the self-contradiction of *bheda* and *abheda*. The philosophy of identity-in-difference has, however, a strange fascination for certain temperaments interested in the meeting of the extremes of monism and pluralism.

The book is divided into two portions. The first sets out the metaphysical, moral and mystical implications of the Bhedābheda of Bhāskara. The first part of the second portion presents the Vedānta of Yādavaprakāśa and certain allied schools. Bhāskara's commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* is published in the "Chaukāmba

Sanskrit Series," Benares ; but no extant edition of Yādavaprakāśa's commentary is available. The drift of his teaching is, however, gathered from the criticisms levelled against it by the expositors of other systems like Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika. In the second part, a critical estimate of Bhedābheda is attempted and this is followed by a comparison of this school of Vedānta with similar lines of thought in the West. The concluding chapter indicates the direction in which the varieties of Vedāntic thought may benefit by mutual and sympathetic criticism and thus supplement the method of *siddhānta* by a synthetic insight into the fundamental features of the philosophic thought enshrined in the Upaniṣads. It will be observed that, in summarising the philosophies considered in the course of the work, I have tried to adopt the language of their authors.

My grateful thanks are due to my esteemed friends and fellow-students who have encouraged me in the publication of this book. I am indebted to Pāṇḍit Kumārāvādi Srinivasachariar who helped me to go through the Bhāṣya of Bhāskara. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Mahamahopādhyāya Vidyāvācaspati Prof. S. Kuppaswami Sastrigal for kindly reading the book in its proof stage and making valuable suggestions. Prof. M. Hiriyanna and Mr. S. Vasudevachariar rendered great help to me by pointing out errors and

suggesting improvements. I have been profited by discussions with Mr. S. Gopalaswami Aiyengar on the philosophical relationship between Viṣiṣṭādvaita and Bhedābheda. Messrs. G. K. Rangaswami Aiyengar and M. R. Rajagopala Aiyengar very kindly undertook the arduous task of proof correction and I am under great obligation to them for the considerable help they rendered to me in various ways. I should not omit to mention the aid given me by Mr. Jiyappa Aiyengar and Dr. K. C. Varadachari in the preparation of the manuscripts. My special thanks are due to Professor Hiriyanra for his kindness in having written a Foreword to this book. I also gladly acknowledge the assistance rendered by my printers, Messrs. Srinivasa Varadachari & Co.

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P. N. SRINIVASACHARI.

FOREWORD

I AM contributing this Foreword at the desire of Prof. Srinivasacharya, but I altogether fail to see the need for it in the case of a book written by one whose studies in Indian philosophy, like those relating to Rāmānuja and Bhāskara, are so well known.

The main purpose of the present work is to give an account of that school of Vedānta philosophy which admits the truth of what is known as the principle of *bhedābheda*. The expression *bhedābheda* does not bear precisely the same significance in all the schools that make use of it, but it may generally be taken to indicate a belief that *bheda* or 'distinction' and *abheda* or 'unity' can co-exist and be in intimate relation with each other. Substance and attribute, universal and particular, whole and parts may seem to be different from, or even opposed to, each other; but really there is no incompatibility between them, for they can be reconciled in a unity which pervades the difference and is its very being. This view is sometimes described also as *pariṇāma-vāda* or 'theory of development' implying that reality, conceived as *bhinnābhinna*, is not static but is continually changing and that it yet maintains its identity throughout. Such a theory is to some a direct violation of the law

of contradiction and is to be rejected as a fallacy. In their opinion, it only restates the problem to be solved and, by a certain verbal adroitness, makes it appear as the solution. But to others the theory, helped probably by its paradoxical character, makes an irresistible appeal. Whatever may be its true logical value, this principle of explanation underlies a good deal of Indian thought. Amongst the doctrines not falling within the strict limits of Vedic teaching it appears, for example, in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. It is also found in the purely orthodox school of Mīmāṃsā splitting it up into two branches, one of which adheres staunchly to this mode of explanation and the other denounces it equally staunchly. The same observation holds good of the Vedānta; and while we have Vedāntins who pin their faith on it, there are others who are never tired of assailing it. But the principle as it appears in the Vedānta differs in one important respect from the same as it appears elsewhere. The diverse elements of the universe are only partially reconciled in the other systems, for the application of the principle is restricted in them at some point or other. Thus the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, though it explains the whole of Nature as a unity in totality, does not extend that explanation to the realm of Spirit and therefore leaves the dualism of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* unresolved in the end. The principle suffers no such restriction here; and the result is

the affirmation of the *sole* reality of Brahman. It is the one source of all that exists, and the whole world is an actual manifestation of it. This variety of the Vedāntic doctrine is known as *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*; and, when one remembers that 'Brahman' is the Upanisadic word for 'spirit,' its general resemblance, we may add by the way, to Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute, becomes clear. Whether such a view of the ultimate Reality is in accordance with the teaching of the Upanisads, we cannot say. But it is not at all difficult for an adherent of the view to claim their support for it. It is well known that these ancient scriptures, though they emphasise the unity of Being, sometimes distinguish Brahman from the individual self on the one hand, and from the physical universe on the other. This may be only an apparent discrepancy as those who look upon the Upanisads as literally the 'word of God' maintain. Nevertheless the discrepancy has somehow to be explained, and the easiest way to do it is to assign equal validity to the two teachings. That will yield the *bhedābheda* view; and the ultimate Reality, as taught in the Upanisads, will be neither a bare unity nor a mere plurality but a vital synthesis of both.

This version of Vedānta—the one with which we are concerned here—has its own distinctions. All of them agree, no doubt, in holding that Brahman changes or

becomes ; but, as set forth so fully and clearly in the following pages, they differ in the manner in which they explain its relation to the individual self and to the objective universe. The doctrine is also very old and, in some form, was probably known to Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Vedānta-sūtras*. The foremost among its early exponents, so far as we know at present, was Bhartṛprapañca, none of whose works, however, has come down to us. Śaṅkara, though he never mentions him by name, often criticises his view ; and, chiefly as a result of his criticism, the *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda* lost its attraction once for all for the Indian mind. Weaker echoes of it were heard once or twice in later times, but they soon died away. As a consequence, the doctrine, in its various phases, is little known now. Prof. Srinivasacharya has done a great service to Indian philosophy by bringing it to light, and giving an admirable exposition of it in the present volume. The exposition is followed by a critical estimate of the value of the doctrine in comparison with other Vedāntic views and with the views of Western philosophers. The book deserves the careful attention of all that are interested in Indian thought, and particularly of those that wish to study the Vedānta in its several bearings.

M. HIRIYANNA.

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BOOK I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BHĀSKARA

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BHĀSKARA

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Vedānta as a philosophy of religion is enshrined in the Upanisads, the Gīta and the Brahma-sūtras, which are known as the *Prasthānatraya* or the trune sources of Divine knowledge. The Upanisadic intuitions form the basis of the Vedānta and its ethical aspects are emphasised in the Gīta. The Brahma-sūtras which are the systematisation of *śruti* define the nature of Brahman, determine the means and methods of realising it and discover the exact content of this realisation. Brahman is super-sensuous and spiritual and it is only the spirit that can realise the spirit. The true test of spiritual reality consists in its spiritual realisation and this is the supreme and the only way in which the rival claims of reason and revelation can be reconciled. True Vedāntic thought can thrive only in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom which is unfettered by the dogmas and doctrines that belong to sectarianism. But mere logic and dialectics can never prove divine reality nor disprove it. *Vāda* is merely a battle of words that leaves us ultimately broken and barren. Heaps of syllogisms can never help us in inferring the infinite; they only make spiritual life sterile. Reason no doubt gropes for God and makes guesses at Him; its contradictions and antinomies, its *anavasthas* and *hetvābhāsas*

carry no conviction and admit of no finality. Inaccessible to discursive reason, Brahman can be apprehended by intuitive insight. This pre-supposes a living faith in the verities of Revelation and their verifiability in personal experience. Revelation has objective certainty and is impersonal, eternal and infallible, but intuition is its inner assurance or certitude. To err is human and inerrancy is divine. The Vedānta has its roots in revelation and finds its fruition in the intuitive and integral experience of Brahman. Reason mediates between revelation and intuitive realisation. It confirms the former and corrects the latter and thus brings out the inherent coherence of spiritual knowledge. The central teaching of the Vedānta consists in the recognition by the seeker after truth, of the travails of transmigration and the possibility of his transcending them by the realization of Brahman. Reason collects and co-ordinates this teaching and constructs it as the philosophy of the Vedānta in its three-fold aspect of metaphysics, morality and mysticism. The first aspect is an epistemological enquiry into the origin and the validity of spiritual knowledge, the ontological determination of the nature of Reality or Brahman, and the cosmological account of Brahman as the supreme cause of the world and its evolution and involution. Secondly, Vedāntic ethics, as a criticism of the values of empirical life, insists on the life of self-renouncement and purity as the essential condition of freedom. Lastly, Vedāntic religion defines the nature of *Mumukṣutva* or mystic longing for union with Brahman and

securing immortal bliss or *mokṣa*. It thus satisfies and harmonises the three fundamental needs of spiritual life.

Among the recognised exponents of Vedāntic thought, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva hold the highest place. The philosophies of Nīlakaṇṭha and Vallabha are also fairly well-known to the students of comparative Vedānta, but very little is known about Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa and their philosophy of *bhedābheda-vāda*. Like other Indian philosophers, Bhāskara sinks his personality in the formulation of impersonal truths and no reference is to be found in his *Bhāṣya* to the incidents of his life or any event of his times. In the preface to the *Bhāskara Bhāṣya* published by Mr. Dvivedin, the editor claims to have gathered all the available material relating to the biography of Bhāskara and mentions about twenty Bhāskaras known to Indian thought. Vedāntin Bhāskara or Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara is referred to in several works on *Nyāya* and *Vedānta*. He appears to have written other works on Vedānta and references to a commentary by him on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* are found in his *Bhāṣya* on sūtras I. iv. 21 and IV. iii. 14. Bhāskara is alluded to by Vacaspati who is known to have flourished about 841 A.D. It is clear from his criticism of Śaṅkara that he is later than Śaṅkara. Later than Śaṅkara and earlier than Vacaspati-mis'ra, Bhāskara should have composed his work somewhere in the early part of the ninth century.

Bhāskara displays great dialectic skill in refuting and demolishing what he calls the false and distorted interpretations of the *S'rutis* and the *Sūtras*. The main object of his philosophy from the negative point of view was his condemnation of *māyā-vāda*¹ as a version of the Nihilism of *Māhāyānika* Buddhism.² His teaching of *bhedābheda* differs from the other species associated with the name of Yādavaprakāsa. While Yādava postulates both difference and non-difference as the essential relation between Brahman on the one hand and the *prapañca* on the other (*vide* Thibaut's *S'rī Bhāṣya*, p. 460), Bhāskara upholds the idea of Brahman as the absolute and the relative and distinguishes between *cetana* and *acetana* in the *prapañca*. The relation between Brahman and *acetana* is both different and non-different, while in the relation between Brahman and the *Jīva*, difference is adventitious and non-difference essential. Yādava is more idealistic and he does not recognise any fundamental distinction between *cit* and *acit*; *acit* is only *cit* in an unmanifested state. What is latent in the former becomes patent in the latter, and the unconscious is but a phase of the conscious.³

¹ & ² "Vicchinnaṃ māhāyānika bauddha gāthitam māyāvādam." [I. iv. 25].

³ "Yādava-prakāśa-mata sarvamapi cetanameva; tatra ghatade-scaitanya-anabhivyakti-mātrameveti na cid-a-cidvibhagaḥ."—*Tātparya Dīpikā* of S'rī Sudarśanā-carya.

The philosophy of Bhāskara marks a transition from S'aṅkara to Rāmānuja. Every philosophy historically considered is a response to the needs of the age when it is born and is both its criticism and fulfilment. Śaṅkara freed Indian thought from the agnostic and nihilistic tendencies of Buddhist idealism and enthroned the spirit of the Upanisads once again in the heart of Hinduism. But the practical advaita of Śaṅkara which recognises empirical reality does not satisfy the advaitins who, in their monistic zeal for absolute identity, deny the plurality of souls and reject the world. The logic of *Ēka-jīva* leads to the ego-centric fallacy and lapses into solipsism. Monistic idealism on the intellectual level lands us in sheer subjectivism and scepticism. Rāmānuja repudiates the theories of *Nirguṇa Brahman*, *Vivartavāda* and *Jīvanmukti*, affirms the reality of experience in all its levels, and upholds the Viśiṣṭādvaitic idea of God, and the absolute dependence of the finite self or *prakāra* on His redemptive love and grace. Bhāskara is even more emphatic in his criticism of the *Mūyāvāda* and, while he accepts the conclusion of divine personality and causality and *Videhamukti*, he insists on the monistic truths of *abheda* and absorption in the Absolute. The system of Bhāskara is built on the following doctrines which may be called its corner stones, i.e., the law of identity in difference (*bhedābheda*), the reality of Brahman possessed of attributes (*Saguṇa Brahman*), the acceptance of the principle of God evolving into the world (*parināma*

vāda), the recognition of the means of attaining salvation or *mukti* as a co-ordination of both knowledge and action (*Jñāna-karma-samuccaya*) and the possibility of obtaining release or *mukti* only after death (*videhamukti*). The Absolute is, according to Bhāskara, both conditioned and unconditioned. It differentiates itself into the manifold of finite selves and things, and, when the condition is removed, the finite becomes one with the infinite. The merit of Bhāskara's system lies in supplying a mediating link between the metaphysical monism of Śaṅkara and the ethical monism of Rāmānuja and arresting the subjectivistic tendencies of the former and the anthropomorphic accretions of the latter.

The Vedānta is treasured up in immemorial tradition and Bhāskara claims to formulate its truths on the foundations of *s'rutis* and *sūtras* without the slightest distortion of meaning and often appeals to *Sūtrāksara*. He is never tired of condemning the practice of reading one's own ideas into the text and distorting its sense, leading to what he calls *s'rutahāni* and *as'rutakalpanā* and straining the text to suit one's theory. Speculation should be subordinated to *s'rutis* and spiritual insight and made to serve their ends. The Vedāntic method employed by the *sūtras* consists in choosing a relevant Upanisadic topic and establishing its true import by the refutation of all possible and plausible rival theories. Truth is determined by the elimination of false theories and partial truths. Bhāskara following the philosophy of the *sūtras*

refutes and rejects the other prevalent theories of the time and in some cases re-states their problem and conclusions. The *Mīmāṃsaka*, the *Dhyānaniyōga vādin*, the *Nisprapañicanyōgavādin*, the *Sūṅkhya*, the *Buddhist*, the *Jain*, the *Pāsupata* and the *Pāñcarātra* are reviewed in turn and repudiated absolutely or in part. Bhāskara has no sympathy for atheism, materialism, nihilism, ritualism, phenomenism, idealism and pan-psychism as maintained in these schools. Brahman is, to him, neither an aggregate of atoms nor a contentless identity. A philosophy that favours duality or dreaminess is fatal to the spirit of the *S'āstra*. Absolute identity as well as absolute difference is a mere abstraction devoid of meaning and both are subversive of moral and religious needs. But *Māyāvāda* comes in for the greatest share of Bhāskara's criticism and condemnation.¹

In commenting on Sūtra, I. ii. 6, Bhāskara states his firm conviction that the *bhedābheda dars'ana* is the only philosophy that is acceptable to the *Sūtrakāra* and not the *māyāvāda* that makes *Is'vara* the first born of the Absolute and the highest *samsārīn*² or product of the cosmic figment. Reality is both one and many (*abhinna* and *bhinna*). The one is the unconditioned absolute and the uncaused cause but the manifold is the absolute conditioned by the *Upādhis* or the de-limiting adjuncts. The absolute becomes the

¹ "Śrutyardham ācāryoktim ca prṣṭhataḥ kṛtvā." [I. ii. 12].

² "Vadanti īs'varasyaiva samsāritvam." [I. ii. 6].

relative and is immanent in it. The finite self is the one Brahman limited by the metaphysical and moral imperfections of *avidyā*, *kāma* and *karma*. *Mukti* consists in removing the barriers, transcending the boundaries of *Samsāra-maṇḍala* and becoming one with the absolute or attaining *Ēkībhāva*. This is the central teaching of Bhāskara. The *Sūtras* are divided into four chapters dealing with the metaphysical, moral and mystical aspects of the Vedānta. The first and the second chapters, according to Bhāskara, define the nature of Brahman as the one supreme reality which is the unconditioned but not the indeterminate; the one becomes the many and is the ground of the manifold. The third determines the means of realising Brahman and that is summed in the principle of *Jñāna-karma-samuccaya*, and the last chapter considers the value and destiny of the finite self in terms of *Videhamukti* (salvation after death) and *Ēkībhāva*. The metaphysical standpoint may itself be divided into the epistemological, the ontological and the cosmological aspects. The first discusses the nature of truth and accepts the authority of the *S'ruti* as satisfying all human values; the second as the philosophy of being defines Brahman as the *Sat* without a second that is immanent in all experience and the third as the philosophy of nature explains the reality of the cosmic evolution in terms of immanence, emanation or evolution or *pariṇāma s'akti*. We shall first consider the epistemological aspect of Bhāskara's metaphysics.

CHAPTER II

EPISTEMOLOGY

The Vedānta affirms the knowability of Brahman as the *Sat* without a second, the unconditioned infinite that has the power to infinitise all finite beings and absorb them into itself. The term Brahman primarily connotes *Īśvara*¹ and it is only in a secondary sense that the term connotes Brahmā (*Hiranyagarbha*) who is entrusted with the making of things and the moulding of souls. The philosophy of Bhāskara is sustained by the living faith that the self when purified and perfected can know the unknown. Brahman is unknowable to discursive reason, but the beatified soul becomes Brahman and its separate consciousness is then dissolved. There is really no contradiction or boundary line between the finite and the infinite. Like the sun and its rays, the soul is one with the self. The higher includes the lower and explains it. Of the main sources of knowledge, i.e., *pratyakṣa* (sense perception), *anumāna* (inference) and *S'ūtra* (revelation) the last is the ultimate source and centre of all spiritual knowledge. What is self-revealed and illumined does not need any external light to illumine it. The Veda is the word of God and as the words are the symbols of

¹ "Brahma śabdena īśvaro gṛhyate" [I.i. 1.].

ideas, the Veda is a body of divine ideas or eternal (*nitya*), impersonal (*apauruṣeya*), and infallible truths. Its validity is self-established (*svatassiddha*); it is its own criterion. Divine truth is its own immanent criterion. Its universality and eternity is in no way affected by *pralaya* or cosmic dissolution as *pralaya* is only a periodic cosmic sleep that precedes the dawn of creation. Vedic thought is, in *pralaya*, a potentiality, contained in the divine nature, and, along with the will of God to create the world, the Veda which is His redemptive light illumines the soul of the First-born and of the other makers of the world, and becomes explicit to the seers of the spirit (*mantratrastūrah*). These Vedic Rsis have a soul-sight of the divine content and the Ūpanisads are the outpourings of their intuitive insight. *S'ruti* being thus an immediate knowledge of the Infinite is self-positing (*svatassiddha*) and absolutely valid (*anapeksa*) but *Smṛti* has no authority of its own as its conclusions are deduced from *śruti* (*śrutiśāpeksa*). They are therefore known respectively as *pratyaksa* or intuitions and *anumāna* or deductions.¹ When there is a conflict between the immediate truths of *śruti* and the mediate truths of *smṛti*, the former alone is to be relied on, and, in cases of conflict among the *smṛtis* themselves, as for example, between the metaphysical theories of Kapila and the moral rules of Manu, their

¹ "Pratyaksam śrutiḥ, anumānam smṛtiḥ." [I. iii. 28].

validity is tested by reference to the coherence of the *smṛti* as a whole and ultimately to the self-evident authority of the *s'ruti* which is the bedrock of all Vedāntic reasoning.

The *Vaiyākaraṇas* have a theory of *sphoṭa* or the subtle and eternal significative unit manifested by articulate sounds in language, but Bhāskara following Upavarsa, the commentator on the *Mīmāṃsa Sūtras*, rejects it as complicated and unnecessary. Similarly, the view of certain *mīmāṃsakas*, that Vedic imperatives alone have full meaning and statements on accomplished facts (*siddhaparavākya*) like Brahman are not authoritative, is combated on the ground that, both in worldly life and in the Vedas, meanings are attached directly, not merely to imperatives, but to affirmations also, and that the authoritative nature of the *s'ruti*, being dependent solely on its being impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) and consequently *anapeksa* (not requiring confirmation from other sources of knowledge), holds good in respect of affirmations about Brahman as well as of the imperatives of duty laid down.¹ Thus the texts about creation are as valid as the results of sense perception.² Bhāskara accepts the *mīmāṃsaka* principle of the relative importance of *S'ruti*, *Linga*, *Vākya*.

¹ "Apauruṣeyatvam hi kāraṇam; tacca avīṣiṣṭam."
[I. i. 4].

² "S'rṣṭivākyaṃ siddharūpa avabodhakam."
[I. i. 4].

Prakarana, *Sthāna* and *Samākhya*. The meaning of the text is determined by the context and the primary sense is preferred to the implied. Like other Vedāntins, Bhāskara also accepts the unity of thought that underlies a specific Upanisadic topic. The same truth is introduced, developed and summed up in a given topic. Consistent interpretation therefore requires that there should be *ekavīsaya* in *upakrama* and *upasaṃhāra*.¹

Employing the above tests of interpretation, Bhāskara concludes that the principle of *bhedābheda* is the central truth of Vedānta and this is the key-note of his system. Reality or Brahman is an identity that is immanent in differences and constitutes them. That the infinite finitises itself is a fact and not a fiction. The absolute is not out of all relation to the finite but is the ground of all relations and their logical prius and pre-supposition. The finite is sustained by the infinite, but the infinite is not necessarily conditioned by the finite. The finite as the predicate qualifies and conditions the absolute. Bhāskara selects the typical Upanisadic judgments that emphatically bring out this *bhedābheda* relation between the finite self and the infinite. The aspect of unity (*abheda*) is declared by the following texts: 'Thou art That,' Ch., VI. 8 to 16; 'There is no other seer but He,' Br. Up., III. vii. 23; 'This self is

¹ "Upakramopasaṃhārayoh ōkārthatvam." [I. i. 12].

Brahman,' Br. Up., II. v. 19; 'The fishermen are Brahman, the slaves are Brahman. Brahman are these gamblers; men and women are Brahman,' (Brahma Sūkta of Samhitopaniṣad;) 'Woman art thou and man and boy and girl.' Thou art the old man moving with a stick,' Śv. Up., IV. 3. The following texts declare *bheda*: 'There are two unborn, one knowing, the other not knowing, one strong, the other weak,' Śv. Up., I. 9; 'The Lord of Nature and of the souls, the ruler of the qualities, the cause of bondage, of existence and of the release from Saṃsāra,' Śv. Up., VI. 16; 'He is the cause, the Lord of the Lords of the organs,' Śv. Up., VI. 9; 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, without eating the other looks on,' Śv. Up., IV. 6, also Muṇḍ., III. i. 1; 'Having known Him only, one passes beyond death,' Śv. Up., III. 8; 'He who dwells within the self,' Br., III. vii. 22 Madhy. Pāṭha; 'He should be sought, He should be meditated on,' Ch. Up., VIII. vii. 1; 'He who, one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many, eternal, intelligent beings,' Kath. Up., II. v. 18; 'The Lord of everything and the Ruler of the self,' Taitti. Up., Nārā., 10; 'Embraced by the all-Intelligent Self, he knows nothing that is without, and nothing that is within,' Br. Up., IV. iii. 21; 'Mounted by the all-Intelligent Self, this self of the body goes,' Br. Up., IV. iii. 35. These two sets of *s'rutis* together establish the *bhedābheda* relation, and the Mundaka statement: "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman," III. ii. 9, affirms the essential unity of the two in the state

of *mukti* and this is confirmed by the *Brhadāraṇyaka* text : ' But when the self has become all for him, where-with should he see another,' IV. v. 15. The *Sad Viḍyā* in the *Chāndogya* Upanisad asserts the principle of identity in difference in the relation between Brahman and the world of *cetana* and *acetana*.

This same principle is affirmed by the judgments of sense-perception and reasoning (*pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*). Reality is determined by cognitions which are not sublated by valid means of proof. Reality as an inter-related whole is not a mere aggregate of indifferent parts but a pervading identity that is realised in the differences, and the two aspects of identity and difference are distinguishable but not divisible. The clearest examples of this truth are afforded by the judgments which express the relation between cause and effect and genus and species. The aspect of *abheda* is brought out in the causal and the generic states, but, when we think of the effect and the individuals forming the genus, we emphasise the idea of difference.¹ In the judgments : " This pot is made of clay," " this jewel is made of gold," the effect is surely contained in, and continuous with, the cause. Likewise in the judgment : " This cow is short-horned " the genus is realised in the species. The effect is a real manifestation and not a contradiction of the cause. The particular subsists and persists and is in no way

¹ " Kāryarūpeṇa nānātvam abhedah kārāpātmanā." [I. i. 4].

sublated by the universal ; universality and individuality are harmonised in the rhythm of reality. It is true that opposites like light and darkness, or heat and cold cannot co-exist in the same thing at the same time, but it is absurd to argue from this that difference *qua* effected or particular aspect, and non-difference *qua* causal or universal aspect, are not simultaneously perceived in the same thing, for there is no such inner contradiction in the ideas of generic character and individuality or of causal immanence and organic development. The reality of the causal connection is universal, necessary and absolute. It is irrelevant to appeal to the abnormal experience of illusion in explaining the nature of reality. The illusion of two moons (*dvicandra-bhrama*) can be ascribed to the operation of physical and psychical defects and disorders. Besides, the determination of truth on the analogy of such subjective and abnormal experiences would land us in subjectivism and nihilism. But the theory of *bhedābheda* is based on the integrity of normal experience, satisfies the tests of reasoning and *s'ruti* and does full justice to the philosophical demands of monism and pluralism without in any degree sharing in their defects. The absolute manifests itself in the finite and gives a meaning to it. A supra-relational absolute is devoid of content and has no continuity with our experience. All relational thought fails in its attempt to transcend itself. Thus we fail to bridge the gulf between relational thought and the absolute and are landed in agnosticism. There is no substance or subject without qualities

or connections of content (no *guna* without *gunin* or *dharma* without *dharmin*); and qualification or determination is no contradiction of reality. The *sāmānya* or the universal is one and the *viśeṣa* or the particular is the many and the many emanates from the one and does not sublate it. Being is one and unconditioned, and becoming is the conditioned; becoming is no illusion superimposed on the one being. Brahman is one and the world of experience (*prapañca*) varies. "The one remains and the many change and pass" and Bhāskara illustrates this truth in a variety of ways. From the same clayey stuff, the potter moulds a vase or an urn. The sea is one limitless expanse but the waves raising therefrom vary and vanish. Fire melts wax but hardens clay. The sun illumines all things but, when its light is refracted, it is stained and separated into numerous spectral colours. The *vāyu* or the air that animates the body is one but it functions in five different ways. *Akūs'a* is all-pervasive but the *Ākūs'a* in one vessel is different from that in another. *Manas* is one single psychical content, but its working varies with physical and psychical conditions. Brahman is the one unconditioned Being, and the finite, with all its wealth of colour and detail, is only the self evolution of the One. Reality reveals the self and does not veil it.

CAUSALITY.

The idea of the *Upādhis* or conditionateness of the absolute furnishes the *raison d'être* of Bhāskara's epistemology. The theory of causality is to Bhāskara what the theory of *Avayā* is to S'aṅkara and that of *Karma* to Rāmānuja. It connotes not merely a mechanical or teleological idea but the free causality of God, including the first cause as well as the final, and the validity of this meaning is derived *apriori* from the *S'āstra* itself. Causality as a mechanical theory commits us to infinite regress, but efficient and immanent causality implies power and purpose. The absolute idealist regards *Īś'varatva* or cosmic Lordship as a limitation of the absolute by degrading *Īś'vara* to the empirical level and subjecting him to the dialectic difficulties of the empirical notions of causality. Bhāskara regards himself as a loyal expositor of *S'ruti* and maintains that Brahman in the causal state is the unconditioned and in the effected state is the conditioned or the finite. Causality is neither a contradiction nor an external relation but a process of self-limitation. Cause is temporally and logically prior to the effect but the two are different aspects of the same reality. In spite of temporal and spatial differences, they have an identical reference to reality. The effect is contained in the cause or the ground but is not contradicted by it. The Upanisadic idea of the immanence of Brahman in *prapañca* can in no sense be construed as a denial of the cosmic objective

reality. Truth is not subjective or relevant to human needs and experiences (*Purusāpēkṣa*) but a constraining reality independent of subjective conditions. Colour blindness, for example, does not alter the existence of colour. The same sun shines on the wicked as well as the votary of God and its objective reality does not depend on the eye that sees it. Similarly, the world cannot be a fiction to the seeker after release and a fact to the empirically minded (*mīthya* to the *mumukṣu* and *satya* to others).¹ If reality were subjective and contingent, there would be no reality at all. The analogy of the illusory double moon perceived through defective eye-sight is inapplicable to the world as there is no valid reason to disbelieve the evidence of the senses. If the illusory nature of the world is stated to be based on the teaching of the *s'ūtra*, that illusion should last for ever. Besides, it will be shown later that the *s'ūtra* does not teach the doctrine of illusion. Consequently, the assertion that the world is a fiction to some and a fact to others is entirely opposed to every test of truth and reality. Whatever is conditioned is no doubt finite and fleeting, but is not for that reason a contradiction and an illusion. There is no incompatibility between the supreme self and the world of experience (*paramātmān* and

¹ "Narabhedānna hi gūyeyā vastunas-sadasatyatā." [I. i. 4.]

prapañca), between the transcendental and the empirical, but a real transition and passage from the one to the other. The cosmos is the expression of the free causality and self-directive activity of Brahman and this truth alone gives a valid meaning to the reality of *mukti*.

Bhāskara thus employs the realistic principle of *satkāryavāda* or the theory of immanent causality, and uses all his dialectic skill in defending it and demolishing the rival theories, in his exposition of the *Sad Vidyā* and the *Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa*. *Parīṇāma* is a real identity in difference and is a *vikāra* and not a *vivarta*. The *Sūtra* insists on the immanence, the organic unity and the continuity of causality. The cause contains the effect potentially and the effect is the cause actualised. The difference between the cause and the effect is in condition and not in kind (*avasthābheda* and not *atyantābheda*). Bhāskara first vanquishes the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *asatkārya vāda* which asserts the absolute difference (*atyantābheda*) between cause and effect and the creation of the existent from the non-existent. If in the judgment "this pot is made of clay," the cause is *asat* or non-existent in the effect and not pre-existent and the effect is produced out of nothing, clay may as well produce curd or a piece of cloth. If there be a potency in the cause to account for the effect, then that potency is either eternal (*nitya*) or not eternal (*anitya*). If it be

eternal, the effect would be an eternal becoming. If it be not eternal, then it should be caused by something external to it and so on *ad infinitum*.

Bhāskara then states the case of the *Māyāvādin* and condemns it as a theory subversive of all Śāstraic knowledge. The *Māyāvādin* regards the effect as a figment of reality which somehow comes into being and ascribes the character of dreams to the whole phenomenal process. According to this theory, the world of experience is unreal (*asatya*) and non-existent (*abhāva*) like the horn of a hare. Causality is a magical show and has no logical constraint. Our whole experience is a false reading of the absolute based on the perception of mere appearances and is as conventional as the letters of the alphabet and as unreal as the imaginings of an infatuated lover. They exist but have no reality. Even dreams sometimes have a prophetic and permanent nature and the cosmic dream may claim to have a certain amount of reality like them, but the claim to truth is not really justified. Besides, the idea of negation does not arise at the empirical level, and it is only when the true nature of reality is intuited in the *pāramārthika* state that the world dream vanishes of its own accord. The phenomenal process then ceases to be, and the absolute alone is. The cause of this cosmic illusion is *māyā*; it is frankly a statement of the contradictions of life and is ultimately inexplicable. When this nescience is removed

by the knowledge of the absolute, the world-illusion vanishes and the riddle is dissolved. In combating this theory Bhāskara adduces very nearly the same arguments as Rāmānuja.

In a rational account of reality which challenges and destroys dialectically the definitions of others, the theory of the inexplicability (*anirvacanāyatva*) of *avidyā* merely tries to silence the spirit of logical enquiry and there is no transition from the logical to the alogical. If causality is a bare identity, it is self-explanatory but such a relation is no explanation. If illusion is an experience, reason demands its causal explanation, and indefinability is no explanation at all. If causality is an illusion, the knowledge, which removes this illusion, is itself an experience and therefore an illusion and *Brahmagiṇāna* which removes *avidyā* is also a case of *avidyā*. When the employment of *hetu*, which is the heart of the whole reasoning process is distrusted, the whole science of controversy and conviction falls to the ground, and *Māyāvāda* ceases to be a *vāda* or theory. The stuff of *Māyā* or *avidyā* is out there as a *s'akti* or *ādhāra* and the theory cannot escape the charge of dualism. Illusion, as an experience, is as real as normal experience, and, while the object perceived may be false, the subject that experiences the illusion is not itself an illusion. Illusion is due to the operation of real causes like physical and mental disorders. Empirical life is not an illusion but a real experience conditioned by the adjuncts of

sensibility and *samsāritva*. The false imaginings of infatuated love are, no doubt, a folly and a failing, but they persist as the most potent fact and factor of our experience. Idealism, in all its forms, starts with the subject and finally lapses into subjectivism, and *māyāvāda*, realising the nihilistic conclusion to which the Buddhistic *Vigñānavāda* and *Mādhyanika* epistemology inevitably drive it falls back on realism at least at the empirical level.

The *Sāṅkhya* theory of *pariṇāmavāda* gives a mechanical account of causality and fails to explain the teleological nature of evolution, and the idea of a soulless *pradhāna* passing from the potential into the actual lacks spiritual spontaneity and the creative urge. The mechanical theory ignores the validity of thought and the value of spiritual personality. The *Sāṅkhya* has to admit the reality of final causes; but, in the absolute dualism that he creates between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, he finds no place for the idea of immanent causality and purpose, and he contrives various devices to bridge the chasm between the two. He resorts to the analogies of milk becoming curd, the lodestone drawing pieces of iron, the mirror and its reflection and the two pilgrims of whom one is blind and the other lame. But all these analogies are irrelevant and unsound and metaphors cannot be a substitute for metaphysics. The first is mechanical,

as milk changes into curd in a natural way. The second connotes an inherent power which is neither in *puruṣa* nor in *prakṛti*. The third makes the reality of *mukti* or freedom a mere make-believe, as the *Jīva* that seeks *mukti* is itself a reflection of *Puruṣa* and not a real self and the last misses the whole point of the analogy as both the pilgrims are intelligent. Lastly, the theory of proximity (*Sannidhānamātra*) is a mere external relation riddled with the fallacies of *virūḍha*, *vyabhicāra* and *asiddha*. Proximity may result in eternal creation without involution and afford no scope for *mukti*. The *Sāṅkhya* theory does not sufficiently insist on the reality of the subject-object relation, the finite self, its sins and sufferings, and its final unity with the absolute which is the ground and goal of all experience. The world cannot guide itself without God and the whole theory is therefore opposed to Vedāntic teaching.

The atomic view of the *Vaiśeṣika* goes to the other extreme and while recognising the eternity of the atoms and the will of god as the operative cause, it entirely denies the reality of causal immanence. The theory of *adṛṣṭa* applies neither to the mechanical atoms (*acetana*) nor to the souls which are absolutely distinct from them and are ultimately devoid of consciousness in *mūḥṣa*. The view of *samavāya* relation peculiar to this system is external and unnecessary and lands us in the fallacy of

infinite regress. The relation is external to the relata and yet the relation is required and this goes on endlessly. If cause and effect as antecedent and consequent are separate and successive as *avayava* and *avayavin* we cannot at the same time say that they are inseparably related (*apṛthaksiddha viśeṣaṇa*). The theory of atomic causation is equally futile. Atoms (*paramāṇu*) should be considered as either active or passive. They cannot be active as they subsist in a state of passivity in *pralaya*. They cannot be passive, for if they are passive, there is no creation. Nor can they be both as the terms are contradictory. The atoms either have eternal form or are formless, both of which are inadmissible for similar reasons. Pluralism and atomism fail to satisfy the philosophic demand for unity.

The Buddhistic theory of causality is only a part of its negative logic. To the Buddhist, reality which is both physical and psychical is only a phenomenal series, and a fleeting flux. It is a mere complex or aggregate of the *skandhas*. Reality is neither an identity nor a difference nor both, but a ceaseless becoming. But becoming without being is unthinkable, and if it is traced to *avidyā*, this *avidyā* itself has to be accounted for. The idea of physical order and personal identity is rooted in our normal experience and *avidyā* fails to explain this fact of persistence. *Avidyā*, as a psychic complex, may affect our mental states, but it cannot cause

the physical order. If every physical or mental state is particular and perishing, reality ceases to be objective and permanent. The doctrine of *saṅghāta* or *samūdāya-satya* which regards the individual as an aggregate of atoms or a psychic series is mere phenomenalism; for if the atom or the sensation perishes, a combination of perishing states cannot make it permanent. If the antecedent is at once abolished, there is no meaning in speaking of the consequent. Then, anything may be the cause of anything else, and a mud pot may produce a mango. If the theory of momentary mental modification (*kṣaṇika vigñāna*) were seriously maintained, then there would be no personality, and no moral responsibility, and life would become impossible. The Buddhist realist is himself constrained to admit the reality of causal persistence and continuity and recognise extra-mental existence. The Buddhistic idea of *abhāva* is equally untenable and idle, as bare negation without a positive affirmation is inconceivable. How can *abhāva* or bare negation produce *bhāva* or positive affirmation? If all things pass away, why is *ākāśa* regarded as an eternal and all-pervading substance? A belief in the theory of *karma* and *vāsanā* without positing a persistent personality meets neither the demands of logical stability nor the claims of moral responsibility.

The *Yōgācāra* Buddhist is a subjective idealist to whom reality is only a complex of mental states, and

his position is equally untenable. Solipsism arises when the object is resolved into the subject. Every judgment is a single ideal content and, like dreams, has no reference to external things. *Vigñāna* is, like the dream state, without any objective basis and the difference between the waking state and dreams is only a difference in degree and not in kind. But this reasoning is a case of unsound analogy and involves the fallacy of *Petitio Principii*, or arguing in a circle. It may be stated as follows : All dream cognitions are false because they are contradicted by cognitions in the waking state, but the cognitions in the waking state are false as they are momentary. If externality is an illusion, how is the illusion accounted for ? Every perceptive judgment pre-supposes the reality of external things and is therefore objective and is not subjective and private like desire and aversion. If the world of space-time were dissolved into a more mental series, then there would be no knowledge or theory of knowledge at all. Sublation pre-supposes two contradictory propositions and no proposition can contradict itself. There can be no *svataḥ nirākāra* but only a *parataḥ bādha*. It is impossible to prove the truth of a cognition on the basis of its non-contradiction at any time. The law of contradiction as applied to subjective knowledge would become a bare identity without any basis in objective reality. The doctrine of *Alayavignāna* is built on perishing psychological

material and is therefore a baseless fabric without any *ādhāra* or substratum. In the history of Buddhism, realism leads to subjectivism and scepticism is the logical conclusion of both.

The theory of *bhedābheda* is free from all these fallacies and the spiritual unity which it reveals is the basis and background of all differences and reconciles monism and pluralism. The Jaina theory of predication known as *saptabhamujī* affirms nothing and denies nothing. A truth that is partly true and partly false is no truth at all. Besides, the same thing cannot be both true and false. But it may be maintained that the predications refer to the relativity of knowledge and the different view-points as they are said to inhere in the nature of the thing itself (*svarūpa*). If the *svarūpa* or essential nature cannot be defined, then there is no *niś'caya gñāna* or determinate knowledge at all. But no such charge can be levelled against the theory of *bhedābheda vāda* with which it is often falsely identified. It asserts the reality of the causal relation in which Brahman exists as the unconditioned one and the conditioned many and integrates idealistic logic with that of realism.

CHAPTER III

ONTOLOGY

Vedāntic ontology is developed in the clearest and most classical manner in the *sad vidyā* of the Ch. Up., VI. 2, and systematised in the first chapter of the Sūtras. If, as the western critic says,¹ Śaṅkara mainly relies for his idealism on the teachings of Yāgñavalkya, and Rāmānuja finds the surest support for his theory in the Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa (Bṛhad. Up., VII. vii), Bhāskara turns to Uddālaka for the foundations of the *bhedābheda* theory. The *sad vidyā* defines Brahman as the *sat* without a second externalising itself as the manifold of material things and thinking things. Brahman is the unconditioned, beyond the categories of time, space, and causality; but, by its infinite Śakti, it finitises itself into thinkers and things. Brahman thus exists in three forms known as *kāraṇa*, *kārya*, and *jīva*. The first connotes *Parames'vara*, the lord of all beings, eternal, infinite, omniscient and omnipotent Brahman in the fulness of being and bliss, power and perfection. But by His creative urge, He wills the many and becomes the many. When the infinite becomes the finite, He differentiates Himself into the *jīvas* or the subjects of experience and the *acetana* or the objects of experience. The infinite itself thinks all things and

¹ This view is not accepted by the Ācāryās. All Vedāntins rely on all Upanisadic texts.

creates all creators. When we say the absolute constitutes the relative, we do not mean there is a relative absolute. Mere relativity ends in subjectivity, just as the absolute as absolute becomes a mere abstraction. The *bhedābheda* theory corrects this one-sidedness by its conception of causal immanence. Brahman, in the causal state, is the transcendental being beyond subjectivity and the *samsāramāṇḍala*, beyond the stars above and the soul within; but, in the effect aspect, the infinite incarnates into the finite and becomes the finite. The eternal enters into the empirical and becomes the empirical. The two are correlative and not contradictory. While Brahman limits itself into the names and forms of the world, the world does not exhaust the whole, even as the waters of the ocean constitute the waves while the waves do not constitute the ocean.

There is no distinction between the absolute of metaphysics and the god of religion. Both express the same reality which is realisable by intuition alone. A supra-relational experience is a contradiction in terms. The infinite is not a negation of the finite but is its positive affirmation and fulfilment and is both intelligent and intelligible and can be apprehended and attained by the *jīva* freed from its conditionateness. This intuitive apprehension is impeded by the *upādhis* or the principle of ignorance and evil. *Īśvara* is nowhere mentioned in the Śruti as a glorified *samsārin*, the first born of the absolute

having maximum of being and minimum of non-being.' The Vedānta, as a philosophy of religion, dealing with *mōkṣa*, would be entirely stultified if the god of religion is less than the absolute and a concession to empirical consciousness. If the omniscience of the all-self is only nescience on a cosmic scale, there is no need for the grace of God or Guru. The absolute devoid of content provides no scope for moral aspiration and religious attainment. To say that *Īśvara* is a *samsārin* conditioned by cosmic illusion is a glaring instance of text-torturing and mere metaphysical imaginings. The *Śūtra* emphatically declares the qualitative distinction between *Īśvara*, the cosmic lord, and *Jiva*, the other (*anya*) who is a *samsārin*. The *Māyāvādin* himself recognises this in his philosophy of *Saguṇa Brahman* in which he contrasts the infinite *Īśvara*, the omnipotent lord and ruler, with the *jīva* who is created, dependent and imperfect. But, when he comes to the religious aspect of ultimate destiny and realisation, *Saguṇa Brahman* is assigned to the empirical world of *samsāra*, and promised salvation with the ceasing of the eternal world process. The lord of creation is then subject to the hazards and hardships of creation and the all-enveloping power of the cosmic figment, and while the *Jiva* attains *mukti* in this very life and returns to the absolute, *Īśvara's* claim to the absolute is rejected and he is ultimately relegated to the

function of the first-born self or *Hiranyagarbha*. The other theory of the *Māyāvādin* that *Īśvara* is a *samsārin* enveloped in cosmic fiction and the *jīva* is its fragmentary fiction is opposed to all authority and experience. Being absolutely free, eternal, perfect, blissful, and immutable, he cannot court imprisonment in empirical life. Logically speaking individuation is the result of ignorance and *Īśvara* is only a *Jīva* or the only *Jīva*; *Ekajīva vāda* thus brings out the subjectivistic implications of mere *Māyāvādā*.

Bhāskara, following the *Sūtrakāra*, establishes the truth of divine causality by eliminating the rival theories of *S'āṅkhya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Bauddha* and *Jaina*. He first repudiates the *Sāṅkhya* contention that the *Śadvidyā* refers to the *P'radhāna* as the *Sat* without a second that accounts for the universe. The problem of philosophy so clearly stated by Śvetaketu, the seeker after salvation, is "What is that *ādes'a* by knowing which everything is known"? The *Sāṅkhya* theory that it is *pradhāna* is entirely opposed to reasoning, revelation and the rules of Vedāntic interpretation. The terms *aikṣata* and *Atman* cannot be explained away as mere figures of speech. No mechanism is known to seek for *mukti*, and volition and feeling can in no sense be ascribed to the non-living. Freedom and mechanism are entirely opposed, and the self can never be the secretion of matter. Besides, the higher alone can

explain the lower and not the lower the higher. *Ātman* is the supreme reality which is the centre and source of all beings. Thus the thesis or the *pratigñā* contained in the text "It willed to be the many" (*tadaikṣata bahusyām*) entirely rules out the mechanical origin of the world and establishes the immanent causality of *Īśvara*.

The reference to *avyakta* in the *Kāthopanīṣad* passages I. iii. 11 and II. vi. 7, 8, as higher than *mahat* and less than *Puruṣa*, is not to the corresponding terms as used in the *Sāṅkhya* system, just as the words *Puruṣam Mahāntam* in the *Puruṣa Sūkta* and Sv. Up., III. 8, refer neither to the *Sāṅkhya mahat* nor the *Sāṅkhya puruṣa* but to the supreme lord. The triple coloured *aṇḍā* of Sv. Up., IV. 5 and Tai. Nara., xii, and the two *aṇḍās* enjoying and rejecting her, refer not to the *Sāṅkhya prakṛti* and *puruṣa* independent of *Īśvara*, but to the world of experience and experiencing subjects or *jīvas* as evolutes or fulgurations of *Īśvara*. Further, the enjoyment of the world by the worldly and the rejection of its values by the wise indicate that *jīvas* differ from one another, though they are essentially one in God, just like waves and foam which are distinct from one another but are all essentially one with the waters of the ocean. Hence, it is also appropriate that when the seeker after salvation is released from *samsāra*, the

other *jīvas*¹ abide in their own separate and samsāric being.

The statement in the Tait. Up., Ānand. 7, "It of itself, evolved into the world" proves beyond all doubt that *Īsvara* by His own *pariṇāma śakti* emanates into the universe and sustains it.² But how can the indivisible *niravayava* Brahman evolve into the world of form and matter in the same manner as milk which is divisible (*sāvayava*) changes to curd? Bhāskara replies that *sāvayavatva* is not the cause of the transformation of milk to curd, as, if that were so, water, being divisible should also change to curd. Besides, if the capacity for transformation be grounded on divisibility, each component particle of the changing milk should itself be divisible and the argument would lead to infinite regress. As a matter of fact, however, the capacity for changing to curd is a separate property of milk quite independent of its being *sāvayava* or *niravayava*. The whole is not composed of the parts but constitutes them and is not discrete but organic. The chief point in the theory of *pariṇāma* is its insistence on the principle of self-differentiation as opposed to external origination. Just as the spider weaves its own web and the *nyagrodha* (banyan)

¹ "Evam ekasmin mukte paro na mucyeta iti upapadyate bandha mokṣa vyavasthā." [I. iv. 10.]

² "Katham punaḥ ātmanah kāraṇam sambhavati ityāha pariṇāmāt iti." [I. iv. 25.]

seed evolves into a mighty tree, Brahman, by virtue of His Infinite energy (Sv. Up., VI. 8) differentiates Himself into the manifold without being affected thereby.

Bhāskara next turns his attention to the *Vāiśeṣika* theory of atoms and *adr̥ṣṭas* and absolutely rejects it as it contradicts *Manusmṛiti* and other *śāstras*. Its doctrine of causality makes God only an external designer and practically ousts Him from the cosmic scheme. Reality is either a *viśeṣa* or a *sāmānya* or both. It cannot be the first because no unity can be extracted out of plurality; it cannot be the second as it will lead to the abstract universal. The third is an identity in difference and it avoids the mistakes of both. The world is a universe and not a multiverse and forms the concrete content of the cosmic self. The Buddhist schools are confessedly atheistic and positivistic. They start with hypothetical realism and end with solipsism, negation and nihilism. Reality is according to them a phenomenal and perishing flux without any underlying identity. If the doer dies every moment and the deed alone lives, then there is no moral responsibility or retribution, and even in the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*, the version of Buddhism which comes nearest to Vedāntic reality, there is a mere series without any substantiality. The Jaina theory of a plurality of souls each of which is all-pervading and infinite is a glaring self-contradiction. If the souls

are infinite, how can they admit of quantitative measurement? The *Māheśvara* theories which accept the Lordship of *Īśvara* as the operative cause of the world fail to explain divine immanence and the existence of moral evil. Bhāskara does not reject the *pāñcarātra* system but he condemns its doctrine of successive emanation and the origination of the finite self,* as it contradicts the Vedic idea of the eternity of the self and furnishes no basis for immortality.

We may now take up Bhāskara's interpretation of the different Upaniṣadic topics relating to the causality and the attributes of Brahman which are discussed by the Sūtras. In defining the supreme end of man, the Tait. Up., (Ānand., 5 and 8), adopts the language of aesthetics and predicates unconditioned bliss as the essential nature of Brahman. But the *Puccha Brahmanvādin* or the *Māyāvādin* distinguishes between *Saguṇa Brahman* and *Nirguṇa Brahman* and predicates bliss to the *Saguṇa Brahman* for the following three reasons:—The whole topic explicitly refers to the absolute, which transcends all ideas of determination or predication (*yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasū saha*, Tait. Up., Ānand., 4) and hence the text regarding

* But Bhāskara is not fair to the theory as it is based not on the idea of origination or emanation, but on that of divine immanence in a fourfold form in the finite self to satisfy devotional needs. Likewise his criticism of *Māyāvāda* is not quite fair to its mystic side.

the blissful nature of Brahman must necessarily refer to the lower *Saguṇa Brahman* of whom predications are possible. Secondly, the term *ānandamaya* in Tait. Up., Ānand., 5, cannot refer to Brahman as the suffix *mayaḥ* implies modification (*vikāra*) as in the case of *annamaya*, *prāṇamaya*, etc. Besides, the idea of organs like the head of love (*priya śiras*) which are attributed symbolically to the *ānandamaya* cannot be ascribed to the absolute. Finally, even if the suffix *mayaḥ* be taken to connote not *vikāra* or modification but only *prācurya* or maximized bliss, it would necessarily introduce the negative element of non-bliss or suffering; and, since Brahman is absolute, the term *ānandamaya*, implying maximum bliss and minimum pain, signifies only *Saguṇa Brahman*.

Bhāskara dismisses this theory of two Brahman as the Indeterminate and the Determinate as a mere speculation full of fallacies and fancies and treats it as a typical case of *śrutahūni* and *aśruta kalpanā*. The whole topic really relates to the absolute as the Determinate. It begins with the statement in Ānand. 1, *Brahmavid āpnoti param* (he who knows Brahman attains the highest) and ends with the text in Ānand. 8 that the Vidvān attains the blissful Brahman. The beginning and the end (*upakrama* and *upasamhāra*) thus discuss the same ultimate reality which is characterised as the blissful Brahman, and make no reference to two Brahman.

The suffix *maya* does not indicate that *ānanda* is an appearance of the absolute to be transcended ultimately, but only the abounding or highest bliss without the possibility of any imperfection. Brahman is infinitely blissful and the pleasures of sensibility are but partial expressions of the absolute bliss and are not sublated by it. The *Śruti* adopts a calculus of pleasures in a progressive scale of values and ends with the highest bliss of Brahman. Just as moonlight fades into nothing before sun-light, the pleasures of life pale into insignificance when compared to the rapture of divine bliss. A quality is a quality of some substance and bliss is the determining attribute of Brahman. If not, the only other alternative would be the acceptance of the *Vaiśeṣika* view that *ānanda* is only a negation of suffering without any positive content which is opposed to the Vedāntic idea of Brahman being absolute bliss and *nirguṇa* would be a bare concept without any content. Predication is not a perversion of reality but is its affirmation and the definition of Brahman as bliss means that Brahman has bliss. The idea of indefinability in the text of Tait. Up., II. 4, (*yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha*), does not deny the possibility of the knowledge of Brahman, but denies only its accessibility to the mind tainted by desire. The logical highest is thus the same as the intuitional highest. When the *buddhi* is purified, it can realise the absolute and attain immortal bliss as revealed in the texts *dṛśyate*

tvagryayā buddhyā, Kath. Up., I. iii. 12 and *gñāna prasādena viśuddha sattvaḥ*, Mund. Up. III. i. 8. The absurdity of treating Īśvara as a glorified *samsārin* with maximum of pleasure and minimum of pain has already been pointed out. The text in Tait. Up., Ānand., II. 1, "He enjoys all the qualities with Brahman," really refers to the attainment of Brahman with the determining qualities, and not to the pluralistic experience of qualities alone. In pure consciousness there is identity of content between the subject and the predicate and this identity in difference gives a monistic meaning to the pluralistic perfections.

The Chāndogya texts I. vi. 6 and I. vii. 5 that speak of the "Golden Person in the sun" and "the Person in the eye" do not refer to the finite self but to *Paramēśvara* who, absolutely free from all imperfections, assumes forms suited to the nature of the meditating devotee in the interests of his redemption and release. This form is no fictitious creation of *māyā* but a real manifestation of the Lord and His redemptive impulse and the idea does not admit of any anthropomorphism. As *ākāśa*, He is not the elemental ether but is the *Paramākāśa*, who shines as the immanent being of the whole universe, without being tainted by its imperfections. As *jyōtis*, He is not the physical light but is the supreme light (*jyotiṣām jyotis*) that illumines all lights and shines eternally in the stars above and the souls within,

and at the same time transcends the light of suns and selves. Brahman is the eternal *prāṇa* or the Life of our life that sustains the whole universe like the axle supporting the spokes of a wheel. Vāmadēva, the Vedic seer, attained this cosmic consciousness when he said : "I am the Sun, I am Manu, etc.," Bṛ. Up., I. iv. 10, and became one with the Brahman and attained *Ēkībhāva*. The Upaniṣadic meditation on Brahman as the All-self in Ch. III. xiv. 1 : "All this is Brahman. It lives, moves and has its being in Him" is not to be identified with the pantheistic theory which ascribes the imperfections of the world to God, as He eternally loves the good and wills the true, *satyakāma*, *satyasaṅkalpa*, and is the cosmic ground which only a purified mind can apprehend. While it is true that Brahman becomes life and consciousness (*prāṇa* and *manas*), the converse that these are Brahman does not follow. This theory is free from the charges of vitalism and pan-psychism. The seeker after God is quite different from God Himself. The subject-object relation is well brought out by the Gīta which defines the immanence of Brahman in all beings. The monistic texts like 'thou art that' refer to the absolute as the unconditioned. The dualistic passages refer to the same Brahman when He is conditioned by the *upādhis*. The theory of *bhedā-bheda* alone is acceptable to the *Sūtrakāra* and sanctified by *sampradāya* or tradition. The *jīva* is the *ams'a* or element of the absolute which subjects itself

to metaphysical and moral imperfections and gets implicated in endless *samsāra* and suffering and when it is free becomes one with Brahman. The all-pervading (*sarvagata*) absolute incarnates into the hearts of beings (as *sthāna* for meditation) like the pervading *ākāśa* permeating the eye of a needle, with a view to rescue the finite from its finiteness, and even as the *ākāśa* is not affected and destroyed by fire, so in the in-dwelling of the infinite in the finite, there is not the slightest trace of evil, error, or imperfection. The idea of *mukti* as fruition is not the figment of false knowledge but is a real attainment. The Kath. Up., I. iii. 1 that refers to the two beings entering into the cave asserts the distinction between the supreme self and its other. Though the *jīva* is really one with the infinite (*sajātīya*, *samānasvabhāva*), it is, in the conditioned state, caught up in the trammels of *karma*. The one is really eternal and immutable; but the other has its exits and entrances. The finite seeks the infinite and is separate from it. The Br. Up. text in III. vii. 22, that defines Brahman as the inner ruler, immortal, that is immanent in all thinkers and things, refers to the Lord as ruler and redeemer (*niyantā* and *amṛta*). The idea of the *antaryāmin* most adequately brings out the truth of the *bhedābheda* relation. Both the *Kāṇva* and *Mādhyaṇdina* readings emphasise the *bhēda* aspect between the *jīva* and Brahman.¹

¹ "Na hyasyās's'ruteḥ vacanam subhagā vacanamiva anādarāṇyam." [I. ii. 20]

These texts do not set forth the distinction between the metaphysical absolute and the Brahman spatialized for meditational needs. The perfect enters into the imperfect and then makes it perfect. Brahman is the only subject of knowledge, and, when the text refers to two subjects, it does not speak of their logical contradiction to be transcended in the self-identity of the absolute, but brings out the *bhedābheda* relation between the two. The text in Mund. Up., I. i. 6 that defines Brahman negatively does not deny determination, it only affirms the transcendental perfections of *Saguṇa Brahman*. As stated in the succeeding text II. i. 2, Brahman is the real reality that is different both from *akṣara* or *pradhāna* and from the *jīva*. The meditation on the *Vaiśvānara* self in Ch. Up., V. xi. 6 refers, as Jaimini says, to the Supreme Self as He alone pervades the organism of the universe. The term *setu* or bund of immortality in Mund. Up., II. ii. 5 does not connote mere consciousness without content but points to *paramātmā* as the goal of immortal life. The Sūtra I. iii. 5, *bhedavyapadēśāt*, finally establishes the distinction between *Īśvara* and *jīva* as the subject and the object of experience. The *Bhūma Vidyā* insists on the meditation of Brahman as the blissful self, that is the life of our life, in which alone the *jīva* finds temporary rest in sleep and eternal stability in *mukti*. In both, the *jīva* is viewed as being soaked through and through by the

infinite and yet different from it. The term *akṣara* employed by Yāgyavalkya in Br. Up., III. viii. 8 has no reference to the Sāṅkhyan *pradhāna* but connotes the cosmic ruler under whose command (*prāśāsana*) nature performs its duty in a uniform way. Brahman is the supreme self *parāt para* of Praśna Up., V. 5, superior to the *jīva* *ghaṇa*, the relative self, with physical and metaphysical imperfections of *avidyā* and *karma* (*ghaṇaḥ mūrtiḥ avidyākarmabhyām mūrtibhāvam āpannaḥ jīvaḥ*) and the goal of *Brahmaloka* mentioned there is appositional with Brahman, and, in no way, indicates the world of Hiranyagarbha. The Sūtra I. iii. 13. does not contemplate any distinction between *Saguṇa Brahman* and *Nirguṇa Brahman* based on the view of self-stultification. The *Dahara Vidyā* text in Ch. Up., VIII. i. 3 defines Brahman as the perfect self which sustains and supports the world of relativity. The reference in VIII. 3, 4 to *samutthāna* or ascent and *upasampatti* or attainment clearly brings out the reality of ascending to and attaining Brahman. The *jīva* is Brahman obscured by *avidyā*, *kāma* and *karma*, and when it is purified, it shines in its eternal light illuminating all lights. The idea of the self as of the size of the thumb (*anguşṭhamātra puruṣa*) in Kath. Up., II. iv. 12-13 refers not to the finite or spatialized self but the infinite, meditated on as the finite. Bhāskara thus closely follows the method of the Sūtra and establishes.

the nature of reality as *Saguṇa Brāhman* by controverting all the rival theories. Brahman is the absolute being (*kūraṇātma*) with boundless qualities and perfections. The same Brahman exists in the conditioned form as the world of nature (*kāryātma*) and the world of souls (*jīvātma*). The idea of the absolute as and in the conditioned is according to Bhāskara, the only view that satisfies the authority of *śāstra* (revelation), *sampradāya* (tradition) and other tests of truth and is entirely opposed to the theory of *Māyāvāda* based on the law of contradiction and self-identity, and the theistic conclusions based on eternal distinctions.

CHAPTER IV

COSMOLOGY

Udayanacārya, the famous logician, refers to the *Brahma Parīṇāma Vāda* of Bhāskara, and this idea strikes the key-note of the cosmological theory of Bhāskara. *Parīṇāma* is the principle of the self-differentiation of Brahman. The Veda is a body of divine truths, which abides potentially in the state of *pralaya* or dissolution, and, when the divine creative impulse asserts itself, it manifests itself again and illumines the minds of the world-makers and becomes the intuitions of seers and saints. Consequently, it is the only source of the knowledge of the cosmic order. Bhāskara seeks the foundation of his ideas in the truths of revelation and posits a twofold *śakti* in Brahman known as *jīva parīṇāma* and *acetana parīṇāmā* or *bhoktṛ śakti* and *bhogyā śakti*. Brahman is the unconditioned one; but, in His infinite wisdom, purity and power, He enters into the finite and emanates into the multiplicity of names and forms. Finite existence is therefore distinguishable into the *jīva*, the subject of experience (*bhoktā*), and the *acetana* or the object of experience (*bhogyā*). Finite selves and material states thus constitute the whole universe of *prapañca*. In discussing this truth and demolishing antagonistic theories, Bhāskara shows his polemic ingenuity and dialectic power. The

Sad Vidyā of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI.2, furnishes to him the classical text of cosmology. Its thesis is the discovery of the one by knowing which everything else is realised, and thus, at the very outset, it brings out the identity of the operative and the immanent cause. Reality is the self-existent *Sat* without a second which is absolutely devoid of differentiation in the *pralaya* state. The multitudinous variety of names and forms that make up the universe is absorbed in the absolute like salt dissolved in water. The effect disappears in the cause but is not thereby destroyed or contradicted, and, when the world form vanishes, its potentiality remains as a part of the divine content; creation is nothing but the renewal of cosmic life and activity. Brahman wills to be the manifold and becomes the manifold by His own infinite power of *pariṇāma*. Creation follows *pralaya* like day following night. The world is a living process sustained by periodic pause and repose alternating with activity, and this process is an infinite series and its drift is to relieve the *jīvas* from their self-imposed limitations. This may be a puzzle but is no pretension. The expression *sadeva* etc., in Ch., VI ii, 1 connotes causality and not inner contradiction. Differentiation is in no way a denial of the absolute. The cause is pre-existent, and therefrom we cannot say the effect is non-existent. The effect is contained in the cause and is continuous with it. The difference is only in the aspect (*avasthābheda*) and there is no

illusion or *avidyā* at the heart of reality corrupting the very foundation of cosmic experience. To the *Māyāvādīn*, causality implies infinite regress and is therefore a contradiction. The idea of God as *causa sui* or the first cause is unthinkable, and causality does not bring out the unity of reality and its self-identity. William James thinks that causality is an altar to an unknown God, but the *Śruti* which has specialised in God affirms that it is the only category that adequately brings out the immanent unity and activity of God, and thus reconciles the claims of intellectualism and voluntarism.

The potential evolves into the actual. The implicit develops into the explicit. The absolute itself assumes the form of the relative. The infinite is the prius and the pre-supposition of the finite and is revealed in and through the finite. Like the spider weaving its web, the absolute by its immanent energising power transforms itself into the relative and becomes its explanation. The cosmic order is the self-alienation or eternal determination of the absolute. The Upaniṣads and the Sūtras based on them assert this truth in unequivocal terms and Bhāskara claims that the traditional interpretation of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad given by the *Vākyakāra* and the *Vṛttikāra* is absolutely in his favour. ¹

¹ "Ayameva Chāndogyaavākya-kāra-vṛttikārābhyām samāśritah." [I. iv. 25.]

The Sūtras develop the same truth and Bhāskara regards the Sūtras I. iv. 25 and 26, II. i. 14 and II. i. 27 as the very fulcrum of his cosmic philosophy. The first asserts the immanent causality of the infinite (*ātmakṛteḥ pariṇāmāt*); I. iv. 26 defines Brahman as the very seed of the universe, and II. i. 27 explains the nature of *pariṇāma śakti* and the ways of its self-revelation. But II. i. 14 sums up the doctrine of divine causality and establishes the truths of immanence, unity and continuity. The cause is eminent, eternal and necessary, while the effect is evanescent and contingent and the cause alone explains the effect. Brahman transforms Himself into the cosmic manifold and both the living and the non-living are real modifications (*vikāra*) of the absolute.

The question "How the formless infinite (*niravaya va*) can become the finite and composite (*sāvayava*)?" may now be answered. The Veda which is divine thought or the word of God and thus the only guide in spiritual matters answers this problem thus. God is the all-self and absolutely free and by His *vikṣepa śakti* or infinite power of transformation emanates into the universe and ultimately absorbs it. It is the nature of the infinite to become the finite and infinitize it. A particular *śṛṣṭi* or creation becomes an episode in the endless cycle of empirical life. From the creative urge there emanates the primeval deep containing the seed of the universe. The seed becomes the golden egg or creational possibility, and Brahman

the totality of selves, is the first-born of the absolute. The Lord, out of His own fecundating thought and free will, conditions Himself into the five *Tanmātras* or ultimate elements of matter, incarnates into Brahmā or Logos, and, through him, externalises Himself into the heterogeneous forms of living and non-living beings, according to the moral and spiritual needs of *jīvas*. By a process of tripartition or quintuplication, these elements are made to cohere without losing their nature, and constitute the world of nature. By His mere volition, Brahman gradually evolves into the manifold of material things, the thirty-three Gods and the infinite variety of plants, animals, human beings, and other existences. The universe is the soul-making process and nature forms the soul's environment and instrument. The archetypes or the *jāti* or the *samsthāna* of the *Devas*, *Rṣis* and others are eternal, while the individuals are particular perishing things. The forms are the same though individuals may vary. *Indras* may come and go but *Indratva* remains for ever and each *Deva* has his own form and function in the cosmic scheme. The universe is a cosmos and not a chaos, as it is ordered by divine intelligence and will; and owing to the reign of divine law, there is uniformity in nature and every new creation is but a repetition of an earlier one and illustrates the same law. Novelty and sameness refer to continuity within differences.

The self-differentiation of the absolute is not tainted by the evils and imperfections of the finite. Brahman transforms Himself into the finite and yet transcends it His will being eternally self-realised (*avāpta samastakāma*), He has nothing to gain hedonistically by the creative process. Creative evolution is essentially the outcome of the sportive spontaneity (*svabhāva*) of God and is sustained by His redemptive love. The apparent injustice in the operation of the moral law is entirely due to the freedom of the finite self. Spiritual freedom functions through moral necessity and there is no disparity between the divine law of love and the moral idea of righteousness. Even as the same rain-drops cause the seeds to sprout in their own different ways, the omnipotent love of God operates on all alike though, in effect, it is determined by the moral differences of the *jīvas*. Virtue is fecundative ; it grows from less to more and gives eternal happiness. Vice also multiplies itself and is self-destructive and the vicious man is hurled into hell. But this law of retribution is governed by the principle of divine love, and cosmic history has thus a spiritual import.

In establishing all these truths, Bhāskara examines and repudiates the false theories of the philosophies of nature. To the *Māyāvādin*, the whole cosmic process is but an inner discrepancy and an illusion which exists but is not real. To him, the *eva* in the Ch. text *Sadeva* connotes the reality of the cause and the

unreality of the effect, Brahman in the transcendental sense is the one without a second and the world is the effect of cosmic illusion which is unreal and unaccountable. But, at the empirical level, there is no illusion or contradiction. Though *avidyā* is unreal like dreams, it makes the absolute an appearance. Bhāskara dismisses this explanation as a mere speculation of the *Māyāvādīn* without any rational or revelational basis. His arguments against the *Māyāvādīn* may be summed up as follows:—The unreality of the effect might affect the integrity of the cause itself, and scripture, as the effect of *avidyā* and relational thought, loses all its value and validity. Illusion is no contradiction at all, but is a real experience due to the constraining power of reality, though its validity is vitiated by physical and psychical disorders. Knowledge is both subjective and objective, and mere subjectivity does not sublate reality. If the absolute is real and its appearance false, then falsity itself has a focus and factual reality. The fact of life is a phantom and phantom is a fact : reason is thus entangled in a vicious circle and this given unthinkable cannot stultify itself.

Bhāskara is equally strong in his condemnation of the Sāṅkhya system. The Sāṅkhya theory of *pradhāna* or primordial matter being the cosmic cause may be formulated as follows : (1) *Pradhāna* or *prakṛti* is constituted by the three *guṇas*, and the *Puruṣa* reflected in *Prakṛti* is the *jīva*, subject to

pleasure and pain ; (2) the processes of *pariṇāma* can be enumerated and classified ;—there are twenty-three evolutes from the *pradhāna* starting with *mahat* and ending with gross matter ; (3) *pariṇāma* is an activity ; (4) it gives rise to the operation of causality ; and (5) it is a process of manifestation. Bhāskara's criticism of this theory may be briefly stated seriatim. Evolution implies a conscious end and *pradhāna*, as a mere mechanical process, is devoid of purpose. Besides, pleasure and pain are psychical experiences and matter has no such feeling-tone. The last three conditions may be ascribed to Brahman as well as to *prakṛti* and do not therefore form its differentia. The power of self-differentiation (*svataḥ prakṛti*) can never belong to the non-self. The uniformity of natural law is determined by divine purpose and is not blind necessity. It is by the will of God that the sun shines and the soul functions. Besides, if *prakṛti* be eternally active, then creation would be an endless process without any pause. Natural effects are not explained wholly by mechanical causes. Mere eating of grass by the cow does not account for the secretion of milk, as, in that case, the bull also should secrete milk. If evolution is for the experience of pleasure and pain, there is no meaning in the *Puruṣa* desiring *mukti*. If *Puruṣa* is, by nature, eternal and free, there is no meaning in his seeking and attaining freedom. The Sāṅkhya doctrine that rationality, activity and bliss are the products of *prakṛti* arising from its proxi-

mity to the *Puruṣa* is not tenable. For, if the theory of proximity were true, then there would be eternal creation or dissolution, or both. If the *guṇas* are harmonised in the *pralaya* state, how are we to account for all the later tensions which give rise to creation? The Sāṅkhya theory has, therefore, to be stated in terms of *Brahmapariṇāma* and evolution is not in the presence of the self but is the process of the Self. Brahman is one and infinitely blissful and the *jīva* as His *aṁśa* is controlled by his own *karma* or freedom and implicated in *samsāra*. Fire which burns other things does not burn itself and the self as a subject always implies an object. The same self cannot be both sovereign and subject. Brahman is the absolutely blissful being and the *jīva* is subject to the hazards and hardships of *samsāra*. Brahman and the *jīva* are different like *tāpaka* and *tapya*, one who causes and one who undergoes experience; and, when *jīvatva* is removed, the *jīva* becomes one with Brahman and obtains absolute bliss.

The Vaiśeṣika theory of atomism and pluralistic realism asserts the absolute dissimilarity between cause and effect. The cosmic order, according to it, is only an atom-complex. The atoms are the ultimates of matter without any secondary qualities. Owing to the operation of divine design, they coalesce and form the world-aggregate. Creation is due to the composition of three causes. The atoms are the *samavāyi kārana* and they inhere in the cosmic stuff. Their

union or coalescence is the *asamavāyi kārana* and the *adr̥ṣṭa* of the *jīva* (the invisible merit or demerit of the finite self) and the will of *Īśvara* form the *nimitta kārana*. The four kinds of atoms, fire, air, earth and water, furnish the stuff of creation, out of which the Lord fashions the universe by a fiat of His will. *Praḷaya* is the dissolution of parts due to the Divine will. Bhāskara, in criticising this theistic system contends that uncreated matter in the form of atoms is like another God and asks "Does the *adr̥ṣṭa* function in the atom or in the *ātman*, the finite self?" It cannot be in the atom, as the latter is non-sentient (*acetana*) nor can it be in the *ātman*, which, according to the Vaiśeṣika, is essentially unconscious. Besides, the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *samavāya* as an eternal and external relation lands us in infinite regression. Further, what is the nature of the *Paramāṇus*? Are they active or passive, or both? If they were active, there would be endless or eternal creation; if passive, there would be no creation or *śṛṣṭi*; they cannot be both, as contradictories cannot co-exist. It is not *adr̥ṣṭa* but the absolute that conditions all things and explains them. Otherwise, the whole system would suffer from the fatal defects of occasionalism and pre-established harmony. The creationistic view should be rejected in favour of the *Brahmapariṇāmavāda*.

The Buddhistic system of *saṃghāta* and momentariness has already been shown to be absolutely untenable. The Buddhistic realist speaks of the

skandhas as constituting personality or the phenomenal series and denies the reality of the absolute. He fails to account for the way in which the super-sensuous atoms become concretised. The theory of *avidyā* may explain subjective states but not the reality of external things. How can the fleeting flux become a permanent *sanghāta*? A series can never become a self. The idea of antecedent and consequent has no place in a theory of momentariness. As there is no fixity or substantiality in a fleeting flux, clay may as well cause a piece of cloth as it does a pot and thus anything may be the cause of anything else. The Buddhist view of space (*ākāśa*) as a mere non-existent (*abhūva*) is untenable. Buddhism cannot also account for the persistence of memory and personality. The *Yōgacāra* or *Viṣṇūnavādin* asserts the reality of *viṣṇūna* as a mere mental complex and a single psychical content without any substantiality or objective reference. Knowledge is immediate (*aparokṣa*) and objective (*sākāra*) or mediate (*parokṣa*) and subjective (*nirākāra*). The former is given in sense-perception and the latter refers to subjective feelings like desire and aversion. The *Viṣṇūnavādin* fails to recognize the objectivity of knowledge and explains away externality as a mere illusion. His comparison of the waking life to dreams is open to the fallacy of *petitio principii* as already pointed out. The *Māyāvādin* adopts the same logic and subjects himself to the same fallacies

of subjectivism and nihilism and, says Bhāskara, the condemnation of the Yogācāra in *Sūtra* II. 11. 29 is directed equally against him ¹.

Thus, Bhāskara's account of the origin and nature of the universe in terms of *bhedābheda* seeks to avoid the perils of pancosmism, creationism, pan-illusionism, and subjectivism. While insisting on the immanence of God in the universe, it, at the same time, frees Him from the imperfections of finite life. The universe is the moulding of matter for the evolution of souls and their ultimate absorption in the absolute. While the self thus becomes one with Brahman, the world of nature exists as an eternal necessity of the divine nature but does not exhaust its infinity.

If the cosmogony of *bhedābheda* based upon causality is presented in its modern western form, it will be seen that causality is not an "altar to an unknown God" nor is the creational view the root error of all false metaphysics and dogmatics. Logically, cause refers to necessity and is interpreted philosophically as the ground of all things and finally as the immanent activity of God. Thus, logic is one with metaphysics and religion. Time and space belong to the world of sense and contingency, and being a sensuous series cannot be infinite. But the causal relation involves necessity and relativity and it also suffers

¹ "Māyāvādinopi anenaiva nyāyena sūtrakāreṇaiva nirastāh." [II. ii. 29.]

from the defect of endlessness. Philosophically, cause is the real ground or reason of all things; and since relativity and absoluteness go together the causal relation is rooted in the self relation of reality and is the unfolding of the immanent idea. All process is in, and not of, reality and the self-activity of reason fulfils itself through contingency. Religion reconciles the finite-infinite conflict by regarding the universe as grounded in the divine nature. Infinity is spiritual and not sensuous and creation is not spatial nor an incident in time but is the self-imparting of the infinite to the finite. It is the eternal self-revelation of God. The temporal view refers only to the finite but spiritually, it is the whole that incarnates itself in and as the parts, and realises itself through them. Time and space are the stuff of reality, the divine nature fulfils itself through contingency and the eternal is in and more than endless duration. In this way the opposites like transient action and immanence, mechanism and finalism, are reconciled in a pervading identity and purpose. God is as necessary to the world as the world is necessary to God.

CHAPTER V

BHĀSKARA'S CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF MĀYA

Since the refutation of *Māyāvāda* is the main theme of Bhāskara's destructive philosophy, his criticism may be conveniently summed up in a separate chapter even at the risk of prolixity. He ignores the plausible contention that *Māyāvāda* is a philosophic deduction or descent from the monistic experience of Advaita, akin to his own experience of *ekibhāva*. To him the *upādhi* is not a false but a real adjunct of the absolute and this can be subdued but not sublated. The *Māyāvādin*, who styles himself a specialist in Vedāntic thought as opposed to its theology, employs the logical idea of contradiction in the determination of truth, and confirms his conclusion by the analogy drawn from the universal experience of illusions and sleep. Brahman is, to him, the transcendental *Sat* without a second and the empirical world is an illusion super-imposed on reality and therefore sublated by it. Even *Īśvara* is only an appearance of the absolute who has no doubt maximum validity and value, but He is caught in the contradictions of relativity. The negative judgments employed by the Upaniṣads deny the reality of phenomena and affirm the absolute. The judg-

ments relating to divine causality apply only to apparent reality and not to real reality. Brahman is mere being and thought, all becoming is but an illusory projection conjured up by the *māyā*-made mind, and *mukti* consists in denying the negation and affirming the absolute. § The *Māyāvādin* says that *māyā* is *anirvacanīya*, indefinable; and is a confession of the self-contradictions of life. Self-discrepancy or the impasse of illusoriness is finally dissolved in the immediacy of self-identity. The givenness of *māyā* and *avidyā* is first explained in terms of causality and contradiction, or relational thought and inexplicability respectively and then dissolved in mystic *gñāna*. When the non-self is stultified, the self shines of itself. Bhāskara devotes all his dialectic skill in demolishing these speculations which, according to him, are absolutely unwarranted by *Śruti* and reasoning and are opposed to all metaphysical, and religious truths and values.

The doctrine of causality contained in the *Sad Vidyā* is discussed in all its details in the *sūtras* in the *Arambhaṇādhikaraṇa*, II. i. 14, *et seq.* Causality, according to Śaṅkara, is ultimately based on contradiction and illusion. Brahman is the absolute, devoid of all determination, and the empirical world is enveloped in cosmic illusion, which claims to be true, but is not really true. The manifold is only the making of *māyā*. But this does not involve the absolute denial of the reality of sense-experience, or moral and

spiritual aspirations. | At the empirical level there is no contradiction or negation, and causality is a real process of effectuation involving immanence and continuity and is phenomenally true. Negativity at this stage implies the relativity of knowledge; at a higher stage it becomes a middle of life (a *vivarta* and not *vikara*). But, when the identity of the absolute dawns in one's consciousness, all this finiteness becomes a fiction and vanishes for ever. | The term *sadeva* emphatically declares the reality of the cause and the unreality of the effect. Clay, for example, is one homogeneous stuff, but its varied names and forms are modifications which have only a relative and verbal value. *Māyā* is a falsity, but yet it may appear to be a fact satisfying certain practical needs. The unreal world may appear to be real and have a pragmatic value for empirical needs, like the prophetic character of certain dreams, the conventions of the alphabet, the fancies of infatuated love and a false statement producing fatal consequences. But this claim to truth is only an appearance and the world becomes absolutely false like the flower in the sky and the horn of a hare when it refers to the self-evidencing absolute. Then reality merely *is* and no *ism* or logical account of it is possible or adequate.

Bhāskara rejects this doctrine of *māyā* as a baseless fabrication. In seeking to establish the stability of the absolute by this theory of causality, the *Māyāvādin*, he says, cuts at the very root of knowledge. If

in the judgment, "The pot is made of clay," the effect is a negation of the cause and not its revelation, then the unreality of the effect as effect should affect the cause as well, and *māyā*, as a cosmic illusion, would taint the very foundations of the absolute. *Avidyā* gnaws at the very root of reality and would infect the whole range of experience, spiritual as well secular. Since causality is a condition of *māyā*, the attempt to destroy it is itself an illusion and is futile and idle. All cognition is a determination and a denial, and *Brahmagñāna* being an experience, is caught in the meshes of the all-enveloping power of *māyā*. *Māyā* stifles every effort to overcome it and it does not contain the possibility of its own destruction. If the causal relation involves mediacy and necessity, and if the absolute is immediate and self-identical, then there is no logical transition from the mediate to the immediate, and the dual experience of the empirical and the transcendental lands us in dualism. Thus, in the causal category, there is no passage from the illusoriness of the effect to the self-identity of the cause, from the logical to the alogical; Brahman is self-established and *māyā* is self-stultified. If the category of causality does not fully bring out the nature of the absolute, the absolute is identical with itself and there need be no philosophy of identity to establish it by reasoning. A *sūdhānta* is arrived at by means of reasoning applied to revelation and the whole body of the *Sūtras*, starting with causality and cosmology and ending with the value and destiny of

the self, is a system of thought based on inter-related judgments and is therefore really an identical whole in which differences are strung together. If this view be not accepted, then there would be no method of thought at all, and *Māyāvāda* itself as a monistic logic would become a fiction and not a theory. The contention that it is the end of philosophy to eliminate all false theories is then refuted by the argument that elimination cannot be the test of truth. Double negation based on bare negation is meaningless and the admission of degrees of falsity leads to agnosticism. The 'that' can have no 'what' at all.

Besides, it is false to say that real knowledge can arise out of false judgment. *Avidyā* is not subjective but objective and positive. The objects that are presented in dreams may be real or unreal; but dreams themselves are a positive experience. The *viśaya* or the object presented in a dream may be unreal, but the *viśaya-gñāna* or the knowledge of the object is real. | Likewise, all illusions are real cognitions. Abnormal experience is not a contradiction of the normal but constitutes a real factor in the whole world of our experience. Besides existence cannot be abstracted from the things that exist or from the real immanent in them. Finite thought is conditioned and not contradictory. Reality is objective in the waking state and subjective in dreams. The one state does not sublate the other. The

contrasted states imply each other and form an identity of opposites. Illusions, hallucinations and other abnormal experiences are caused by real, physical and mental disorders. Illusion is a fact of experience and the distinction between reality and illusion is based not on contradiction but on causality. The cause is contained in the effect without in any way sublatiug it. The manifold that is given in experience is a revelation of reality and not the veil of illusion. The absolute actualises itself and becomes the world. Writing is a real motor experience and the word is the symbol of thought, and language, as a system of meanings is a real medium of thought including monistic truth. Doubt leads to supposition claiming truth and is an undoubted experience of our logical life. The fancies and follies of infatuated love are an integral part of our aesthetic experience and therefore cannot be dismissed as mere illusions. *Māyā*, as the principle of illusory individuation and multiplicity, is said to conceal the one (*āvarana śakti*) and project the many (*vikṣepa śakti*). The former as a theory of knowledge lands us in subjectivism and the latter as a cosmological theory cannot explain away the world-order as *mukti* is only the elimination of the individual (*svarūpa-nāśana*) and not the annihilation of the world (*prapañcānāśana*).

The whole conception of *māyā* has its foundation in the theory of *avidyā*, with its account of relative reality and the duality that arises from

the subject-object relation, and Bhāskara's brilliant polemic against this subjectivistic theory anticipates Rāmānuja's classical refutation of *Māyāvāda* known as the *saptaviṅśa anupapatti*. The *Māyāvādin* does not define the locus or *āśraya* of *avidyā*. If *avidyā* is an innate defect or obscuration of knowledge, is that element of obscuration inherent in the *jīva* or in Brahman? It cannot belong to Brahman as Brahman is absolutely self-luminous, pure (*viśuddha*), perfect and blissful. Thus the absolute cannot be the locus of *avidyā*; nor can *avidyā* reside in the *jīva* as the *jīva* itself is the projection of *avidyā* or a reflection of Brahman and is an illusion which has no reality at all. If the *jīva* has its origin in *avidyā* and *avidyā* has its origin in the *jīva*, the whole reasoning is circular and specious. If *avidyā* has its basis in consciousness, then the sublation of *avidyā* would destroy the substratum itself. The roots of *avidyā* are nowhere. *avidyā* is not a name for finitude. It is a mere fiction like the horn of a hare. But the *Māyāvādin* posits its finiteness and relative reality, and when he is forced to account for its origin and locus, he resorts to the analogy of sleep and asks us to give up our logical views of relativity and rise to the philosophic intuition of the self-identical or static absolute. If *avidyā* is a defect of relational thought, is it inherent in and co-eternal with Brahman or is it non-existent like the round square or the son of a barren woman? If it is the inherent *śakti* that is somehow in the self, it

is eternal and absolute, and it cannot be destroyed by the intuition of identity, and the possibility of full cosmic liberation is then entirely ruled out (*anir-mokṣaprasaṅga*). But, if it is bare negation, without any positive basis, then it has no existential import, and phenomenal reality is not accounted for. If it connotes the fleeting flux of finite life, then it should have had some origin and therefore an element of reality. If *avidyā* is a self-projection of Brahman, then, with the dissolution of *avidyā*, Brahman itself would be stultified and destroyed. *Avidyā* is thus neither being (*vastutā*) nor non-being (*avastutā*), nor is it both.

The object of the *Māyāvādin* is the repudiation of plurality and the establishment of the integrity of the absolute. Now, if *avidyā* is the lapse of the self into the non-self, then Bhāskara asks: "Is *avidyā* a monistic experience (*abheda darśana*) or is it an experience of plurality (*bheda darśana*)? It cannot be the former as it is a real defect of thought and therefore different from the non-dual experience. Nor can it be the latter, as that would be an admission of pluralism. This difficulty has given rise to two conflicting schools known as the *Ekajīva Vāda* or the theory of a single self, and *Nānājīva Vāda* or the theory of a plurality of selves. If *avidyā* is the single all-pervading illusion of the self, then, we are landed in solipsism and the ego-centric fallacy. But, if it is a principle of individuation, subjective and objective, then *mukti* also becomes a case of partial release

from finiteness. To say that the self is only the subject caught in objectivity and *adhyāsa*, and that *mukti* is freedom from finiteness is to deny the reality of the That by whose grace the thou becomes free. The theories of partial reality and unreality can never explain reality at all, because there can be no degrees of the nought or *tuccha*.

Avidyā is said by the *Māyāvādin* to be sublated and dissolved by knowledge. It is, according to him, a logical defect residing in *buddhi* and obscuring reality, and *gñāna* is defined as the immediate and non-relational knowledge of the absolute. This is the same as saying that the absolute is ever self-realised. If so, it evades the point at issue. The whole question is: "How does the integral, indeterminate absolute project the phenomenal and create its false values?" If *gñāna* or knowledge is a case of consciousness returning to itself (*ātmarūpa*) then how does *avidyā* arise from *vidyā* as these are absolutely opposed like light (*dīpa*) and darkness (*tumira*)? Is *avidyā* prior to *gñāna* or is it co-existent with it and contradicted by it? It cannot be prior to *gñāna*, as consciousness is pre-supposed even in its denial. The two cannot co-exist as they are contradictory, and pure consciousness cannot be co-present with illusoriness. If it is bare negation, there is no meaning in denying a denial. Besides, *gñāna* itself is relational and illusory and therefore cannot transcend itself. If reality admits of degrees

of truth and error, and if a thought which is a lapse of reality is to be sublated by another, then we have to transcend that also and thus we are landed in infinite regression. If there are degrees of truth, then there is no truth at all. *Avidyā* is neither false predication nor predication of falsity as the real has no predicate.

Whether *avidyā* is a fragment of *māyā* or cosmic fiction or the whole of it, its obscuring power is all-pervading and leads to an endless process of *samsāra*. The consciousness of finiteness and plurality (*bhēdagñāna*) is so powerful that it leaves no scope for its sublation (*advaita*) or hope of salvation (*mokṣa*). Release is progressively attained when the cause of finiteness is removed and it is a contradiction to speak of *jīvan-mukti*. *Mukti* is not merely the apprehension of reality, but its attainment as well. As long as there is embodiment and empirical thought individually and collectively, there is no chance of transcending it. To the *Māyāvādin* the absolute is a self-identity and there can be no partial *mukti* or degrees of *mukti*.

When the cause that conceals truth destroys itself then there should be a complete cessation of reality and relational thought. When a man who mistook a rope for a snake perceives the rope, his conduct is completely changed. But, in the case of the *jīvan-mukta*, there is no such cessation. He continues to function as a particular mind attached to a

particular body, though such activity is opposed to his identity with the absolute. In sublation, there is immediate and entire knowledge; and to predicate residual activity (*śeṣa*) and relativity to the absolute (*nirviśeṣa*) is like predicating degrees of truth and reality to the horns of a hare.

Defeated at every point, the *Māyāvādin* ultimately takes refuge in the theory of indefinability or *anirvacanīyatva* and tries to escape between the horns of the dilemma. But he creates a yawning gulf between the absolute of intuition and the relativity of thought and then confesses his inability to connect the two. The law of contradiction pervades all knowledge and perverts its very foundations, and *Māyāvāda* relies more on the twist and abnormality of experience than on its trueness and normal integrity. The discrepancy between the infinite and the finite, being and becoming, Brahman and the world, knowledge and activity, freedom and causality, the eternal and the ephemeral, lands us in dualism, and the ideas of causality and transcendence are mere make-shifts, which cannot really bridge the chasm. } A philosophy that mercilessly dissects and destroys other theories cannot consistently take refuge in and justify indefinability or *anirvacanīyatva*. } The "somehow" of the absolute instead of satisfying the quest of thought completely defeats its purpose and stifles it. Every *vacana* or word connotes some meaning and if *avidyā* is *anirvacanīya*, having no

meaning, then it explains nothing. Besides, a theory of truth that seeks non-contradiction is confessedly inconsistent when it predicates reality, unreality and indefinability to the same experience of *avidyā*. The doctrine of *Māyāvāda* is said to be deduced from *Śāstra* or revelation. But revelation itself belongs to the world of relativity and appearance. Consequently, *Śāstra* itself would become a case of self-contradiction and Buddhistic nihilism would be the inevitable result of the theory of *māyā* and *māyā*-ridden *Śāstra*. The theory of *māyā*, as a process of the illusory projection of the infinite, over-powers all things and thinkers and the seeking of release from *māyā* becomes itself a semblance. Therefore Bhāskara concludes that relational knowledge is a real experience and not an inner contradiction. Divine causality denies external determination only and not self-limitation (*svābhāvika sṛṣṭi*). When we say that the *nyagrodha* seed sprouts and grows into a tree, we refer to a real vital process of evolution and not to any illusory projection. Likewise, the indeterminate *sat* or the absolute divides itself into the heterogeneity of names and forms (*viśatīya pariṇāmā*) by its own *vikṣepa śakti* (power of projection). *Bheda* or difference does not sublimate undivided unity but subsists in and explains *abheda* as the principle of self-effectuation (*svabhāvasiddha*).

The *Māyāvādin* dichotomises reality into the absolute and the empirical and relegates the science of *Karma Kāṇḍa* to the realm of the phenomenal and

the fictitious. Every theory has a definite end in view, and, if *Karma Kāṇḍa* satisfies the empirical needs of *karma*, then *Gñāna Kāṇḍa* satisfies the spiritual needs of realizing Brahman, and the latter does not sublate or stultify the former but is co-ordinated to it. Reality is a *bhedābheda* in which the one emanates into the many and explains it. The unity of *Gñāna Kāṇḍa* is synthesised with the pluralistic experience of *Karma Kāṇḍa* and then freedom is a fact as well as fruition.

The negative judgment 'neti neti' in Br. Up., II. iii. 6 denies the finitude of reality and not the finite. Immanence is not bare identity devoid of difference. It removes the false identity of the self with embodied existence due to the empirical limitations of sensibility; but in no sense does it predicate *nityatva* to *prapañca* per se. When we say Brahman is neither *acit* nor *jīva*, we really affirm its transcendental, as distinct from its transient, nature. The absolute is in the conditioned but is not the conditioned. The infinite limits itself into the finite but is not affected by the limitations of time and space. Negation affirms the unconditioned as the basis of the conditioned and not as its contradiction. The Upaniṣadic idea "there is no plurality of existence" *neha nānāstī kiñcana* in Kath. Up., II. iv. 11 affirms the unity of Brahman in the causal state (*kāraṇa svarūpa*) and does not refer to cosmic illusoriness. In the statement "one who sees duality as it were" *ya iha nāneva*

paśyati, the particle *iva* (as it were) does not connote appearance or illusoriness but really refers to the manifold of thinkers and things as the effectuations of the infinite, like sparks issuing from a blazing fire as described in Mund. Up., II. i. 1. When the intuition of the unconditioned *ātman* arises, all these differences vanish for ever. *Bhedābheda* thus accounts for the transition from the infinite to the finite without creating any gap or gulf between the two and is therefore *nirvacanīya* and not *anirvacanīya* like *māyā*. It substitutes for the 'somehow' and sublation of *māyā* the ideas of substantiality, immanence, and self-transcendence. In *Māyāvāda* ontology, Brahman is defined as bare being devoid of all determination; therefore it is not distinguishable from non-being. To posit the absolute as the explanation of experience and then to deprive it of all content, is the negation of thought itself. The world is an organic whole with a uniform behaviour in which there is infinite differentiation of structure and function. If reality were bare being having homogeneity alone, then there would be a cessation of all these specific functions, and there is no reason why the eye should not hear and the ear should not see. A cow would be identical with a piece of cloth, and *manas* would be the same as the other senses. Difference is not only a fact, but also an act of reality and it alone gives a meaning to identity. The *Sanmātravādin* reduces the living process of reality to a mere logical abstraction, and his philosophy lapses

into nihilism and universal void (*sarva śūnyatva*) with an eternal 'night of the absolute.'

The process of meditation, which the *Māyāvādin* prescribes for getting the intuition of the indeterminate lacks reality and is futile. The sections in the *Sūtras* dealing with *ubhayaliṅga* do not distinguish between *Nirguṇa Brahman* and *Saguṇa Brahman* but they only insist on the meditation on Brahman as a formless being (*mrākāra*) as distinguished from the same Brahman in its cosmic aspect (*Prapañcā-kāra*). Negation is not a denial of differentiation but only brings out the character of Brahman as the absolutely pure being (*śuddhātmasvarūpa*) beyond the dual limitations of the living and the non-living (*upādhi-dvaya*); it denies the finitude of reality but not the finite. *Śruti* would stultify itself if it first predicated the form of the sensible and the super-sensible to reality and then denied it. The first 'neti' in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, II. iii. 6 denies to the *nirūkāra* Brahman the finiteness of Brahman in the forms of nature constituted by the five elements (*bhūtapañcaka*), the subtle (*amūrta*) as well as the evolved (*mūrta*). The second 'neti' denies to it the finiteness of Brahman in its aspect of *jīva*. Brahman is therefore appropriately meditated on as the true of the true or the real reality (*satyasya satya*) that transcends the empirical subject-object consciousness.

The *Śruti* nowhere distinguishes between the indeterminate and the determinate, or the absolute of

metaphysics and the God of meditation. The term *neti* refers to the formless nature of God and not to his characterlessness. The Tait. text in II. i distinguishes between Brahman and its qualities, the *dharmin* and the *dharma*, and defines Brahman as the true, the intelligent and the infinite that is beyond the finite categories of space and time. The determining quality can never be said to negate or stultify itself. Brahman as the absolute transcends the world of relativity, but does not sublate it. When the *vyavahāra* state vanishes, the real also ceases to be. Though it is *avyakta* or unknowable to the empirical mind imprisoned in embodiment, it can be realised by purified knowledge. In his commentary on Sūtra II. i. 14, Bhāskara says that the term *māyā* in some instances points to *prakṛti* and the *guṇas* as the primordial stuff which modifies itself in all the manifold ways of the world. Likewise the term *māyā* may signify the relativity of thought by which the immeasurable is measured, or, it may stand for the Veda which affords knowledge of *svarga* and *apavarga*. The Svetāśvatara text IV. 10 employs the term *māyā* with a view to establishing the real distinction between the finite and the infinite. There is no warrant anywhere for the view of *māyā* as an illusion of the absolute, particularly in view of the Sūtra III. ii. 3 specifically contrasting the world par excellence in which we all live with the dream experience which alone is described as *māyāmātra*.

The idea of *Īśvara* as the first-born of the cosmic figment has already been refuted and rejected; *avidyā* cannot be ascribed to the finite as the finite is a fiction; nor can it be predicated of *Īśvara* as He is eternally pure and self-luminous (*nityavigñāna-prakāśa*). To attribute *samsāritva* or empirical experience to *Īśvara* is a case of *śrutahūni* and *aśrutakalpanā*. *Samsāritva* is the susceptibility to the feelings of pleasure and pain; but *īśvaratva* implies absolute freedom from them. Knowledge and ignorance, *vidyā* and *avidyā*, freedom and bondage, *svātantrya* and *bandha* are incompatible qualities which can never co-exist in the same Being. The Upaniṣads are never tired of glorifying the qualities of Brahman such as purity, peace, perfection and immutability (*niṣkala*, *śānta*, *niravadya*, *nirañjana*) and the lord of *māyā* cannot encase himself in sensibility and *samsāra* and become their victim. If *Īśvara* is the product of illusion, then there is no need for spiritual outlook and its eternal values.

BHASKARA'S IDEA OF GOD.

Bhāskara's idea of God is thus a reconciliation of the conflicting claims of the various monistic schools. He does not favour the theory of external relations in which a personal God enters into personal relations with the finite selves with a view to redeeming them from their career of sin and admitting them into His own perfect kingdom. But, in his absolute antagonism to the *Advaitic* idea of a *Nirguna*

Brahman or the Indeterminate, his theory has affinities with the ethical monism of Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja asserts the reality of a supreme God with a form of his own with infinite auspicious qualities fulfilling himself in the manifold of finite selves and things. As the self of all beings, he is their ultimate source, the inner ruler and the supreme means as well as end, and his self-directive will becomes a redemptive love in which the *jīva* is finally soaked and saved. Personalism comes midway between theism and absolutism, and resembles the philosophy of Rāmānuja, though it does not bring out the inseparable relation between the supreme self and the finite self. But Bhāskara's monism is more pronounced than personalism and ethical monism and the *Suddha-advaita* of Vallabha. Bhāskara has no faith in *Īśvara* with an *aprākṛta* form of his own, and in a religion of self-surrender and service to his supreme will. To him, Brahman is a super-personality devoid of all name and form, but possessed of infinite metaphysical, moral and spiritual perfections. The formless assumes a form to enable the self to transcend itself, but this form is real and not fictitious (*pāramārthika*) and not *māyāmaya*. It thinks all things (*sarvagñā*) and with its self-directive will (*pariṇāma-śakti*) it expresses itself as the finite *cit* and *acit*; but transcends their finitude and other imperfections (*apahata-pāpma*). Its foreknowledge does not affect the freedom of the finite self. The divine purpose is mainly

realised in transfiguring the self and removing its finiteness. This account frees the idea of God from the errors of anthropomorphism and also the evils of acosmism. While safe-guarding the reality of divine immanence, it, at the same time, satisfies the monistic craving for the unconditioned absolute.

Bhāskara's warfare with the *Māyāvādin* in his account of *Īśvara* shows that his main philosophic object was not merely to assert the reality of *Saguṇa Brahman* but to bring out the fallacies of the theory of *Nirguṇa Brahman*. There are generally speaking four main varieties of the *advaitic* idea of Brahman which are derived from the doctrines of *māyā* and *avidyā*: (1) In attacking Buddhistic subjectivism and nihilism, practical *advaita* or non-dualism insists on the reality of *Īśvara* as the cosmic creator possessed of all perfections and comes very near the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* account at least from the *vyāvahāric* point of view. A presentation differs from its representation and consciousness itself testifies to the externality of things given in sense-perception. The finite is rooted in the infinite which is therefore the informing and inspiring spirit in all things and it is by the grace of the Lord that *mukti* is effected. (2) In his rejection of theism and thought, the idealist goes to the other extreme, adopts the dialectics of Mādhyamika Buddhism, dethrones *Īśvara* from his cosmic lordship and rulership and defines *ātman*

subjectively as *drk* in relation to *drśya*. I alone exist and the cosmos is the objectified form of my mind or *saṅkalpa*, which is sublated in sleep and is therefore non-existent. The inevitable theory of *eka-jīva-vāda* commits him to the perils of subjectivism, selfism and soporific quietism. (3) The third theory, which may be called singularism is an attempt to escape the evils of realism and idealism. *Māyā*, in its cosmic form, reflects Brahman, and this reflection is known as *Īśvara* or the world-soul with super-excellent limiting adjuncts. In its individuated form of *avidyā*, it is the finite self. *Īśvara* is only an aggregate of *jīvas*, or a magnified *māyin*, and the world is nothing but a magician's show. He is the arch-illusionist, or the first figment of the world-fiction that emanates as the logos and the cosmic collectivity of the counterfeit selves made of the atomic *avidyā*. What the arch-illusionist does on a cosmic scale is repeated in the inner psychic show. By negating the false, we affirm the absolute. On this view, *Īśvara* appears first as the absolute; then he becomes a contradiction and a cosmic show and finally vanishes in the absolute. (4) The fourth theory is a variety of monism which rejects the ultimate reality of *Saguṇa Brahman* and, at the same time, refuses to accept the full cosmological and ethical implications of the illusion theory and is therefore midway between the illusion theory and *bhedābheda*. By employing the devastating dialectics of Buddhism and Bradley, it brings out the self-contradiction in the relation

between the personal god of *upāsana* or religion and the absolute of philosophy or *gñāna*. In the religious or theistic consciousness, an element of negation enters into the absolute and causes a collision between existence and content. The finite self is over against God and yet there is a perfect unity between the two. The personal god thus becomes the crown of self-contradiction and this discrepancy is removed only when god passes beyond himself and is absorbed in the absolute. *Īśvara* is the logical highest entangled in relational thought and subject-object opposition. Though he can control *māyā* and triumph over error and evil and thus be regarded as supra-personal he is still a person (*puruṣa viśeṣa*) related to other beings and limited by them, and is therefore finite. His omniscience and omnipresence are clothed in space-time and belong to the bad infinite. Omniscience is only nescience on a cosmic scale and omnipotence is endlessness and not infinity. The idea of a personal god as a concrete infinite is only a concession to anthropomorphism and is therefore a realistic deflection of the true infinite. The metaphysical real is clothed in space-time to satisfy the theistic demands of meditation. In certain modern expositions of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, it is contended that, while Rāmānuja thinks of reality as the logical highest, Śaṅkara goes beyond relational thought and regards reality as the intuitional highest. While Rāmānuja and Hegel are held to rise to the idea of *Saguna*

Brahman as the highest synthesis of thought, Śāṅkara realises the self-contradictions of the finite-infinite and the pluralising tendency of the logical intellect and insists on transcending it by the intuition of the indeterminate. In this integral and non-dual experience the world-consciousness alone is denied and not the world itself.

In combating the doctrine of illusion and illusion-ridden *Īśvara* in extenso, Bhāskara repudiates the distinction between the indeterminate and the determinate, the intuitional highest and the logical highest and the metaphysical real and the meditational real. Predication is an affirmation of reality and not its perversion. Negation itself is a form of determination. But if we adopt the Mādhyamika logic, then we cannot resist its conclusion of the nothingness of things. God is not an idea or an ideal but is a real reality that is transfinite. A finite god is no god at all. He is the absolute or the true infinite that is the informing spirit in all things. The infinite is revealed in and through the finite and the finite is revealed in and through the infinite, and yet the infinite is more real than the finite self or all the finite selves taken together. Brahman has infinite perfections and though it evolves itself into the universe it still exceeds its content. It is not quite accurate to identify Rāmānuja's system with the dialectic process of Hegel. While Hegel thinks that the concrete universal logically becomes the world process,

Rāmānuja insists on *vairāgya* and the spiritual attainment of Brahman by going beyond the historic process of *samsārā*. The absolute of Hegel has more affinities to the Brahman of *bhedābhedavāda* than to that of *Viśiṣṭādvaita*. In an *advaitic* interpretation of Bhāskara, a distinction is drawn between the intuition of the indeterminate or the *Nirguṇa Brahman* and the self-intuition of the concrete infinite. Bhāskara, on this view, does not explicitly refer to the indeterminate beyond the infinite and the finite, but the idea is implicitly contained in his teaching of *ekibhāva*. But this view is not plausible as Bhāskara does not affirm that there is an indeterminate which expresses itself dialectically as the infinite and the finite. On the other hand, his whole teaching is a criticism of the distinction between *Nirguṇa Brahman* and *Saguṇa Brahman*. Likewise he does not favour the theistic view of eternal distinctions. The absolute is not God and the world but God-and-the-world.

THE THEORY OF UPĀDHIS.

Upādhi is the finitising process of the infinite. Brahman who is absolutely free, pure and perfect enters into the finite and differentiates itself into the manifold of *jīvas* and sustains them. There are undoubted monistic texts which establish the unity of the finite and the infinite like those cited on pages 12 and 13; other texts establish the difference between the two; and the essential non-difference in the

state of release is affirmed by the Mund. Up., III. ii. 8-9. Then all distinctions are resolved and absorbed in the absolute. Thus this one-many relation is not a logical or empirical category in which the infinite is reduced to the level of the finite by the empirical consciousness but is an absolute spiritual truth affirmed by the *Śruti*. *Īśvara* is not a logical version of Brahman subject to the space-time relations of *samsāra*, but the Supreme Self possessed of all metaphysical and moral powers and perfections. The distinction between the intuition of the indeterminate and the conceptual *Īśvara* is a mere negative account which creates a yawning gulf between logic and intuition. *Īśvara* by his own *pariṇāma śakti* becomes the finite self and sustains its being. This *śakti* is something like the absolute of Fichte which posits itself by differentiation into the finite self, which thus becomes its other or opposite. But this impediment or obstacle is not a negative element of the absolute but is its real expression. The idea of *Īśvara* becoming the finite does not involve the contradiction of being and non-being or the finite-infinite nature sublated by a superlogical experience of the indeterminate. The *jīva* is not a historical self opposed to the absolute of metaphysics. *Jīva* and *Īśvara* are not opposite but distinct, and relatedness is a real factor of reality and is opposed to the ideas of co-existence and contradiction. Bhās-

kara thus establishes the reality of unity as well as of multiplicity.

The foundation of this truth is in the theory of the *upādhis* based on the *Śruti* and formulated in the *Sūtras*. Brahman has the power to become the finite self and finally to absorb it within itself. The subject-object relation is not a seeming show superimposed on reality but is a concrete expression of the self-revealing nature of God. The eternal never changes but the finite self is a spark of the absolute and is conditioned by ignorance and evil which impede the knowledge of its infinity. Its activity arises from the sense of false identity with empirical life which is a complex of *avidyā*, *kāma*, *karma*, and *sarīrendriya*. *Upādhi* or the principle of individuation and embodiment is a psycho-physical process which distorts the one and divides it into the many and it is the body consciousness and not matter as such that accounts for the sense of particularity and imperfection. The *upādhi* is a complex of logical, moral and aesthetic limitations. The *jīva* is essentially the supreme shining self (*param jyotis*), and, when it attains the state of oneness with the absolute, the whole finitising process comes to an end. But, owing to *avidyā*, the *jīva* in the empirical state identifies itself with the psycho-physical process and becomes the historical self that wanders in the world of *samsāra*. The moral imperfections arising from this false identity account for the desires that the

jīva has for the pleasures of sensibility and for its endeavours to realise them. Ignorance and empirical desires get concretised into the *śarīra* composed of mental and material factors. The *śarīra* is constituted by the five *prāṇas*, the eleven sense-organs including *manas*, *buddhi* and the five gross elements. The whole forms the *sthūla śarīra* and the first seventeen alone form the *sūkṣma śarīra*. Each of these factors has its own functions. *Buddhi* or self-consciousness is not, as the Sāṅkhya says, the reflection of *Puruṣa* in *prakṛti*, but is an essential quality of the self. It remains as a mere possibility (*anabhivyakṣa*) in the states of sleep and *pralaya* and becomes manifest (*abhivyakṣa*) in the waking state and in the creational process, like the development of manhood from infancy. *Manas* is the psychical factor which conditions consciousness, and, if it is withdrawn from the object, knowledge itself becomes impossible. It is on account of *manas*, as the Vaiśeṣika says, that we are not conscious of many things at the same time. The five *prāṇas*, including the *mukhya*, preserve the vitality of the body as illustrated by the Chāndogya story of the body and its members. The *prāṇa* functions in five ways with a view to maintaining the organic functions. The *indriyas* are really eleven including *manas* and the ten cognitive and conative senses and are not seven, made up of the five senses, speech and *manas*. Owing to the reality of *utkrānti* or migration, these functions are atomic

and individuating and not all-pervading and universal as the Śaikhya says. Each *karāṇa* or sense-organ has its own presiding deity which enables it to perform its function. The god of fire for example presides over speech. All these physical and mental changes constitute the *upādhis*, and the *jīva* is the *svāmin* or the lord that controls and utilises the apparatus and experiences the joys and sorrows of empirical life; the self wanders in the world of *samsārā*, and gets implicated in its evils, errors and other imperfections. The whole finitising process is a long story and its origin and working are ultimately unaccountable. How the infinite and perfect becomes the finite and imperfect is an ultimate mystery frankly recognised by all philosophers. While the *Māyāvādin* describes it empirically, defines its indefinability and ultimately denies it altogether, and while the theist explains it in terms of external relations, Bhāskara in his monistic scheme of *bhedābheda* tries to reconcile the claims of both absolute monism and theism and regards it as the only theory that is supported by the Sūtras and satisfies all philosophical and spiritual needs. While in the realm of nature, the irradiation of the one reaches the level of matter, mystically the soul ascends to and is absorbed in the absolute good.

CHAPTER VI

BHĀSKARA'S PSYCHOLOGY

THE NATURE OF THE FINITE SELF

Psychology is deduced from metaphysics and religion and it adopts the introspective method based on the light of reason and spiritual insight. In self-consciousness there is a spiritual intuition of the pure ego as distinct from the empirical ego and it refers ultimately to the absolute or the unconditioned. In his *Baṣya* on *Sūtra* II. iii. 43, Bhāskara determines the exact meaning of the relation between Brahman and the finite self as expressed by the term *amśa*. The *Māyāvādin* regards it as an appearance of the absolute riddled with contradictions and as a projection of cosmic illusion. Rāmānuja explains *amśa* as a *prakāra* or organ of the absolute (*aprithak-siddha-viśeṣana*) having finite being and divine content. Bhāskara rejects both these extreme theories of monism, abstract and concrete, and establishes his own theory of *bhedā-bheda*. The term *amśa* is employed in three senses. It may connote (1) the relation of the cause to its effect as when thread is explained as an *amśa* or component of cloth; (2) a share in property to be divided; or, as in this context, (3) the principle of self-differentiation through *upādhi* ¹.

¹ "Upādhyavaccinna ananya bhūtasya vācakoyam amśa śabdah." [II. iii. 43].

The *jīva* as an *amśa* is, according to Bhāskara, a fragment or self-limitation of reality, and is therefore neither absolutely different from God (*atyantabhinna*) nor absolutely identical with Him (*aikya*)¹. As the sparks are to the fire, the five-fold *prāṇas* to air, and the coil is to the coiled snake, the *jīva* is related to Brahman both as *bhīna* and *abhinna*. Like the rays of the sun, the finite self is a radiation of the supreme self which is the source and centre of consciousness. The infinite posits itself and becomes the other and is therefore both the subject and the object of all experience. Like the *ākāśa* that is enclosed in a jar, the all-pervading Brahman breaks itself, as it were, against the *upādhis* and becomes the finite centre of experience. When *Īśvara* thus becomes immanent in the finite self, he becomes the lord who thinks all things and is the ultimate subject of all experience. Yādava, like Bhāskara, insists on the many-one-ness of reality by preserving the integrity of both the elements and avoiding their dualism; but he is not able to free the infinite from the imperfections of the finite. Bhāskara avoids this pantheistic peril by predicating transcendence to Brahman. The immortal bliss of Brahman is beyond the world of conditions (*pādosya viśvā bhūtāni tripād asyāmṛtam divi*) and the finite itself is, as the *Bhagavad Gītā* says, a fragment of the infinite (*mamaivāṁśo jīvaloke*) (B. G., xv. 7) and, while the *amśa* or the divided self is

¹ "Sa ca bhinnābhinna svarupah." [II. iii. 43].

caught up in the meshes of *samsāra*, Brahman, the *amśin*, is absolutely free from all evils and imperfections.

The finite self has, according to Bhāskara, an atomic and monadic nature and abides in its own separate being. Finiteness or *jīvatva* is a defect or deprivation that is inherent (*aupādhika*) in the *jīva*. The spiritual, though essentially infinite and unconditioned, is, owing to the *upādhis* or the physical and psychical conditions, spatialised, and thus becomes the subject of measurement and enumeration. The body, the *brahma-pura* or the temple of God with the five *prāṇas*, *manas*, *buddhi*, and *ahaṅkāra* is really a prison-house of the infinite. The formless and supreme self now acquires a spatial and temporal setting and is capable of quantitative measurement. It is this idea of atomic individuality (*ārāgramatra* and not *mahat*) that accounts for the endless historic process of the *jīva* involving the spatial ideas of exit and entrance (*gati*) and limits its own innate and real infinity. When the formless one creates bodily forms suited to its *karma*, it enters into and pervades them like a perfume or like light and experiences their pleasures and pains. The association of the absolute with its adjuncts, is governed by the moral law of *karma*, which is an endless stream of cause and effect on the moral level and is ultimately unaccountable. Though beginningless, it has an end; and, when the *jīva* realises the perils

of particularity and *samsāratva*, it dissociates itself from the *upādhis*, and, when these are gradually dissolved, it returns to its home in the absolute and attains its undivided unity.

The *Bhedābheda* *avadin* finds no difficulty in expounding the Sūtras relating to the qualities of the *jīva* and in determining their exact nature. The soul is eternal and immutable and is therefore neither produced nor destroyed. Mortality and movement apply only to the body and not to the self which is unborn, immortal and eternal (*aja*, *niitya* and *śūśvata*). No Vedāntin accepts the Cārvāka view that the self is an epi-phenomenon or a bye-product of matter. Unthinking atoms and brain storms can never produce the soul and its sensations. Likewise the Buddhistic theory that the self is a mere perishing psychic series is entirely false. A stream of thought cannot strive for its own cessation or *nirvāṇa*. The process of thought pre-supposes the thought of the process and the thinker as its foundational reality. The subject is present in all states but is not exhausted by them. Bhāskara criticises the *Pāñcarātra* account of the origination of the *jīva* from the Supreme. The Upaniṣadic text, Muṇḍ. Up. II. i. 1, which employs the *viṣpuliṅga nyūya* or the analogy of fire and sparks, in no way supports the theory of origins, but only refers, according to Bhāskara, to the limiting adjuncts by which the infinite becomes finite

and fragmentary. Brahman by its own intrinsic nature externalises itself into the world of finite things. Divine causality is both efficient and phenomenal (*kāraṇa* and *kārya*). The former refers to Brahman as the uncaused cause which exists by itself as the centre and source of all beings; but the latter connotes the phenomenal reality of the finite self which persists in all its changes. The *jīva*, as a thinker, is both self-conscious and conscious of external objects. Just as fire cannot burn itself, no idea can be its own illumination without presupposing the subject-object consciousness. Bhāskara distinguishes between the unconditioned 'I' and the conditioned 'I'. The latter is the *jīva* associated with the psycho-physical organism (*upādhi*) consisting of material, vital and mental factors which persist in the whole process of *samsāra*, either potentially or actually, till the attainment of unconditioned bliss. This *upādhi* is a complex of logical (*avidyā*), moral (*karma*), and aesthetic (*kāma*) limitations and accounts for the three states of the *jīva* known as cognition, conation, and feeling.

The *jīva* has the qualities of cognition or *gñātṛtva*, activity or *kartṛtva*, and feeling or *bhoktṛtva*, and the account of each of these qualities given by Bhāskara may now be briefly outlined. Even the ordinary judgment (*aham idam adarśam*) 'I saw this' testifies to the persistence of

the conscious self. The 'I' persists in all the cognitions as their pervading identity. The phenomena of recognition and retentiveness testify to the self abiding in all its states. The sub-conscious and the unconscious states are continuous with the waking state. The content of the self extends beyond the present and there is no temporal gap in its continuity nor the possibility of its abolition. Consciousness is the essence of the self and it is the consciousness of something. The Vaiśeṣika account of the abolition of consciousness in *mukti* reduces the self to the state of a stone (*pāṣaṇa*). The Buddhist idea of the self as a mere series without any substantiality is as one-sided and abstract as the *Māyāvādin's* account of the absolute without any connection of content. The only way of avoiding this abstraction consists in affirming the reality of both substance and quality, or the subject-object relation. There can be no substance apart from qualities. Bhāskara is aware of the distinction between a Vedāntic truth deduced from the *Śruti* and an empirical category derived from common-sense as an analogical explanation of the truth. Substance is the source and centre of its qualitative differences and cannot be identified with them and, even in our ordinary experience, it is the substratum that supports qualities. It is identity alone that changes and explains the changes. But quality is nowhere perceived to be a contradiction of substance. In the dialectic of distincts the subject of

consciousness differs from its object and consciousness is destroyed with the destruction of this difference. Transcending *tripuṣṭ* and relational consciousness is like burying one's own shadow. If the self-identity of the finite self that persists amidst all changes reduces reality to an abstract monadism, the conception of the absolute and its appearances or apparitions is equally abstract and futile. Though Bhāskara has a genius for controversy, he realises the futility of logic in discovering spiritual truths, and, relying upon *Śruti* as the absolute authority for knowing Brahman, deduces a relation of *dharma* and *dharmin* as the only possible satisfactory explanation of reality.

Bhāskara predicates the freedom of will to the finite self. If the self has no freedom and responsibility (*kartr̥tvā*), then all Vedic and Vedāntic nuperatives, like *śrotavyaḥ*, *mantavyaḥ* and *nidhidhyāsitavyaḥ*, would have no meaning or purpose. The very fact of the *jīva* seeking new bodies and wandering from world to world proves its volitional nature. The choice between the beneficial and the injurious is due to this moral freedom. The Sāṅkhya idea of a passive self or indifferent spectator fails to explain the reality of moral endeavour; it is the witness that witnesses nothing. As the self alone is the subject of moral experience, the attribution of agency to *buddhi* which is the reflection of *Puruṣa* gives an air of unreality to the moral life. *Buddhi* or self-consciousness only serves as a tool of the *jīva* and is not the

jīva itself. But the freedom of the self by which the *jīva* seeks the fetters of *karma* and experiences its pleasures and pains is only adventitious and not essential. If the *upādhī* is essential and eternal, there would be no chance of freedom or *mukti*. This, however, does not mean that it is *apāramārthika* or unreal. Freedom is not a fiction due to nescience but is reality in its aspect of conditionateness. The affective side of consciousness known as *bhokṛtva* or *kāma* relates to the nature of desire and its satisfaction. Owing to its identity with the empirical conditions, the *jīva* seeks the pleasures of sensibility and thus subjects itself to the woes of *samsāra*. But when this same desire is transformed into a longing for *mukti*, the *jīva* attains immortal bliss.

We may here summarise the account of abnormal psychology given by the Sūtras as explained by Bhāskara. Dreams are subjective experiences arising from the memory of the past stored up in the psychic apparatus, and therefore devoid of objective reality. They belong to the world of the sub-conscious, in which suppressed desires seek satisfaction in wild and fantastic ways. The Lord creates the cosmic and the objective order. But the *jīva* alone is responsible for the psychic stuff that is presented in the dream world. The objects presented in dreams are the creations of the finite self, conditioned by the *upādhis*. Being only a fragment of the infinite, the *jīva* has not the power to create and control the

cosmos. While the objects presented in dreams are false, the dream experience itself is real and is continuous with the other states of consciousness. But the *Māyāvādin* says that they are false (*apāramāṛthika*) as they are sublated by the reality given in the waking consciousness. He distinguishes between existence and reality and rejects the reality of dreams though they are existent. Rāmānuja rejects this distinction, asserts the reality of all experiences and ascribes the dream consciousness to the moral law of God who distributes rewards and punishments according to individual desert. But Bhāskara repudiates the metaphysical theory of contradiction and the moral law of *karma* and explains every experience in terms of causality. Brahman is the absolute will which conditions all things and the *jīva* obscured by *agñāna* and *karma* creates its own world of dreams, and, while the dreams are false, the dreamer shines for ever like a spark of the supreme consciousness. During sleep the *jīva* enters into what is known as the *purita nāḍi* in the heart, and returns to its home in the absolute, for temporary rest. Sleep is not cosmic nescience in its causal state nor discontinuity of personality. The three states of the mind, the conscious, the sub-conscious and the unconscious form a totality and the gap or disruption is more apparent than real. Personal identity is proved by the continuity of consciousness and the moral order which provides for the unity of the doer, the deed and the consequences. In

the state of swooning there is life, but no consciousness. It is different from the states of waking, dream and sleep and is midway between life and death. In all these psychic levels which are the crests and depths of consciousness, the self abides in its being but in different degrees of conditionateness.

Bhāskara arrives at his theory of the finite self by rejecting the claims of rival theories. The Cārvāka view that the self is made by the grouping of cells and sensations is absolutely untenable. Man is not a mechanism or a whole of indifferent parts. To the Buddhist, whether he is a realist or an idealist, the self is only a *skandha* or a psycho-physical series without any substantiality (*avastu*) and freedom or *nirvāṇa* consists in the destruction of these series (*samskāra-kṣaya*). The idea of personality as a mere perishing presentation fails to explain the persistence of ideas in memory and retentiveness (*anusmṛti*) and also personal identity. The *saṅghāta* as a mere aggregate lacks the inner power of synthetic unity and continuity. The cognitive self is more than a colony or confluence of mental states. The self is really pre-supposed in every experience and no one ever says 'I am not' (*aḥam na asmi*). The experiencer, therefore, cannot be explained away as a mere experience, and the whole theory of conduct as a continuity of deeds without a doer contradicts itself and falls to the ground. The

Jaina theory of the soul having the size of the body (*ātmasarīraparimāṇah*) is self-contradictory. The *jīva* is an immaterial spirit and does not admit of measurement (*niravayava*). How can the human soul contract into the body of the ant and expand into the size of the elephant? Besides, this view of the Jainas contradicts their other theory of the relativity of knowledge and truth. If that is true, then we have to say that this *pariṇāma* is partially true and partially false. If the *jīva* in the essential *Dīgambara* state of eternal freedom, is all-pervasive, then how can it be subject to the modifications of contraction and expansion?

The Sāṅkhya *Puruṣa* as a silent, solitary seer, sees nothing and seeks nothing. If it is eternal and immutable, and has no qualities of its own, then the ideas of *bandha* and *mokṣa* have no meaning at all. But the Sāṅkhya explains rationality, activity and bliss as the products of *prakṛti* arising from its proximity to *Puruṣa* or reflection therein. But mere proximity can never move the immovable. It is *Parameśvara* alone that, by his *pariṇāma śakti*, emanates into *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and energises them. The unconditioned confines itself within the bounds of individuality owing to the contracting tendencies of *avidyā* and *karma*. The Vaiśeṣika account is pluralistic and deistic and is equally unconvincing. It asserts the eternal and the all-pervading character of the soul, the atomicity of the

manas (mind), and the abolition of consciousness in the condition of *mukti*. But the connection of an all-pervading soul with the atomic mind is unthinkable. If the soul is really all-pervading, it should occupy all bodies and have the experience of all. Consciousness is the essential nature of the self and therefore cannot be eliminated. Rāmānuja reverses the position and says that the *jīva* is finite and atomic, but that its essential quality (*dharmabhūta gñāna*) is all-pervasive. The *Pāñcarātra* doctrine of the origination of *jīva* is opposed to the Vedāntic view of its eternity. The *Māyāvādīn* attributes *jīvatva* to the false reflection of the *ātman* in *avidyā* (*ābhāsa pratibimba*). Its atomicity is only a metaphor and has no metaphysical reality. The self is hypostatized by *buddhi* or the adjunct of *avidyā*. When this reflection is removed, the Absolute abides as the one without a second. *Ābhāsa* is either real or unreal; owing to the perverting medium the absolute must be presumed to cast its own shadow; then there is no possibility or need for *mukti*. If Brahman is really one, then what one man does would be experienced by others as well (*sarva karma sāṅkarya*) and the uniqueness of personal experience would be left unexplained. But the theory of the *upādhis* is free from all these defects. It provides for the reality of experience, recognises the self-identity of the *jīva* and its numerical distinctness and affirms its ultimate unity with the absolute. The *Brahma Sūtras*

(I. iv. 20-22) discuss the relation between *jīva* and Brahman and determine its exact nature. Āsmaratya holds the view that the *jīva* is not altogether different from Brahman ; there is some essential difference between them in spite of their pervading identity and his view is identified with the *bhedābheda* theory of Yādhavaprakāśa (*Srutaprakāśika*, I. iv. 20). Audulomi, on the other hand, admits the absolute difference between the *jīva* and Brahman, but asserts their unity when the *jīva* attains *mukti*, on the authority of the Muṇḍ. text III. ii. 8. The *Sūtrakāra*, however, approves of neither of these views and cites Kāśakṛtsna in support of his own *siddhānta* which, according to Bhāskara, is that, even in the state of bondage, it is the absolute itself that exists as the *jīva* owing to conditionateness or the *upādhis* ; and Bhāskara cites in support of this the Ch. text VI. iii. 2, “ I shall enter these elements as the *jīva* and differentiate myself into names and forms.”

CHAPTER VII

THE ETHICS OF BHĀSKARA

The ethics of Bhāskara deals with the moral and spiritual methods by which the *jīva* frees itself from the trammels of the *upādhis* and becomes the infinite. The Indian philosopher, with his synoptic insight into the soul of things, does not make any hard and fast distinction between the different departments of knowledge like metaphysics, psychology, ethics and religion. He is more interested in the synthetic grasp of the underlying principles of all knowledge than in the analytic method of discovering distinctions, though, in the classification of knowledge, he reveals acute analytic genius. The result is a fusion of all sciences and disciplines into a single comprehensive scheme of inter-related parts. Vedāntic ethics does not know the absolute distinction between mere morality and religion and the antagonism between the two that results therefrom. Consequently, while we deal with moral freedom and the nature of duty and virtue, the study of their ultimate bearings on the immortality of the soul and its relation with God becomes inevitable. In Chapters II and III of the *Sūtras*, Bādarāyaṇa examines the Upaniṣadic truths relating to the moral ideals of self-purification and self-renunciation. The central idea of Bhāskara's ethics is

contained in the suggestive term *gñāna-karma-samuccaya* or the co-ordination of knowledge and duty. The science of *karma* or duty does not satisfy the spiritual craving for god. The philosophic life of meditation often lapses into excessive asceticism and abstractionism. The Mīmāṃsaka insists on *karma* or duty and explains away the value of *gñāna* or knowledge as mere *arthavāda*. The Advaitin goes to the other extreme and abandons *karma* altogether on the ground that the monistic intuition of identity is opposed to ethical dualism. Rāmānuja subordinates *karma* to the needs of *gñāna* and *bhakti*. But the *Bhedābheda* *vādin* is entirely opposed to all one-sided theories and is interested in the philosophy of the meeting of the extremes. *Karma* is neither subordinated to *gñāna* nor sublated by it. *Karma* and *gñāna* are the two wings of spiritual aspiration and attainment, and the theories of contradiction and subordination should therefore be rejected and replaced by the theory of co-ordination or *gñāna-karma-samuccaya*.

Before considering this main question, Bhāskara points out the imperative need for the desire for release or *mumukṣutva* and renunciation or *vairāgya*. Owing to the confusions of *avidyā* and the relentless rigour of the law of *karma*, the *jīva* is caught up in the meshes of *samsāra* and the endless series of births and deaths. Death dissolves the physical body and the good soul which follows the path of

duty ascends with its psychic apparatus to the world of the devas and slavishly ministers to their pleasures as described in Br. Up. I. iv 10, and, when its good deeds are spent, it is hurled down once again into the world of activity. The next birth is determined by the moral tendencies for good or evil (*śīla*, *ācāra*) of the *jīvi*, stored up in the psychic apparatus. The souls that are not fit for the two *mārgas*, viz., the *arcirāli mārga* or the pathway to perfection and *dhūnādīmārga* or the way of the gods, are born here as birds, insects, and creeping things without going to any other world, (Ch. Up. V. x. 4—8 and Br. Up. VI. ii. 16). The process of ascent and descent (*āroha* and *avaroḥa*) is an endless cycle of *avidyā* and *karma* and, when a man reflects on the woes of *samsāra* and the waste of soul-life, he realises the impermanence of empirical experience and longs for emancipation. The *mumukṣu* then renounces the changing values of sensibility in *svarga* as well as in this life and longs to go back to his home in the absolute (Mund. Up. I. ii. 10—12). Evil physically implies suffering, morally the violation of the Vedic 'ought' and metaphysically the sense of individuation which the infinite has but ought not to have.

The *Māyāvādīn* relying on the method of mere knowledge without action (*kevalādevagñānān-muktih karma nirapekṣatvāt*) contends that *mumukṣutva* or the longing for release is a mere negative method and that *mukti* is nothing but the direct intuition of the absolute. *Karma* is, in his view, opposed to *gñāna* and sublated by it, and the immediate apprehension of

Brahman (*Brahmagñāna*) entirely excludes the idea of aspiration and attainment. Vedic injunctions can never apply to the Vedāntic eternal which is ever existent. *Karma* or activity has four principal objects, namely, origination, modification, purification and achievement (*utpādya, vikārya, saṃskārya* and *prāpya*) and none of these can apply to Brahman. The idea of origination cannot be predicated of Brahman as it is eternal, and the ideas of mutation, modification, and becoming are incompatible with the immutability of Brahman; nor can the perfection of Brahman admit of purification (*saṃskāra*) or achievement. Morality is an endless process and therefore betrays an inner discrepancy. Good and evil are relative and the absolute transcends these distinctions and is amoral. In reply to this argument Bhāskara points out that, though Brahman cannot be an object of origination, modification or purification, there is nothing against its being an object of achievement. If Brahman is really the indeterminate absolute that is ever self-realised (*nitya prāpta*), then reality is bare being identical with itself. Brahman is and *māya* is not and there is no need for moral progress and spiritual release and realisation. If the self is eternally true and free, the striving for salvation becomes a mere make-believe and myth. *Mukti* is being and becoming Brahman. Becoming is not a contradiction or negation of being. The return to Brahman is therefore a real historic process including moral aspiration as well as spiritual

attainment. The freedom of the moral self is the essential condition of *mumukṣutva* or longing for release. If freedom is denied, the Vedic and Vedāntic imperatives of duty like *yajeta* (sacrifice) and *upāsita* (meditate) would lose all their meaning and value. Personal effort (*puruṣa prayatna*) involves the self-directive activity of the *jīva* and consists in the attainment of sovereignty over the sensitive self. *Prayatna* is known in various ways as *dharma*, *vidhi*, *apūrva*, *codanā* and *bhāvana*. But it is not to be identified with the *niyoga* of the Mīmāṃsakas. They no doubt insist on the absolute value of Vedic duties; but their theory of *apūrva*, as an unseen moral agency, makes morality a mere mechanical process. The doctrine of *niyoga* has no scriptural or rational foundation. It does not conduce to the reign of justice and the apportionment of merit according to desert. It entirely ignores the moral and spiritual order of the universe. Bādarāyana therefore reconstructs the theory by substituting the idea of *niyāntṛtva* or lordship of Brahman for the *niyoga* of *karma*. The moral order is rooted in Īśvara and not in karma. Īśvara alone constitutes and controls the moral law. The theory of the *Māyāvādin* that the will of *Īśvara* involves relatedness and contradiction and makes him a victim of the illusory process provides no scope or hope for spiritual realisation. *Śruti* is not aware of the divine perfections like omniscience and omnipotence being

perverted by *māya*. They do not conceal the nature of Brahman as the all-self but reveal His glory and goodness.

But the crux of the moral situation is in the relation between divine determinism and individual freedom. The Kausītaki Upaniṣad tells us that *Īśvara* elevates some beings, urges them to good deeds and makes them happy, but prompts others to resort to evil and then punishes them with hellish pains. This would apparently predicate caprice and cruelty to the divine nature. But the *Sūtra* II. iii. 42 dispels this notion by the idea of the freedom of God functioning through the moral mechanism of *karma*. *Īśvara* is absolutely free from all imperfections like partiality (*vaiṣamya*) or cruelty (*nairghr̥ṇya*). The former arises from desire (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and confusion (*moha*), and the latter results from anger and violence (*krūrabhāva* and *candatā*); but Brahman is eternally pure and perfect. The divine will works through the will of the finite self (*prāṇikarma sāpekṣa*) and is conditioned by moral necessity. Divine law consists in the apportionment of rewards and punishments according to individual merit and qualification (*adhikāri bheda*). The rain that causes different seeds to sprout and grow is one and the same, but the varieties of plants and their variations in growth are entirely due to their own individual nature. The former is the remote cause, and the latter the immediate cause. In the same way the

divine law of righteousness and love pervades the whole moral realm and its operation is conditioned by individual freedom. Righteousness is really the redemptive power of love and the freedom of the self consists in responding to this love and receiving the summons of the infinite. The imperfections of the finite self or *amśa* do not touch the infinite, the *amśin*. *Paramātmā* is eternally pure and free and is, like the water in the lotus, untainted by *sam-sāra*, though he is associated with it. The *amśin* who is unconditioned and pure, legislates for the *amśa* and transfigures it. The reflection of the sun in water is conditioned by the medium and is therefore curved and confused. But the light is really unaffected and pure. The fire is one; but it consumes the sacrificial fuel as well as filth. The purity of the Ganges is not affected by any pollution or impurities. In the same way Brahman is pure and perfect. The moral distinctions of good and evil, pleasure and pain, arise only from the *upādhis* and do not infect its nature.

The supreme end of man consists in the apprehension and attainment of Brahman by abandoning the transitory values of finitude. Brahman is metaphysically the source and centre of the finite self. The aim of moral and spiritual endeavour lies in knowing Brahman, who is the supreme ground of all existence and the goal of all experience. The finite self overcomes and transcends

this limitation of finitude and expands into the infinite. In other words it is the reversal of the finitising process of the infinite and involves spiritual activity (*karma*) as well as knowledge (*gñāna*). *Vidyā* or *gñāna* is knowledge of the undivided self in which the finite "I" becomes the absolute "I", and *karma* is a process of purification by which the self abandons the fleeting pleasures of sensibility and transcends the planes of thought. The Mīmāṃsaka lays stress on the performance of duty. The *Māyāvālin* insists on the immediate knowledge of Brahman here and now, in which the dualism between the *jīva* and Brahman is dissolved. Whatever is made or modified is false and fictitious and therefore *mukti* is an intuition and not a consummation. Bhāskara criticises both these extreme views of ritualism and rationalism and adopts the theory of the golden mean.

The Mīmāṃsaka regards the *Karma Kāṇḍ* as the goal of life and explains away the *Gñāna Kāṇḍ* as a subsidiary and indirect discipline. He holds that the knowledge of ātman reveals the true nature of duty and is therefore only a means to it (aṅga). While *ātmagñāna* is intended for the weak who cannot stand the stress and strenuousness of active life (*daurbhāgya*), the Vedic imperative or *karmānu-ṣṭhana* is a universal and necessary law which applies to all normal beings. The Veda insists on the performance of duty as the only end of

life; whatever refers to action is the purport of the Veda and whatever does not refer to action is purportless. Life is essentially an activity rooted in will; all consciousness is conational; even the meditation of *Nirguna Brahman* is an ideomotor activity. But the most important element in work is endeavour and not the attainment of end. All Vedic judgments like 'do the sacrifice' (*yajeta*) are imperatives of duty which can never be abandoned. The categorical statements like 'He who attains Brahman attains the highest' are only *arthavādas* whose object is to produce a moral effect by an exaggerated appeal to emotions. As a matter of fact, even categorical statements are only imperatives in a disguised form and are subservient to them. When we say "Caitra goes there" we really mean an imperative like 'See Caitra going there.' The proposition 'This is a rope and not a snake' means 'Do not be afraid as this is only a rope.' It is for this reason that the *Bhagavad Gita* refers to Janaka, the *Karma-Yogin*, as the moral exemplar. The Mīmāṃsaka maintains that Vedic texts refer to *karma* or activity generating an unseen agency known as *apūrva* or *niyoga* and thus explains the moral process by which men reap the benefits of their activity. Therefore the Vedāntic idea of deity should give place to the Vedic ideal of duty, and the enquiry into Brahman is only a means to the enquiry into *karma*.

But the Vedāntin sets aside the whole contention of the Mīmāṃsaka and reverses the values of *karma* and *gñāna*. The *śāstra* consists of *Karma Kāṇḍa* and *Gñāna Kāṇḍa* and the two are organically united into a single whole. Nowhere does it insist upon the distinction between activity and the affirmation of truth and create a gap between the two (*kāryapara-vākya* and *siddhaparavākya*). Every judgment, whether it is imperative or assertive, has a certain relevancy or end in view (*prayojana*) and both the *Karma Kāṇḍa* and the *Gñāna Kāṇḍa* have a definite purpose. While the former regards the end of conduct as the attainment of *svarga*, the latter refers to the attainment of *apavarga* or *mokṣa* as the supreme end of life. The moral 'ought' is based on the spiritual 'is.' Even in ordinary language, imperative sentences ultimately affirm reality. In the given example 'This is a rope and not a snake' the idea of the rope refers to reality (*tatvāvabodha*) and it is this affirmation that removes the fear and not the mere injunction, expressed or implied. The Mīmāṃsaka's argument, that categorical statements like "This is a rope and not a snake" are not complete till the implied action is understood, would apply equally in the case of imperatives, as the command "Come here" is similarly incomplete till its special relevancy is understood. The arguments employed in the *Mīmāṃsa Bhāṣya* have a categorical basis and their value depends on conviction based on sound reasoning and not on mere commands or imperatives. Besides, even the:

imperative sentence "Bring the cow," has an implied connection with reality and relevance. The Mīmāṃsaka contention that only sentences as significant syntactic wholes have meaning is therefore baseless.

The Dhyānaṇiyogavādin accepts the principles of the Mīmāṃsaka that imperatives are direct and absolute, while assertive statements have only an indirect and lower value and that the practice of Vedic injunctions produces an unseen agency known as *niyoga*, but seeks to justify the Vedāntic position by turning the tables on the Mīmāṃsaka and holding that *karma* subserves the value of *gñāna* and is subordinate to it. According to him too, the *Karma Kāṇḍa* is binding on all, but while the *karma* prescribed therein has a direct (**ānvayika*) effect on the ordinary man, it has only an indirect effect (*prāsaṅgika*) on the *uttamādhikārin* by removing his evil tendencies (*vāsanā*) and developing his virtuous disposition. The Upaniṣadic injunctions *ātmā draṣṭavyaḥ*, *śrotavyaḥ*, *mantavyaḥ*, *nididhyāsitavyaḥ* referring to reflecting and meditating on the self and realizing it mark the stages of progressive self-realization for the *uttamādhikārin*; the immediate is thus mediated. These actions, like the actions prescribed in the *Karma Kāṇḍa* in the case of the worldly man, produce a *niyoga*. Thus the Upaniṣadic texts have full meaning as they also enjoin an action or meditation. Indeed they alone are the really valuable part of the Veda, and the whole of the *Karma Kāṇḍa*

merely prescribes a subsidiary discipline for attaining the position of the *uttamādhikārin*. When the *Karma Kāṇḍa* is used for attaining worldly ends, it is really a misuse of it like the performance of *śyena* and other acts intended to kill others, which, though prescribed in the scriptures, are intended only for the sinner who is prone to transgress the injunction "Thou shalt not kill."

Bhāskara sets aside the whole of this argument as having no basis in revelation. The *śruti* nowhere makes any distinction between the *uttamādhikārin* and others. *Karma* is either *nitya* (obligatory) like *sandhyopāśana*, *namittika* (occasional) or *kāmya* (optional) like *jyotiṣoma*. To posit a separate category of fitness (*yogyatva*) in a matter inaccessible to reason violates the rules of Revelation. The analogy of direct and indirect results drawn from sense-perception should not be applied to super-sensuous and spiritual truths.¹ Similarly there is no warrant for the theory of a *niyoga* either in the *Mīmāṃsa Bhāṣya* or in the *Śārīraka Sūtras*.² Besides if the Upaniṣads are to be interpreted as injunctions (*kāryapara*) only, i.e., as prescribing *vidīdhyaśana* of the self, all other passages being understood to be merely explanatory

¹ "Na ca laukikena dṛṣṭāntena vaidikorthaḥ nirūpayitum śakyate." [I. iv. 14].

² "Na ca niyogasya vākyarthatve mīmāṃsāyām s'ārīrake vā sūcakam asti." [I. i. 4.]

or glorificatory (*arthavāda*), the texts about the apprehension of Brahman would have no value. On the other hand, if these texts are given full value, the rule about imperatives alone having direct meaning should be given up. If, by the act of meditation, *niyoga* is produced, Brahman is a mere *arthavāda*. If Brahman is real, *niyoga* stands condemned. The whole theory therefore lands us in agnosticism on the one side and ritualism on the other. The correct position therefore is to give equal value to all the texts. The *Karma Kāṇḍa* and the *Gñāna Kāṇḍa* are equally valid. But the former, being self-contained, is independent of the latter. The latter being based on the former requires its aid. Bhāskara cites in support of this position the Mīmāṃsaka principle of a *Vikṛti* sacrifice requiring a *Prakṛti* for being properly performed but not *vice versa*.

The *Māyāvādin* applies as usual the world-destroying weapon of contradiction against the doctrine of *Mīmāṃsa* and maintains an extreme ascetic view of morals in which intellectualism ousts out the claims of voluntarism and *karma* is sublated by *gñāna*. *Gñāna* is the method of inwardness and introversion by which the intuition of the absolute is affirmed by the elimination of the relative. But the method of *karma* pre-supposes the distinction between the will of God and the freedom of man. It does not overcome the discrepancy between the ideal and the actual nor does it furnish any ground for the

ultimate triumph of goodness and godliness. *Karma* is rooted in the false view that the world of *nāmarūpa* is real and that the absolute which is beyond finite thought is false. Consequently the activity of *avidyā* is to be overcome and sublated by the knowledge of *aikya* or the self-identity of the absolute. To a rationalistic mind that is given to the analysis of thought and the apprehension of the inner self or *sākṣin*, a life of ritualism and duty is bound to be repugnant. The spirit of inwardness and asceticism has a despotic sway over the spirit of activity and service, and ultimately crushes it altogether. The former is an inner urge to repose or *śānti* by the control of the out-going activities and the vanishing of *vāsanās*. But the latter delights in devotion and service to an external law or extra-cosmic ruler. The *Māyāvādin* therefore rejects the claims of *karma* and abandons it altogether (*sarvakarmatyāgā*). True freedom is therefore attained by the relinquishment of all *āśramas* (*ativarṇāśramin*) and the duties pertaining to them. The *videhān* who attains the wisdom of the absolute is therefore beyond good and evil as all the seed of *samsāra* and *karma* in him is entirely burnt up and destroyed by the fire of *gñāna*. The Śāṅkhya also insists on the abandonment of work and the attainment of inner peace and aloneness.

Bhāskara criticizes the above argument as a lapse into Buddhistic asceticism, inertness and irresponsibility.

bility. The *śāstra* does not favour the ideal of *śānti* without service. Meditation on Brahman does not require the abandonment of all activity. The quest for inner quiet should not end in quietism. The Upaniṣads that extol renunciation do not deny the importance of *karma*. True renunciation does not consist in the abandonment of activity, but in doing duty for the sake of duty without caring for the consequences (*niṣkāma karma*). Ordinary Vedic duties are designed to lead one to *svarga* or to *apavarga*. The aspirant after *apavarga* performs the same work as the *svarga*-seeker and in the same way, but in a spirit of *Brahmārpaṇa*¹; the activity remains but the attitude is changed. *Karma* thus done is superior to actions based on inclination and utility (*kāmyā karma*) and has the same value as *gñāna* in attaining *mukti*. The theory of abandoning all works is absolutely false. The Taittiriya text referring of *nyāsa* as the highest discipline refers to the attainment of Brahman and not to the abandonment of *karma* (*karma tyāga*) as the word *nyāsa* in the context is explained as Brahman (*nyāsa iti Brahma*). The text in Br. Up. IV. iv. 4-22 that requires self-renouncement and the sacrifice of the empirical pleasures like progeny, pelf and power is interested only in the education of the motive and not in the elimination of activity. Like the passage in the Jābālā Up. 4, this

¹ "Brahmārpaṇa nyāyena kriyamāṇam bhavati." [III. iv. 20.]

also indicates the need for the evolution of the self from one *āśrama* to another till *sanyāsa*, the highest fulfilment of all *āśramas*, is reached. The term *atyāśramin* in Śv. Up. VI. 21 means "a member of the highest *āśrama*" and does not refer to quietism or to the Buddhistic and the Jaina ideal of abandoning all duties. The evolution of *āśrama* is the evolution of purity and discipline and the highest *āśrama* connotes a life of absolute purity and discipline. The *sanyāsin* or the *uttamāśramin* is bound to observe the rules of his order as laid down by Manu and other moral law-givers. The opponent may perhaps point out that the Sūtra III. iv. 25 insists on the observance of duty by the householder alone and not by the *sanyāsin* who has sublimated or spiritualised sex (*ūrdhvairetas*). But this Sūtra has to be interpreted in connection with the next Sūtra III. iv. 26 which defines each *āśrama* and its duties. Even a *parivrājaka* who abandons the world absolutely has to sustain his life and do the duties that are allotted to him¹.

Bhāskara's warfare with the *Māyāvādin* sometimes oversteps the ethics of controversy especially when he combats the view that the absolute transcends morality. A *vidvān* who tries to abandon all actions has at least to do the duties that are necessary to sustain his life. If the *jīvanmukta* has realised *Brahmabhāva*, then he has attained absolute freedom

¹ Parivrājakasyāpi aparihāryam dhriyamāṇa śarīrasya.
[III. iv. 20.]

and the *Śruti* says that he has no hunger, delusion, disease or death. Since, in the apprehension of the absolute, there can be no degrees, it logically follows that, the moment a man attains freedom, there is a dissolution of his body. But the *jīvan-mukta* has to sustain his life (*śarīradhāraṇa*) by satisfying organic needs like hunger and thirst and has to endure the effects of *prārabdha* even if he does not take to a life of activity. Hence it is impossible to attain in this life freedom from the sufferings of *samsāra* by the mere knowledge of the meaning of the *śāstra* (*vākyaarthagñāna*)¹. As long as the embodied state continues, the mind and the sense organs will function. The smoke lasts as long as there is contact of fire with wet wood (*ārdrendhana samyoga*). Owing to the impetus given by *prārabdha*, embodiment and the experience of difference go together. The moment this residual activity spends itself, the finite self ascends to the absolute and is absorbed in it. *Mukti* being freedom from embodiment can in no case be freedom in embodiment. Therefore so long as one lives and is conscious of one's body and its needs, one has no *mokṣa*, and is bound by the rules of *gñāna* and *karma* with a view to attain it². It should be noted in this

¹ "Vākyaarthagñāna mātrāṇa samsārika nivṛttibhāvovagamyate." [III. iv. 26.]

² "Yāvat karma nibandhanānuvṛttih tāvat āśrama karmānuvṛttiraśakyā nivartayitum." [III. iv. 26.]

connection that *gñāna*, according to Bhāskara, includes *upāsana* or meditation.

The *Bhedābheda-vāda* recognises the values of *karma* and *gñāna* and co-ordinates them into a synthetic method. *Karma Kāṇḍa* is a code of divine commandments whose primary object is the satisfaction of empirical desires. It elaborates the science of sacrificial and other duties by a system of rewards and punishments and seeks to establish harmonious relations between human beings and the cosmic deities. But the pleasures of sensibility are particular perishing states. *Karma* is a mere mechanical routine and is only a profit and loss account with the *devas*. Ceremonialism does not satisfy the spiritual craving for God. The Vedānta turns our attention from the particular to the universal and from the external to the essential and is thus a natural transition from the performance of duty (*karmavicāra*) to the realisation of the deity (*Brahmavicāra*). The method of the two *Mīmāṃsas* is the same, but the goal is different. A true understanding of *Parva Mīmāṃsa* and *Uttara Mīmāṃsa* involves the temporal idea of sequence and the logical idea of consequence and thus leads to a synthetic study. When *karma* is transfigured into a spiritual endeavour, then its hostility to *gñāna* is removed and it becomes an essential element in *ātma-gñāna*, and even Jaimini who insists so much on its primary importance admits this truth when he says that the end of *karma* is the attainment

of *svarga* as well as of *mukti* or *apavarga*. *Karma* is the science of the ideal in conduct dealing with the summum bonum of life. It is righteousness touched with rationality and the end of conduct is self-realization.

In the comprehensive scheme of *gñāna-karma-samuccaya*, the *śāstra* in its infinite tenderness recognises our psychological limitations and satisfies our moral and spiritual aspirations. *Karma* and *gñāna* are vitally related and glued together into a single method whose elements can only be distinguished but not divided. The barriers to freedom are both intellectual and moral and wisdom consists in utilising every means by which these barriers can be broken. Morality is the dynamic element of the divine life and *gñāna* furnishes the comprehensive insight into the wholeness of things. The *Māyāvādin* rejects the values of *karma* as contradictory to the knowledge of the absolute and his whole scheme of the four-fold path or *sādhana-catustaya* is based on the law of contradiction and sublation. *Mumukṣutva* or the longing for *mukti* arises according to him, from discrimination, dissociation and discipline. It is a process of eliminating the unreal and affirming the real by withdrawing the self from the non-self and abandoning all kinds of activity. Rāmānuja rejects this as mere intellectual abstractionism and regards *karma* as the inherent conative character of the *īva* but subordinates it to the discipline of

gñāna and *bhakti*. *Karma*, according to Rāmānuja, is a valuable element in *gñāna*, and finally it is transfigured into *kaṁkariya*, a life of consecration. Work is worship of God and godly men. But Bhāskara's theory of co-ordination does full justice to the claims of both, *viz.*, to the acts of will and the facts of thought. Philosophy is more interested in the values of life than in its origin and true *mumukṣutva* does not consist in suppressing or subordinating desires. Desire or *rāga* is by itself neither good nor bad and its value depends on its direction and use. *Rāga* is either *viśaya rāga* or *paramātma rāga*. In the former case, it is directed to the ends of sensibility and *svarga*; and as this lands us in the hazards and hardships of *sāmsāra*, we have to retrace our steps and follow the spiritual path, *paramātma rāga* or instinct for the infinite. Desire is neither starved nor suppressed but is spiritualized and transfigured into an infinite longing for the infinite. When one's sexual feeling is idealised and attuned to the needs of the eternal partner and alter ego as described in the *Kāma Śāstra*, it becomes the heart of virtue; but, when it is blind, bestial, clamant and chaotic, it blows where it listeth and becomes the deadliest of all sins. Likewise, if a man seeks God, he attains immortal bliss; but, if he seeks the joys of sense and is allured by them, he enters a bottomless abyss. *Kāma* is the creative urge of life; either it may give rise to bodies and their bonds, or it may release an uplifting,

divine energy. In the latter case, *kāma* really becomes *akāma* or *niṣkāma* or *ātma-kāma* and loses all its sting of sensibility and power for evil. In the same way, *kevala karma* or *kāmya karma* has its roots in sensibility and the divided life; but, when, as the *Gīta* points out, it is emptied of all its empirical content consisting of animal inclinations and ideas of utility and is done as mere duty, its value in spiritual life becomes all important. *Kevala karma* as defined by the Mīmāṃsaka no doubt pre-supposes a knowledge of the *ātman* as different from the body; but, it does not insist on the acquiring of this knowledge of *ātman*, as its main purpose is the justification of the Vedic injunctions. *Karma* is both for the *avidvān* and the *vidvān*. The former seeks the pleasures of sex, wealth and progeny and forgets his self, but the latter longs to know the supreme self and has no inclination for these empirical and ephemeral pleasures. He is interested in the science of the sacrifice of the self or *Brahmārpanam*, as the *Gīta* calls it, in which the particular and private self is offered to the universal, and the *paramātma* is seen as the pervading self of all things. When the vision is thus transfigured, *karma* ceases to be *kāmya*, becomes *niṣkāma* or *gñāna* and is thus rationalised. The vital relation between *karma* and *gñāna* as expounded in the philosophy of *gñāna-karma-samuccaya* is contained in the text in Br. Up. I. iv. 15. "When a man meditates on the self only as

his true state, his actions perish not." That the terms *gñāna* or *vedana* meaning knowledge are generally used in the Upaniṣads in the sense of *upāsana* or meditation is evident from the numerous passages, in all of which the word knowledge begins an enquiry or question and the word meditation ends the enquiry or occurs in the answer, and *vice versa*.¹ The importance of *karma* is also indicated in the Muṇḍaka text III. i. 4: "The man of action, whose sport is the self and whose pleasure is the self, this is the highest among the knowers of Brahman." The Īsopaniṣad, 2 also emphasises the need of *karma* by using the adverb *eva* after *karmāṇi kurvan* (doing action); so also the Taittirīya text in the *Nārāyaṇīya Anuvāka* speaks of discarding evil by the performance of duty (*dharmena pāpam apanuḍati*).

Bhāskara bases his whole exposition of *gñāna-karma-samuccaya* on the classical analogy of the Sūtra III. iv. 26, i.e., *aśvavat*. The horse is fit to be used, not as a plodding animal for ploughing the field, but, for riding. It is not a mere beast of burden, but is the symbol of the glory of motion. Likewise *karma*, rationalized by *gñāna* becomes the dynamic energy that is used in the glorious ascent to the absolute. There

¹ "Sarvatra hi vidinā upakramya upāsinā upasamharati; upāsinā ca upakramya vidinā upasamharati: atah ekārthataiva pratyetyavā." [I. iii. 1.]

is no antagonism between the mechanism of duty and the freedom of detachment. They are the external and internal aspects of the same method and are mutually corrective. *Karma* disciplines thought and purifies it and *gñāna* gives a meaning to activity. The former deals with the actual and the latter with the ideal and the ideal is realised in the actual. *Gñāna* is the aspect of apprehending the unity of the absolute and *karma* is the spiritual attempt to bring it about. Consequently the *Māyāvādīn* who rejects the value of *karma* in his zeal for *gñāna* and gives up all *āśramas*, abandons all moral distinctions. The duty relating to one's station in life should on no account be renounced, whether it is in the interests of attaining *svarga* or *mukti*, (*Sūtra*, III. iv. 32). The *āśramas* form a progression in attaining true knowledge and freedom, and every *āśrama* is a fulfilment of the lower, and there should be no backsliding at all. He who, through circumstances beyond his control, is not included in any of the four recognised *āśramas*, is not thereby prevented from aspiring for *Brahma-gñāna*; but he who lapses from his *āśrama*, e.g., a *naīṣṭhika*, *Brahmacārīn* or *sanyāsīn* who fails in his vows, cannot claim the same indulgence and is unfit for it even after penance. The seeker after salvation should remain in the world and at the same time be out of it like the water on the lotus leaf. While he devotes himself to duty, he practises inner

detachment. *Karma* is the inner spiritual endeavour for *mukti* of which *śama* (equanimity), *dama* (self-control), *uparati* (relinquishment), *titikṣā* (patient endurance) and *saṁādhāna* (concentration) are the outer expressions. Food is not for the palate; it not merely sustains life but also sustains the spirit and purifies it, and it is only in the extreme case of starvation and sure death that prohibited food may be taken. The practice of truth and *Ahimsa* is absolutely essential to the expansive life of the spirit. Self-control (*indriya nīgraha*), self-knowledge (*ātma-gñāna*) and straightforwardness (*ārjava*) are the sovereign remedies for the ills of *samsāra*; they make the *āśramas* and not *vice versa*. Even the *vidvān*, who has once for all arrested the empirical process and has waked to the knowledge of the absolute, should follow the rules of *āśrama* till the dissolution of his body. Therefore the Upaniṣadic injunction in Br. Up. IV. iv. 22 about the performance of sacrifice and other duties applies to all the *āśramas*, as established in *Sūtra* III. iv. 26, and, as these stand to *gñāna* in the organic relation of *aṅga* and *aṅgin* they should be observed throughout life.

In the co-ordination of *karma* and *gñāna*, there is no room for getting knowledge by forgetting the rules of *karma*. The idea of *gñāna-karma-samuccaya* naturally follows from the philosophy of *Bhedābheda*. The absolute conditions itself as the finite subjects and objects of experience (*bhokta* and *bhogyā*). In

the empirical state, the *jīva* suffers from logical errors, moral evil and spiritual imperfections (*avidyā*, *karma* and *kāma*) and forgets its true home in the Brahman that is beyond. The *mumukṣu* or seeker after salvation who longs to return to the eternal home, accepts the reality of distinctions between the subject and the object and analyses the nature of desire as defined by *Pūrva Mīmāṃsa* and *Uttara Mīmāṃsa* as a sign-post that points to different directions. He sticks to the path of duty but shifts the motive from the desires of sensibility to the security of salvation. As long as there is the contact of fire with fuel there is smoke, and, in the same way, the idea of duty and discipline clings to us as long as the *upādhis* and the body made by them continue. The *avidvān* or the ignorant man whose vision is obscured by *avidyā* regards this empirical consciousness as an essential condition of reality, but the *vidvān* knows the truth that finiteness or fragmentariness is a passing state which vanishes for ever as soon as he becomes one with *Paramēśvara*, the absolute with all its perfections.¹ The idea of agency (*karṣṭva*) and enjoyment (*bhokṣṭva*) arises from the dualistic and dividing consciousness of the *upādhis* and generates desires for the external objects of sense (*viśaya rāga*). But when these are directed to Brahman, that is within and beyond,

¹ "Aupādhikam karṣṭvam manyate vidvān; itarastu svābhāvikaṃ iti." [III 4. 26.]

the limiting process is arrested, and the *jīva*, impelled and induced by its infinite nature, breaks off the barriers and begins to expand into the absolute. This is the final consummation of the synthetic method of *gñāna-karma-samuccaya*. If *avidyā* and *kāma* finitise the self and divide it into centres, *gñāna* and *niṣkāma* set free the opposite tendency and the finite begins to grow into the infinite. The theory of *gñāna-karma-samuccaya* avoids the perils of the ideas of contradiction and subordination. While it preserves the values of life, it provides for the monistic ideal of realising the *Sat* without a second. Reality and value coincide and the stability and security of *mukti* consist in the mutual necessitation of philosophical insight and moral outlook. *Gñāna* is the awakening of absolute consciousness by the removal of *avidyā* and the cloud of unknowing and *niṣkāma* is the dynamic side of *mukti* which, by a kind of divine alchemy, enables the finite to infinitise itself. The unitive life of *ekībhāva* is thus a vision and way and it is owing to this dual character of knowledge and activity that *mukti* is defined as an awakening and an attainment.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RELIGION OF BHĀSKARA

The supreme end of life is the realisation of our oneness with Brahman by the renunciation of the *upādhis* or the limiting adjuncts. The meaning of this realisation was already explained as an apprehension as well as an attainment. *Avidyā* can never be removed by mere argumentation, and there can be no attainment of the fulness and freedom of the infinite without its immediate vision. In the positive sense, the process of *mukti* or liberation therefore connotes both the elements of philosophic insight and moral outlook, and, in the negative sense, it is freedom from *avidyā* and *karma* which together form the twin shackles of sensibility. According to Bhāskara, *mukti* consists in retracing the steps and returning to the absolute. In the cosmological enquiry, we traced the stages by which the infinite seeks a finite setting; and showed how, guided by the impulse of concrete monism, Bhāskara avoids the perils of *Māyāvāda* on the one hand and naive theism on the other, and posits the idea of the *upādhis* as the only view that reconciles both. But all these views frankly recognize the ultimate indefinability of *avidyā-karma* and the philosophy of religion is, pragmatically speaking, more interested in seeking release and redemption from the world-process than in accounting for its origin.

In the religious aspect, the *Bhedābheda*vādin ceases to think of distinctions and strives for spiritual union. The *upādhis* divide the one and distort it into the many. They are the finitising complex which somehow resides at the heart of reality and conditions the unconditioned. They make for distinctions and duality and entangle the finite self in embodiment and the sorrows of *samsāra*. Owing to the sense of finiteness and separateness, we are tossed between birth and death, heaven and hell. When we realise the agony of this mistake and misadventure, our infinite nature asserts itself and the angle of vision is entirely changed. The empirical "I" now longs for union with the absolute "I." The divided self seeks to merge itself in the expansive consciousness of the absolute. Philosophic thinking and moral endeavour get merged in the mystic yearning for the fulness and freedom of this divine oneness, in which the sense of separateness is dissolved in the bliss of infinite expanse. Mere philosophy delights in analysis and abstractions and gives us only world-views and not God-visions. Synthetic unity never quenches the thirst for spiritual union; and even the moral ideas of duty and virtue give us no promise of fruition and fulfilment. Being the products of *upādhis*, they give us only fragmentary views. But when the monistic or the *abheda* element becomes predominant, the divine urge is slowly felt, and we give up the ephemeral values of the divided life

for the enduring bliss of *ekābhāva* or oneness with the absolute. The self emerges from the realms of sense and thought and expands into the ocean of divine life. Since the *abheda* element is stronger than the *bheda*, the *Śāstra* assures us of the ultimate triumph of the self over its *upādhis*. The very idea of *mukti* contains the possibility of transcending the limitations of empirical life, and becoming one with the absolute. The only difference in the three monistic schools of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara is that Śaṅkara emphasizes the metaphysical knowledge of Brahman in terms of non-dualism, while Rāmānuja insists on a moral monism in which the *jīva* is effaced in service and self-gift; but Bhāskara is inclined to mystic monism and longs for absorption in the absolute. The finite is dissolved in the infinite and soaked in its bliss.

The third chapter of the *Sūtras* discusses the important question of the relation between endeavour and enlightenment. Is the intuition of Brahman one single immediate apprehension or a progressive realisation? The *Māyāvādin* contends that intuition is opposed to relational thought and moral endeavour. Thought is always mediate and never immediate, and moral effort involves the eternal distinction between the actual and the ideal. In the same way, devotion to a personal God lands us in externality and duality. Consequently reflection and righteousness can never bring about the immediate knowledge of.

God. But Bhāskara thinks that this line of argument is entirely untenable and inadmissible. If there is no finality in duty and devotion, much less is it in *Māyāvāda* argumentation and assertion. There is no cessation of *avidyā* (*avidyānīṣṛti*) till the last trace of *prārabdha karma* that has concretised itself into the body and its changes, is effaced. But if it be said that the experience of pleasure and pain belongs only to the *kṣetragñā* or the embodied self and is therefore false (*mithyā*) and the true freedom of self-realisation (*svānubhava*) is to be identified with the absolute, then the meaning of this self-realisation or *svānubhava* has to be clearly defined. Whose *svānubhava* is it? Is it of the *jīva* or of the *Paramātman*? It cannot be of the former, as individual experience involves the uniqueness of the freed self and its numerical distinctness from other selves which are yet obscured by *avidyā*, nor can it be the experience of the *Paramātman* who is not a *samsārin* but is eternally self-realised and free (*satyasaṅkalpa*). If *svānubhava* be the self-intuition of the absolute, then *jīva* is a bare negation (*avastu*) and there is no meaning in negating a negation. To say that the true ever is and the false never exists is formal logic devoid of content. If it be a significant negation, then a distinction between the self and the not-self has to be predicated as real moments of the absolute. If *svānubhava* is the negation of the negation, then, since *avidyā* is an all-enveloping gloom, its removal would bring

about immediate universal illumination (*yugapat sarva mukti prasaṅga*), but the cosmic confusion continues in spite of the *svānubhava* of the *jīvanmukta*. Even in the case of the *jīvanmukta*, freedom is only a progressive realisation and not an immediate intuition in which the world-fiction vanishes. The *jīvanmukta* is found engaged in sustaining his life, in beneficent work and in the practice of ceaseless *samādhi*; and all these are activities involving desire, deliberation and decision, whereas, as the *ātman* is eternal (*natya*) and immaterial (*suddha*) without embodiment (*śarīra sambandha*), embodiedness and emancipation cannot coexist; self-extinction would be the only logical conclusion of *mukti* here-now. It may perhaps be argued that *mukti* means a gradual vanishing of the world-fiction involving the knowledge of the real by *śravaṇa* or instruction, the inferential knowledge known as *manana*, the dawn of *advaitic* intuition and the disappearance of duality (*dvaita gñāna*) and embodiment. But this would contradict the *advaitic* theory of contradiction. If *avidyā* is opposed to *gñāna* as darkness is opposed to light, then it cannot be a gradually vanishing process, as there can be no stages in sublation and self-identity. A consistent *Māyāvādin* cannot say that the illusion remains but illusoriness vanishes. The embodied state of the *jīvanmukta* cannot be accounted for as having its origin in residual (*pūrurabdha*) *karma*, as that would

involve the acceptance of the reality of moral and spiritual effort. The view that *gñāna* is not only obscured by *karma* but is also obstructed and overpowered by it in the empirical state is not consistent with *Māyāvāda*. There can be no degrees in the immediate intuition of the absolute and the negation of non-Brahman or *Māya*. Besides, the idea of *jīvanmukti* cannot apply to the cases of Vyāsa and other cosmic helpers who are said to live eternally in the world with a view to turn the mind of the ignorant to the high-ways of heaven.

The true meaning of *avidyā* is the sense of separateness that arises from the mistaken identity of the *ātman* with conditionateness and the ignorance of its infinite nature. The roots of *avidyā* are deeply embedded in finiteness, as *mūlāvidyā* which persists as a potentiality even in the state of *pralaya*, and can be removed only by perfect discipline and an infinite striving for the infinite. *Mukti* can never be got for the mere asking, and the *mumukṣu* has to develop an irresistible spiritual craving for eternity to counteract the influence of age-long ignorance and its endless sorrows.¹ The will to win the unity of the life that is beyond, has its response in the infinite invading the finite and transfiguring its nature. Spiritual life is thus not an endless becoming or progress, but an ascent

¹ "Dehādiṣu viparītapratipattiḥ Brahmasvarūpā pratipattiśca avidyā." [IV i. 1]

to the heights of the eternal and essential self and attaining its immortal bliss. This is the ideal in which all ideals are realised.

The Upaniṣad points to the parting of the ways between the sphere of *samsāra* and the sphere of salvation, and indicates and illumines the pathway to reality. It insists on the meditation of the supreme self without a second as the only method of transcending the hardships of *samsāra*. Meditation or *dhyāna* is the result of spiritual instruction and is midway between reflection and realisation. It is the ceaseless effort of the mind to give up its diffuseness and distraction, and enter into the silent sanctuary of the spirit and become one with it. The *mauni* selects an atmosphere of solitude and serenity and, sitting motionless like a statue, focusses his whole self on the blissful nature of Brahman and continues this practice till the dissolution of his body (*āprayāṇāt*) vide Sutra IV. i. 12 and the *Agnī-rahasya* text referred to therein. The Vedānta recognises the psychological differences of temperament and inclination and furnishes a scheme of thirty-two meditations for individual selection and practice. Though they differ in nature (*vidyā*), form (*rūpa*), means (*codanā*), and purpose (*phala*), the ultimate goal of all is the realisation of Brahman. In the monistic meditation, the duality of thought

(Continuation of Foot-note from previous page.)

“Sā samyaggñānotpattau nivartate. Tacca samyaggñānam utpannam yāvajjīvam abhyasyamānam paripakvam apavarga kṣamam bhavati.”

is dissolved into a non-dualistic experience. The distinctions of empirical life are merely the accidents of *avidyā* and the contingent factors of *karma*. Just as the impurities of gold are cleansed by contact with fire, the knowledge of the essential and the enduring self removes the barriers of *bhāva* and deifies the self. The Upaniṣad pours out the entrancing ecstasy of this single-soul life in such immortal sayings as 'I am thou, O, blessed God, and thou indeed art I' of the *Jābāla Śruti*. When the mind is habitually focussed on this *abheda* aspect, the finite and the infinite are glued together and the bonds of *bheda* are gradually broken off.¹

Every meditation implies the metaphysical distinction of the subject-object consciousness. Determination is not sublated and transcended by the indeterminate. The Advaitic distinction between the indeterminate (*Nirguṇa*) and the determinate (*Saguṇa*) finds no warrant in the Śruti. The Sūtras devote one whole section in the third chapter known as the *Ubhayalinga Pāda* to combat this view of *Nirguṇa Brahman* as the root error of *Māyāvāda* metaphysics and when Yāgñavalkya employs in Br. Up. IV. iv. 22 the method of negation in determining the nature of Brahman, he does not affirm the absolute by denying the empirical, but recommends the meditation on Brahman as the ultimate ground of all beings (*kāraṇātma*) who is essentially formless and eternal as distinct from his cosmic

¹ Upādhi kṛta bhedastu abheda bhāvanayā upanīyate.
[IV. i. 3.]

form of conditionateness or *natura naturata*. The finite expresses the infinite but does not exhaust it. Waves and ripples rise from the vast expanse of the ocean, but they do not constitute it and the infinity of selves are but crests of cosmic consciousness. The cosmic system is but a spark of the supreme self ; and its infinity can never be exhausted by the finite and the fragmentary. Consequently the seeker after *mukti* should meditate on the *Nirākāra Brahman* which is beyond the cosmic *nāma-rūpa*. Brahman both is and has infinite consciousness and bliss (*caitanya* and *caitanyavat*). This relation of *dharma* and *dharmin* is an indissoluble subject-object unity like fire and heat, and the determining qualities define Brahman and do not deny this nature. The formlessness of Brahman is not to be identified with characterlessness. Svetaketu is therefore asked to meditate on divine causality as the *sat* without a second. Causality is not the logical category involving spatial and temporal ideas, but connotes the supreme centre and source of all reality, and therefore Uddālaka employs nine analogies like the sprouting of the seed, the gathering of honey, and salt dissolved in water, to bring out the nature of Brahman as the supreme *sat*, which is the ground and goal of all beings and their immanent unity by knowing which everything else is known ; and in no context does he think of the rope-snake riddle. Brahman is defined as *satyasya satya*

and *paramātmān*, and there is not the slightest reference in these terms to sublation and indeterminateness. The terms like bridge, quantity and relation do not distinguish between two kinds of Brahman. The bridge analogy employed in the text emphasises the idea of Brahman as the support and sustenance of the world. The category of quantity is utilised in the interests of meditation, and the term *sambandha* or relation emphasises spiritual unity and denies externality. The word *avyakta* or unknowability applies only to the empirical *jīva* imprisoned in embodiment, but, when the *jīva* is purified, it transcends itself and realises its infinity. Brahman is both the eternal seer and the empirical object; meditation on the former aspect removes the relativity of thought and arouses the spirit of expansion, till, at last, the divided self becomes one with the unity of Brahman. In the immortal words of the Upaniṣad, the *jīva* knows Brahman and becomes one with it (*Brahma eva bhavati*) (Munḍ. Up. III. ii. 9).

The *Dhyāna-nyogavādin* comes forward with his scheme of attaining *advaita-gñāna* by a process of meditation and progressive realization. He states that the cessation of illusoriness and embodiedness is not effected by a mere cognition of reality and consequently scripture gives certain injunctions by which the mind is purified and illumined by the knowledge of identity. But injunctions and imperatives only refer to endeavour and not to the affirmation of reality. There is

difference between the apprehension of Brahman and the endeavour to bring it about. Knowledge is given and not made; it is ultimate, self-originated and immediate and not mediate and mandatory. Therefore there is no need for the mediacy of *niyoga*. *Dhyāna* is a direct intuition of Brahman and *niyoga* is only an external agency for which there is no warrant in Vedānta. The whole doctrine is therefore a mere fabrication without any Sāstraic foundation.

The *Niṣprapañcīkaraṇanyogavādin* with his idea of the realisation of the self by the act (*niyoga*) of cosmic dissolution suggests an alternative scheme. Whatever is originated is *ipso facto* ephemeral. The world as the objectified form of Brahman is a fleeting flux, and true knowledge consists in effacing the effect and attaining the eternal. This view is also absurd. How can cosmic destruction produce self-realisation when the cosmos and the self are entirely different? Besides the destruction of objective reality is impossible and has no Sāstraic sanction. The texts that refer to *laya* or dissolution connote only absorption and not destruction. Sleep is not the abolition of consciousness and, in the same way, in *pralaya*, the world process is not destroyed but persists as a real possibility. Also, the dissolution of the cosmos cannot be a self-destructive process. It requires another to destroy it and that again should be destroyed by another and so on *ad infinitum*. Again this dissolu-

tion must be either objective (*sādhāraṇa*) or subjective (*viśiṣṭa*). It cannot be the former, as that would result in the salvation of all when one is saved and this is not a fact and the world process persists in spite of Śuka having attained *mukti*. But if by dissolution is meant freedom from the subjective conditions of *avidyā*, *kāma* and *karma* which are the cause of bondage, then this is virtually the acceptance of Bhāskara's own position. It is only the sense of plurality that is removed and not plurality itself. The term *niyoga* presupposes the instrument of action, the mode of action, and also the agent. If *prapañca* is an effect, then it cannot destroy itself. If it is the *sādhana*, (or means) different from *sādhya* (accomplishment), then since the *sādhana* is real, there is no way of destroying it. Achievement presupposes aspiration and the two are vitally related. If the idea of dissolution is an immediate cognition, then there is no need for attaining what is already intuited. Besides, what is the nature of the knowledge by which the prescribed dissolution of the world of experience is to be accomplished? It cannot be mere knowledge resulting from the study of scripture, as such knowledge is not a voluntary act to be prescribed. Nor can it be meditation, as the latter, so far from destroying the world of differences, creates a further world of the subjects and objects of meditation (*dhyāta* and *dhyeya*), etc. The idea of *niyoga* as an agency has already been refuted. Rāmānuja's criticism of the same subject

in Sūtra I. i. 4 is almost similar, though it is more profound and penetrating.

The immediate consequence of the practice of *abheda* as outlined in the Vedānta is the destruction of the seeds of *samsāra*. Empirical life is conditioned by the complex of *avidyā*, *kāma* and *karma* and is an endless regress of cause and effect. Like the seed and the tree (*bījāṅkura nyāya*), these limiting conditions involve one another and therefore defy all analysis and explanation. The result is an age-long *upādhi* that is stored up in the finite content. *Avidyā* generates the desire for sense objects, and desire causes *avidyā*, and the mechanism of *karma* mediates between both and produces the psycho-physical apparatus consisting of *manas*, sense organs and the body. Death is only the dissolution of the physical body (*sthūla śarīra*) and not of the mental complex. In this way, the finite self is cribbed and cabined by the *upādhis* which pursue it like phantoms wherever it goes. The *upādhis* make the self and the self makes the *upādhis* and the result is endless becoming and bondage. But the whole process is completely arrested by the continued meditation of Brahman and gradually destroyed by it. *Karma* is destroyed by *gñāna*, like seeds burnt by fire. The Vedānta guarantees the triumph of the self over its *upādhis* in the classical statement "The effect of *karma* is dissolved when one intuits the supreme self." (Muṇḍ. Up. II. ii. 8.)

The *vidvān*, who has an immediate vision of Brahman (*samyak darśana*), has not the slightest taint of evil but is unsullied and detached like the water on the lotus leaf. He is not elated by success nor depressed by disappointment. *Rāga* and *dveṣa*, good and evil, pleasure and pain being relative and mutually dependent, the *vidvān* dissociates himself from these pairs of opposites and practises the expansive consciousness. The seed of births stored up in *sañcita* is destroyed for ever. But *prārabdha karma*, which has already begun to materialise, continues as long as the body lasts (Sūtra IV. 1. 14-15.) Ch. Up. VI. xiv. 2 accordingly affirms that *gñāna-śakti* destroys only a portion of *karma* (*sañcita*) and not the whole, just as lightning strikes down the things of the world without affecting the cloud-land.

The theory of the *Māyāvādin*, however, is inconsistent with this view. He has to posit the principle of *jīvanmukti* or freedom in embodiment, as, according to him, the knowledge of *advaita* should immediately destroy *avidyā*, the cause of the experience of difference, and there can be no degrees in dispelling *avidyā*. How then does the *jīvanmukta*, who does not perceive any difference, live and move and have his being in this world of difference? To explain this discrepancy, the *Māyāvādin* gives various analogies proving the persistence of the effect even after the removal of the cause. The potter's wheel, for example, continues to rotate for some time by the force of inertia, even after

the removal of the cause. This analogy is unsound, as it presupposes the real *samskāra* of rotation on a real *vastu* or *ūśraya*, the potter's wheel. But according to the *Māyāvādīn*, the whole of empirical experience is due to *avidyā* which is really a veil and not a wheel, and when it is destroyed, there is nothing further in the nature of *ūśraya* or *samskāra* by which phenomenal reality persists. Neither is the analogy of the man who sees two moons through the eye-disease called *timira* helpful to him. The *Māyāvādīn* argues that, as soon as the man discovers that the illusion of the double moon is due to his own defective vision, illusoriness vanishes though the illusion remains; the sensation continues without any significance. Similarly, though *avidyā*, the cause of the sense of duality, is destroyed by Advaitic intuition, still the body, the effected state of *avidyā*, functions for a while as reflex activity. This simile is unsound as the continuance of the illusion is due to the continuance of the real defect known as *timira*, which is not destroyed by true knowledge, whereas, to the Advaitin, when *avidyā* is destroyed by true knowledge, nothing real remains except the undifferentiated Brahman. The defect is not an illusion (*māyopādhi*) but a real defect (*satyopādhi*). But the principles of *bhedābheda* and *gñāna-kārma-samuccaya* satisfactorily explain the co-existence of *Brahma-gñāna* and the persistence of the body feeling. The *vidvān* has only a glimpse of the immortal sea that lies beyond and has to practise the

idea of *abheda* and perform the duties of his *āśrama*. It is only when the body is dissolved that the residual effect is exhausted and the sense of separateness vanishes and the *vidvān* earns his freedom for ever.

UTKRĀNTI: ASCENT TO THE ABSOLUTE

Death is not to be regarded as the dissolution of the psychic make-up. It is the psychic mechanism (*līṅga śarīra*) that maintains physical life, migrates endlessly from sphere to sphere and has the capacity to contract and expand (*saṅkoca-vikāśa*). The *jīva* perseveres in its own being for ever and the modifications of the mental complex do not affect the spiritual self.¹ When the body is dissolved, the emancipated ego withdraws itself from the obstruction of body-mind and has an intimation of eternity. The senses are merged in *manas* or the inner sense. *Manas* is absorbed in the *prāṇa* or life and life in the *jīva*. When the illumined self sheds its body for ever and ascends gloriously to its abode in the absolute, a sudden flash of light reveals the godward path known as the *devayāna*. The nerve known as the *suṣumnā nādi* marks the divergence of the path of eternal release from that leading to endless hazards. The ignorant follow the dreary path of the *pitṛs* or suffer from the sorrows of sin, but the *vidvān*, equipped with the insight and strength

¹ "Na hi tasya svatassañkocavikāśau, nityatvāt."
[IV. ii. 11.]

that comes from the ceaseless meditation on his divine destiny (*gati cintanā*), enters the straight and shining way of the gods (*devayāna*). Uplifted by the inner self, the liberated ego passes gloriously through the luminous regions to its pre-established centre. This spiritual progress is facilitated by the help rendered by the celestial beings known as *ātivāhika puruṣas* who are really the ambassadors of the absolute. The expanding soul moves higher still to the regions of fire, water, air, sun and moon and is greeted by the cosmic deities who are called *Varuṇa*, *Indra* and *Brahma*. These are not sign-posts (*mārgacinna*) nor spheres of enjoyment (*bhogasthāna*) but spiritual powers with specific functions, of which the most important is the greeting and glorifying of the rare and radiant self in its triumphant progress to extra-cosmic consciousness. When it reaches the essential self which is the eternal centre and source of all goodness, beauty and truth, it expands into infinity and is for ever lost *en rapport* with it. Who can describe the expanse of spirit in the spaceless effulgence of the *svayam jyotis* in which the light of a million suns and stars fades into that of mere sparks? Who can express the entrancing ecstasy of the sundered self with its deathless and divine longing for its Other, losing itself irresistibly in absolute bliss compared to which the sum total of all sensual and celestial joys dwindles into nothingness?

The Sūtrakāra next raises the interesting eschatological question whether this theory of *arcirādi gati* involving progress and attainment applies to the realisation of the supreme (*para*) Brahman or the effected (*kārya*) Brahman, *Hiraṇyagarbha*, and takes as his text the passage in Ch. Up. V. x. 1-2 promising to the *pañcāgnividyūniṣṭha* and also to the *upāsakas* in the forest the godward (*devayāna*) path described above and ending with the words "He takes them to Brahman. This is the godward path" (*sa enūn brahma gamayati, eṣa devayānaḥ pañthāḥ*). Bādari, the monistic or Advaitic philosopher, takes the text to refer to *Kārya Brahman* only as *gati* or movement applies only to the spatialized and phenomenalized Brahman and not to the absolute. There is an insuperable objection to this interpretation, as the neuter form *Brahma* in the accusative connotes the absolute only and the correct form for designating the effected Brahman would be the masculine "*Brahmāṇam*." Bādari seeks to get over this difficulty by holding that the word standing for *kūraṇa* is here used in a secondary sense (*lakṣaṇayā*) signifying the *kārya*, as the latter, i. e., *Hiraṇyagarbha* is very near the supreme Brahman. Owing to proximity, the first-born of the absolute is referred to as the absolute itself. The predication of final release in the corresponding Chāndogya passage in IV. xv. 6 and of immortality in Kath. Up. text II. vi. 16 to the seekers after *Kārya Brahman*

involves no contradiction at all, as the *Śruti* and *Smṛti* also guarantee eventual release to the worshippers of *Kārya Brahman* along with the latter himself when his world is dissolved in *mahāpralaya* (cosmic dissolution). Besides in the corresponding passage in Bṛ. Up. VI. ii. 15 "He leads them to the worlds of Brahman. They live in these worlds of Brahman for ever and ever," the plural "worlds" clearly indicates that the reference is to the *Kārya Brahman* and the pluralistic universe and not to the absolute. Similarly the text in Ch. Up. VIII. xiv "I enter the hall of *Prajāpati*, to the house" can refer only to *Kārya Brahman*. Bādarī's view, as stated above, is first given by the *Sūtrakāra* in this *Adhikaraṇa* as a *prima facie* (*pūrvapakṣa*) view to be rebutted later by stating Jaimini's opinion and finally his own *siddhānta*. But the Advaitins maintain by a method of interpretation described by Thibaut as "altogether inadmissible" that this is the *siddhānta* of the *Sūtrakāra*. An arbitrary distinction is drawn by them between *Saguṇa Brahman* and *Para Brahman* by identifying Bādarī's *Kārya Brahman* with the former and the latter with *Nirguṇa*. The first is stated to be metaphorical and the second metaphysical. This conclusion is justified by the arguments advanced by the philosopher against the anthropomorphic views of Brahman held by the empirically minded. The notion of a paradise or *Brahmaloka* in which the freed soul 'rests in golden groves and basks in eternal

summer' is opposed to the philosophic experience of the absolute. But the devotees of a personal God are interested in clothing their spiritual experience in terms of historical progress and geographical position. The ideas of ascent (*gati*) and attainment (*prāpti*), according to the Advaitin, are only categories of phenomenal reality and are opposed to the idea of the all-pervading unity. In *mukti* there is no going or goal or any such somnambulistic speculation. It is the metaphysical apprehension of the absolute as an eternally self-realised fact and not a spiritual attainment or super-addition. It is only the awakening from *avidyā* and not the accomplishment of a far-off event. It is essentially the experience of eternal consciousness that transcends the distinctions of time and space and is not to be identified with the spatial ideas of ascent and the historical ideas of progress. The distinctions of here and yonder, now and hereafter hold good only in the case of attaining the world of *Saguṇa Brahman*, but the identity consciousness of *Nirguṇa Brahman* is here-now or absolute.

Following the interpretation of Jaimini and Bādarāyana, Bhāskara exposes the fallacies of this theory by appealing to reason and revelation and thus establishes the reality of *gati* in realising the supreme Brahman. True wisdom is not the virtual knowledge of self-identity but is won by spiritual effort, and it becomes a progressive attainment. Bādari's argument that the term 'Brahman' in the neuter has only a

secondary meaning and refers to *Hiraṇyagarbha* is against all the accepted rules of interpretation. Every term has a fixed meaning or *mukhyārtha* and this should not be lightly rejected in favour of a secondary meaning. There is no inherent inappropriateness in ascribing *gati* to the seeker of supreme Brahman, as progress pertains to the *liṅga śarīra* and connotes self-determination and not self-sophistication. As a matter of fact, even when the *jīva* goes from one body to another in the world of *samsāra*, it is the associated *liṅga śarīra* that undergoes the locomotion and not the *svarūpa* of the *jīva*¹. Besides, any inappropriateness in a *gati* towards an omnipresent *Para Brahman* would equally, and perhaps with greater force, apply to the Advaitin's *Saguṇa Brahman*.² If *Saguṇa Brahman* is not possessed of omnipresence and other qualities like purity (*apahata-pāpma*), it ceases to be Brahman and becomes *abrahman*. As regards the plural expression, "the worlds of Brahman," in Br. Up. VI. ii. 15, the 'of' is clearly appositional and involves no self-contradiction. This is evident from the corresponding expression in Ch. Up. V. x. 2 and IV. xv. 6 which is simply 'Brahman' in the neuter. Thus the term 'worlds of

¹ "Samsāriṇopi svarūpato gatiḥ nopapadyate ; tasyāpi liṅga śarīradeva gamanam." [IV. iii. 13].

² "Yadi nirguṇāyām gatiranupapannā, saguṇāsvapi vidyāsu samānānupapattiḥ." [IV. iii. 13].

Brahman' really connotes Brahman and the use of the plural for the singular in this case is similar to the case of "*aditiḥ pāsūn pramumoktu*" where the plural *pāsūn* (cords) denotes also a single cord. The locative "in the worlds" also connotes the ultimate spiritual purpose, i.e., for the full enjoyment of Brahman.¹ The reference to *Prajāpati* in the Ch. text VIII. xiv also is not to *Kārya Brahman* as the expressions there about the sustainer of names and "I am the glorious among Brahman" clearly indicate.

But, says the Pūrvapakṣin, the text "of him, the *prāṇas* do not depart" in Bṛ. Up. IV. iv. 6 clearly states that the *liṅga śarīra* does not leave the body of one who realises the self. This interpretation is controverted by the Sūtrakāra himself in Sūtra IV. ii. 12, where he points out that the *Mādhyandina* reading of the same text is "From him, the *prāṇas* do not depart", i.e., the *liṅga śarīra* does not leave the *vidvān* immediately at death, but accompanies him throughout the ascent to the absolute, till he crosses the whole *samsāric* world and passes beyond the world of *Hiraṇyagarbha*, when it is dissolved in the supreme Brahman². The genitive in the former reading denotes a general relation (*sambandha-*

¹ "Saptamī nimitta mātra vivakṣayā avakalpate. [IV. iii. 13]

² "Prāgeva liṅgasya praḷayo nāsti; samsāramandalam hiraṇyagarbha paryantam atikramya praḷayo bhavati." [IV. ii. 12.]

sāmānya) which, in the light of the other reading, is fixed as the ablative, *i.e.*, from. Even without the other reading, the context shows that there is no question whether the *prāṇas*, *i.e.*, the *līṅga śarīra*, leave the physical (*sthūla*) body. The only doubt is whether, in the case of the *vidvān*, the *līṅga śarīra*, which is the result of *upādhi*, is destroyed immediately at death as seems *prima facie* probable. The *Śruti* states that, by virtue of his *gñāna* and *karma*, the *vidvān* continues to have the *līṅga śarīra* till he completes the ascent and attains the absolute. Consequently the term 'him' has its natural significance, *i. e.*, the *jīva*, the *śarīrin* or the soaring self as the Sūtra says and not the *śarīra*. The same meaning has also to be applied in interpreting Ārta bhāga's question and Yāgñavalkya's reply in Bṛ. Up III. ii. 11: "When this man dies, do the *prāṇas* depart from him? Not so, not so, replied Yāgñavalkya; here only they continue in conjunction that perspires and swells and swollen lies dead." But if the departure of the *prāṇas* from the body be denied, the latter half of the answer about the body lying swollen and dead would be inappropriate and the answer would also be opposed to our normal experience. This meaning is confirmed also by the succeeding passage in the text which speaks of the ascent of the *Brahmavid* and the *Pañcāgnividya*niṣṭha. The Advaitin's attempt to strain the Sūtra IV. ii. 12 in his

favour by splitting it up into two, and interpreting the word *ekēṣūm* as referring to *Ārtabhāgapraśna* instead of to the corresponding *Mādhyandina* reading and ignoring the force of the particle *hi* is, according to Bhāskara (and we may add, according to Thibaut also, *vide* p. lxxxix of the Introduction to his translation of the Śaṅkara Bhāṣya), "altogether impossible." The Sūtra IV. ii. 14 describes the ultimate absorption of the *līṅga śarīra* in the absolute¹ and the ideas of *gati* and *gamana* or spiritual pathway of Reality are deduced from the scripture alone.

Every one, who has an insight into the Vedāntic tradition (*sampradāya*), is aware of Brahman as the *Paramātmān* that is immanent in all things and is absolutely perfect, and that it alone has the power to free the *jīva* from the evils of *samsāra*. Like fire and its light, experience always involves an experiencing subject and object. Consciousness implies a self-conscious personality, and this distinction does not introduce the notion of an antagonism between the self and the non-self, light and darkness, or *Saguṇa Brahman* and *Nirguṇa Brahman*. Even granting the distinction between the relational and the absolute, the idea of *Īśvara* undergoing contraction and expansion is entirely unknown to the Upaniṣads. *Īśvara* is defined as the all-self or the absolute and the idea that *gantavya* and *prāpya* imply a spatial and

¹ "Yataḥ prādurbhūtāḥ tatraiva svakāraṇe pralīyante." [IV. ii. 14].

temporal distinction is absolutely inconsistent with the eternal purity and perfection of *Īśvara*. Determination does not sublate the absolute but is inherent in its very nature. Self-consciousness and other qualities are as pervasive as consciousness itself like the all-pervading *ākāśa*. The negative definitions of Brahman like *asthūla* do not contradict determination but only deny the pantheistic view that Brahman is the universe. Predication is thus not a perversion of reality but is its revelation; reality can be realized and the attempt to account for it as a mere *arthavāda* (or a statement not to be taken in earnest) commits us to the notion of a bare Brahman which is absolutely blank. If *Brahmānanda* is an illusion and not the essence of spiritual life, *arthavāda* and not *asādhūraṇa guṇa*, then the desire for *apavarga* or *mukti* itself becomes an *arthavāda*. Then all the texts dealing with spiritual destiny and attainment should be rejected as valueless.¹ If the theory of *gati* has only an empirical value and applies to the fiction-ridden finite self (*cātanya ābhāsa*), then it may be asked "Is this reflection or *ābhāsa* real (*vastu*)" or unreal (*avastu*)? If it is non-existent, then there is no seeker after salvation, and the whole Vedāntic enquiry becomes futile or idle. But if it has substantiality, then *Māyāvāda* falls to the ground.

The Upaniṣad repeatedly declares the attainment of Brahman as the goal and glory of spiritual life.

¹ "Tatra gatiśrutayah kūpe praveśayitavyāh." [IV. iii. 13.]

The Chāndogya text IV. xv. 6, the Muṇḍaka text I. ii. 11, and Praśna Up. text I. 10 promise eternal life (*apunarāvṛtti*) to the wise man who seeks the solar path and avoids the lunar path. The Kath. Up. text II. vi. 16, and the Aitareya Upaniṣad speak of ascent and immortality in connection with *Parā-vidyā* or meditation on the Supreme Brahman only. The *Gīta* likewise distinguishes in several places between the empirical path and the path leading to eternal life. Similarly the Purāṇas speak of the path leading to immortality. So also, the Vājasaneyaka text "there is no return here for them." The term "here" does not mean this kalpa or the chance of return in the next. As a matter of fact the term *iha* is not found in the Kāṇva reading. Thus Bhāskara concludes that the theory of *bhedābheda* and *upādhis* alone recognises the reality of the distinction between aspiration and attainment, *prāpaka* and *prāpya*, and satisfactorily explains the attainment of Brahman as a progressive ascent to the absolute. The wise man knows the distinction between *bheda* and *abheda* and with the insight and strength acquired by the practice of *gñāna-karma* abandons the former (*bheda*) and finally becomes one with Brahman. It is true that, at first sight, there appear to be conflicting statements in the *śruti* regarding the nature of this attainment. But the Sūtras reconcile these apparent differences by adopting a principle well-known in Vedānta as *tatkratu nyāya*. The Ch.

text III. xiv. 1 says: "According to what a man meditates on in this world, that he attains in the next." There is a close relation between the nature of desire and its realisation. The *upāsaka* may meditate on the *Kārya Brahman* or on *Para Brahman*; and corresponding to these two types of seekers there are two types of *mukti* known as *krama mukti* and *sadyo mukti*. One type of seeker aspires for the world of *Hiraṇyagarbha* or *Kārya Brahman* and by the practice of purity and self-discipline he attains the kingdom of *Brahma* and eventually realises the absolute along with *Brahma*. *Pañcāgni Vidyā* also leads first to the world of *Kārya Brahman*. But the seeker after *Para Brahman* or the Supreme Reality becomes Brahman at once. Thus there are two *vidyās* and paths. One gradually leads the aspirant to the summit of this *samsāra maṇḍala* and promises release and transcendence in due course. But the other is a straight path to the supreme self. The pluralistic temper delights in endeavour and progressive attainment and the monistic type longs for eternity and immediate ascent to the absolute. But in either case, the absolute is the ultimate home and is reached through the *arcirādigati* as the *liṅga śarīra* persists till it is dissolved in the absolute¹.

It now remains for us to analyse the content of *mukti* and determine its exact meaning by a critical

¹ "Arcirādinā gatvā paramātmāni liṅga pralayah, na prāk." [IV. iii. 13.]

examination of the antagonistic theories formulated by the Advaitins and naive theists. We may develop the theme by discussing the exact meaning of the Chāndogya Up. text in VIII. iii. 4 which says that the freed soul attains the supreme light and realises its essential nature (*param jyotir upasampadya svena rūpeṇa abhiniṣpadyate*). The term *svena* indicates that no adventitious celestial or *aprākṛta* form is newly assumed by the self and it connotes its essential, eternal, spiritual nature. The expression *param jyotir upasampadya* refers to the realisation of the supreme self (*śuddha paramātma rūpa*) by renouncing the empirical adjunct. This *jyotis* is not the physical light of suns and stars, but the transcendental light (*jyotiṣām jyotis*) 'that never was on sea or land.' The Upaniṣad thus expresses the nature of *mukti* as self-realisation by self-transcendence. The separate psychic self now becomes the supreme shining self and thus attains eternal freedom. The essence of *mukti* is the attainment of absolute life or *avibhāga* with the absolute.

Now arises the interesting question whether self-realisation involves the persistence of the finite self or its absorption in the absolute. Is *avibhāga* absorption or indistinguishableness? Is it the loss of personality or the loss in personality or is it the self-identity of the absolute? The monist employs the terms absorption, coalescence, dissolution, dissipation, expansion, and identity in a loose sense without

defining their exact distinctions. The Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja is in favour of individual survival and the conservation of the values of finite personality. *Avibhāga* is, according to him, a union with the supreme self expressed in the form of self-effacement or self-gift. There is a coalescence of content between the finite and the infinite in spite of their separate existence. The divine will pours itself into the finite and becomes one with it in a single personality. It is the ecstasy of communion in which love realises itself by the effacement of the self. But Śaṅkara sees the self-contradiction in two different centres of experience, having their own individuality, and yet getting merged in a single self-centred personality, and therefore explains *avibhāga* as the identity with the absolute by eliminating the empirical ideas of self-gift and sovereignty. *Mukti*, according to Śaṅkara, is only a cessation of *avidyā* and bondage and not the accession of something new. Bhāskara is not in favour of identity or inseparability but is inclined to interpret *mukti* as self-expansion and *ekābhāva* or oneness with the absolute. The monistic texts like "Thou art That," "I am Brahman" refer to the finite centre as a divided self becoming one with the infinite. This truth is brought out by the simile of the ether in the jar becoming one with the all-pervading ether when the jar is broken. In the same way, owing to the *upādhi*, the absolute divides itself into the finite, and, when it is dissolved,

it becomes one with it again.¹ The Ch. text in VI. 13 expresses the truth that the self is dissolved in the immanent unity of the self like the solution of salt in water. The Muṇḍaka text III. 11. 8 illustrates the same truth by the simile of the river losing or merging itself in the ocean. Bhāskara is opposed to eternal distinction (*svarūpa bheda*) on the one hand and the intuition of the indeterminate (*aikya*) on the other. No analogy drawn from human experience adequately expresses the ineffable bliss of the expansive life. In the mystic experience, 'thought expires in enjoyment,' and therefore it defies all attempt at definition and communicableness.

The Sūtras, however, indicate the nature of this experience by the various modes in which it expresses itself. They are briefly summed up in terms of cognition, conation and feeling and we shall consider each of these aspects in some detail. The first question is "does *svarūpa* or the essential self involve the highest expression of consciousness or does it involve absolute consciousness? Is consciousness determinate (*sasambodha*) or indeterminate (*nissambodha*)? Jaimini favours the view that freedom consists in the highest expression of consciousness known as *guṇāṣṭaka āvirbhāva* or the presence of attributes like purity, truthfulness, omniscience and omnipotence (*apahatapāpma, satyakāma, satyasaṅkalpa*

¹ "Jīva parayośca svābhāvikaḥ abhedah, aupādhikastu bhedah: sa tannivṛttau nivartate." [IV. iv. 4.]

etc.) in their absolute perfection. But Audulomi goes to the other extreme and speaks of absolute consciousness devoid of all content (*nissambodha* or *caitanya-mātra*). To him pure consciousness is like dreamless sleep without the obscuring element of *avidyā* or the sense of manifoldness. Very nearly the same view is held by the Śāṅkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas. To the Śāṅkhyas, *mukti* is the eternal isolation of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*, devoid of activity, consciousness, bliss and other attributes. To the Vaiśeṣikas also, *mukti* is the freedom obtained by the annihilation of attributes and the cessation of sorrow. Their argument is apparently convincing. *Rāga* or desire is rooted in sense and sensibility (*śarīra*, *indriya* and *manas*) and leads man to the endless sufferings of *samsāra*. Therefore the only way to mend it is to end it and abolish all consciousness that disturbs the "clod" and makes it restless.

But Bādarāyaṇa finds Vedāntic sanction for both the views. To a Vedāntin, who accepts the *bhedā-bheda* theory, there is no incompatibility between the absolute and the relative. Like the sun and its rays the supreme radiates itself in various forms, and there is no inconsistency between *guṇa* and *guṇin*. But the Advaitin, with his distinction between the intuition of the indeterminate or *Nirguṇa* and the logical thought of *Sagūṇa*, thinks that Jaimini is at the stage of *Īśvara* with the eight-fold qualities of *Īśvara*, but without the spiri-

tual intuition of absolute consciousness. To him the Sūtra gives a logical account of *Īśvara* and is therefore only a mere *arthavāda*. But Bhāskara has repeatedly drawn attention to the logical fallacy of this distinction and rejected *Nirguṇa Brahman* as no *Brahman* at all. Consciousness without any content commits us to mere subjectivism and abstractionism. Indeterminate intuition involves the dissolution of the cosmos and lapses into the 'unconscious.' But the Advaitin evades this logical conclusion and explains away the difficulty by various analogies and other devices. One ingenious solution is that illusoriness vanishes, but that the illusion remains. It is only the finitude that is shaken off and not the finite. This is a tacit admission of the truth of *bhedābheda* and the abandonment of *Māyāvāda*. To the Advaitin, there can be no universal consciousness or all-self, as the universe of space-time is an illusion that vanishes in the absolute. The Śāṅkhya theory of the do-nothing, know-nothing *Puruṣa* does not provide for the spirit of expansion of the self and the enhancement of its value. Release leads to passivity and inertness, as the eternal seer has nothing to see. Consciousness without an object is likely to lapse into unconsciousness. Extremes very often meet and the *mokṣa* of the Naiyāyika is very much allied to that of the *Māyāvādin* and the Śāṅkhya. When consciousness is abolished and reduced to the condition of sleep or *laya*, the self is not still like a stone, but itself becomes the stone.

If *ānanda* is the mere absence of suffering, why does the Upaniṣad describe the content of bliss with such a wealth of concrete detail? There can be no calculus of pleasure if pleasure is the mere absence of pain.¹ All these theories are vitiated by a false asceticism which reduces life to a void and a waste. As we already pointed out, there is nothing essentially good or bad in *rāga*. Its value depends upon its direction and end. When it is directed to sense objects, it leads to bondage, but when it is spiritualised it leads to the immortal bliss of *Brahman*.² In the metaphysics of *ānanda*, the value of joy is transfigured and not eliminated. All these three theories are therefore false readings of the absolute entirely opposed to Vedic authority.

Mukti involves the freedom of the cosmic will. *Brahman* is an eternal thinker who is absolutely good and free (*satyakāma* and *satya-saṅkalpa*) and the finite self which has become one with *Brahman* also acquires the same character. Freedom is self-determination and determination becomes conditioned only when there is a higher will that directs and dominates it. But the freed self is not conditioned by any higher will. In divine freedom

¹ "Na vā ānanda śabdo duḥkhābhāvavacanah; śata-guṇottarottarakrameṇa utkarṣāpakarṣapratipādanāt. Na ca abhāvasya nirupākhyasya utkarṣāpakarṣau stah." [IV. iv. 7.]

² "Rāgo hi paramātmaviśayo yasya muktiḥ hetuḥ; viśayaviśayo yasya bandhahetuḥ." [I. iv. 21.]

every conation is immediately satisfied and there is no interval between endeavour and the attainment of the end. This freedom is realised in the mechanism of nature. The eternity of God is not opposed to the temporal process. The eternal realises itself in the temporal. The whole series of events is included in one single span of experience. In the vision of the unity of things the distinction between endeavour and achievement entirely disappears. The end is immediately realised in the process. The universe is not a mere fact but an eternal act, in which the end is immediately divined. Time therefore does not vanish in the absolute, but enters into it and gets transfigured. The freed self does not become a mere static absolute, but realises whatever it wills in the world of relativity.

The Sūtras next raise the question whether this self-directive activity requires the instrumentality of the body and the senses. Bādari, the idealist, realises the discrepancy between embodiedness and freedom and maintains the view that the absolute spiritual life is without any content, physical or psychic. But Jaimini is equally emphatic in his theistic idea of the thinker having the tools of thought. Bādarāyaṇa accepts the validity of both the views and justifies his conclusion by the Mīmāṃsaka rule relating to the ceremonial of *dvādaśāha*. The self has a will of its own but needs no external apparatus or agency. The Brahmanized self is beyond the conditions

of finiteness and may, by its infinite immanent activity, realize its cosmic will and glory with or without the body.¹ The latter experience resembles dream consciousness and the former the volitional activity of the waking state. But the *Māyāvādin* regards the volitional activity of *Īśvara* as a contradiction of the absolute (*nissambodha*) and explains away the experience recorded in the Sūtras IV. iv. 11 to 15 as mere *arthavāda* intended to glorify a certain truth as a mere metaphor and not a metaphysical truth. The analogy of sleep which he often adduces only brings out the elements of solipsism and subjectivism that are inherent in that theory and its affinities with the Vaiśeṣika theory of *mukti*. Contentless consciousness is as empty and futile as the abolition of consciousness and there is no way of distinguishing between the state of a statue and the sleep of *samādhi*. But the *Bhedābheda-vādin* reconciles monism and pluralism by his insistence on the absolute as *Saguṇa Brahman* who is the self without a second, the eternal thinker and mover in whom all things have their being. The absolute alone exists but its experiences are varied and a contentless cognition in any level of life is unthinkable. Though the self becomes one with the absolute, the world-process continues for ever.

¹ "Muktasya sarvaśaktitvāt aiśvaryayogāt śarīropādānam anupādanañca sveccayā upapadyate." [IV. iv. 12.]

and the Brahmanized self may be lost in self intuition, or it may realise its divine nature in cosmic functioning. There is no inconsistency in the *mukta* having multiple bodies at the same time, as the self pervades all things and, like a lamp, illumines them.

Mukta is not only the consciousness of the all-self and its glory but also the realisation of eternal bliss. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad attempts a quantitative estimate of this bliss and ultimately abandons all ideas of measurement and logical definition. In the entrancing rapture of the mystic realisation, the self is not merely merged or lost in the Other; there is neither the confluence of separate selves nor the coalescence of their content, but a self-identification of the absolute. To the theist, bliss is always a double fruition in divine communion. The pantheist is anxious to be merged in divine bliss and to lose his separate being. In bliss the self-feeling alone is effaced but not the self. The monist does not like beatitude or blending but wants to be bliss itself. But Bhāskara delights in the consciousness of the infinite expanse of bliss in which sensation and self melt away and get dissolved in the all-self. The Br. Up. texts in II. iv. 12 and IV. v. 13 that the freed self enjoys eternal sleep without *saṁgñā* (consciousness) refer only to the abolition of the specific empirical consciousness that arises from the association with the body and the sense organs (*śarīrendriya viṣaya nibandhanam viśeṣa vigñānam*), and not to the annihilation of consciousness

(*sāmānya gñāna*) itself. The absolute is not the unconscious, but the highest expression of universal consciousness and the experience of bliss connotes this supreme self-consciousness and glory (*niravadhika aiśvarya*). The self sees and obtains everything everywhere (Ch. Up VII. xxvi. 2) because it sees it under the form of eternity.

But this idea of absolute oneness is repugnant to the theistic mind and the five Sūtras of IV. iv. preceding the very last one are therefore devoted to the description of the theistic ideal of *mukti*. The absolute is the unconditioned will of *Īśvara* who creates the universe and becomes its inner ruler. The *Sadvidyā* ascribes the creation of the universe to *Paramēśvara*, the supreme lord and ruler of all. Even the cosmic deities like *Brahma* and *Indra* have no independent will of their own (*Svātantrya*), but, as the instruments of the divine purpose (*Īśvarāyatta*), they utilise their apparent autonomy and glory in the interests of the world-progress (*lokasaṅgrahavyūpāra*). Though His will is eternal (*nityasiddha*) and self-realised, He realises his redemptive power in the making of the universe and the saving of souls. The finite self is sustained and controlled by its inner self and it secures its freedom by seeking His mercy and by surrender to His will. *Mukti* is therefore the security of this absolute dependence on the absolute will of God and not the attainment of the absolute itself. It is *sāvadhika* and not *niravadhikaiśvarya*.

Mukta is the external and eternal relation of dependence on God (*Īśvarāyatta*) and not the freedom of self-dependence. Experiencing the blessedness and the other perfections of God, the freed self acquires the flavour and freedom of Divinity itself. It is Brahmanized through and through and soaked in bliss, but there is difference in this undifferentenced Advaitic experience. The rulership of the universe belongs only to the supreme self and freedom means the self-dependence of God and the absolute dependence of the self and the participation of the self in Divine glory and goodness.

The Advaitin with his ready-made distinction between *Saguṇa Brahman* and *Nirguṇa Brahman* finds no difficulty in explaining this experience. The released self is one with *Īśvara* except in the matter of cosmic rule, and, its lordship being conditioned by that of *Īśvara*, its freedom is not absolute. The path of the moon is the way of mundane life and endless migration. But the seeker after *Saguṇa Brahman* ascends the luminous path of the gods, and entering the city of God, he enjoys its refreshing waters and its immortal bliss, and eventually attains the absolute. The *jīvanmukta*, however, immediately experiences the stirless state of *nirvāṇa* in which the darkness that arises from duality entirely vanishes and there is no more return to the world of *samsāra* as, in the absolute, there is neither the world of *samsāra* nor the world of *Saguṇa Brahman*.

Bhāskara rejects both the interpretations and follows a middle path. We are now familiar with his utter repudiation of the theory of *Nirguṇa Brahman* and *jīvanmukti*. *Māyāvāda* is a philosophy of negations and the goal of *nirvāṇa* as consciousness without any content is allied to sleep and a lapse into the abyss of nothingness. The *Advaitin* sometimes identifies *Īśvara* with the absolute and, at other times, concedes his relative existence as a response to the needs of empiricism and *bhakti* and finally assigns to him the status of *Hiraṇyagarbha*. Such a view is neither consistent nor consoling. Bhāskara therefore insists on the acceptance and appreciation of *Saguṇa Brahman* as the absolute reality. But he does not favour the theistic teaching of eternal difference between the supreme self and the finite self. Seized with the monistic impulse or the sense of the infinite, the finite self transcends the sphere of *samsāra* and attains oneness (*ekībhāva*) with the absolute for ever. The finite is fused for ever with the infinite. Thus the *Vedānta* teaches non-difference as the essential condition of *mukti*. The Taittiriya statement in II. 1 "He reaches all desires together with *Brahman*" really refers to the attainment of *Brahman* with all desires, and the penultimate five Sūtras which apparently give a pluralistic account of *mukti* should be interpreted in the light of the *bhedābheda* experience. But the last Sūtra provides for the

theistic as well as the monistic ideal. Bhāskara recognises two kinds of freedom, namely, *krama mukti* and *sadyo mukti*. To those who meditate on *Kārya Brahman*, freedom becomes a progressive realisation. But those who yearn for unity attain immediate freedom and the Sūtra guarantees the stability and security of salvation to both.

Before dealing with the other schools of *Bhedābheda-vāda*, we may summarise the whole teaching of Bhāskara. In his theory of knowledge he posits the principle of identity and difference in the relation between *Brahman* and the *jīva*, in which the element of diversity is dissolved in the unity of the absolute. Bhāskara establishes the truth of *Saguṇa Brahman* as the absolute self with an infinity of perfections like goodness, truth, purity and bliss. Influenced by *upādhis* or the principle of individuation, *Brahman* becomes, with his *pariṇāma śakti*, the finite centres of experience and the manifold of things, like the rays of the sun, the waves of the sea, the ether in the jar and the sparks of fire. The best means of securing freedom consists in transforming desire into a longing for the undivided self by harmonizing *gñāna* and *karma* or *gñāna-karmasamuccaya*. Religion is the realisation of the fulness and freedom of *Brahman* by the dissolution of distinctions, and is consequently both the apprehension and the attainment of *Brahman*. In the unity with the infinite, the solid single-

ness of the self melts away and it becomes one with the divine in a single super-personality. *Mukti* is not the abolition of consciousness nor its aloneness ; it is not communion with a personal god nor the absolute identity with the indeterminate. But it is oneness with *Brahman* (*ekibhāva*) which results from the abolition of the idea of duality (*bhinnatva*).

Western mysticism in its pantheistic and monistic expression offers a striking parallel to the mysticism of Bhāskara. The mystic is an explorer of eternity and, in his hunger for the absolute, he is more interested in spiritual realisation, than in speculating on reality. The mystic way is not a diagram of dialectics, but an ascent to the absolute. The real alone can know reality, and the finite self as an eternal spark of God, has a transcendental sense which links it with God and arouses the longing for its true home. The transcendental knower is immanent in the world of becoming and is the centre and source of all existence. The world of becoming rests on the bosom of being and spiritual life consists in going from the stormy sea of sense to the pacific ocean of divine expansive consciousness. Oppressed by the sense of separateness and sin, the mystic tries to reach out to the absolute and expand into cosmic consciousness ; and the whole process is known as the mystic way. The absolute is not a place or a state but is personal. The mystic way is an upward and outward ascent to God

by a process of inward alchemy. The seed of the spirit is extracted from self-seeking and transmitted to divine unrest. It is the flight of the alone to the alone. This process consists of the three well-marked stages known as the purgative, the illuminative and the intuitive stages and is clearly elucidated by writers on mysticism like Miss Underhill. The journey to God is also a journey in God and is a very arduous adventure which defies description. The mystic therefore delights in suggestive symbolism and spatial imagery. In the pilgrimage from the many to the one, the first stage of purgation or self-stripping marks the turning point. It consists in the elimination of the sense of finiteness and fragmentariness by a process of spiritual induction. The fleshy feeling drags us down and stains the white light of eternity. By the cleansing of the senses, the self is unselfed and transmuted. The second stage of illumination includes both intellectual vision and moral discipline. The vision is the result of introversion in which the self is gathered up and the mind is withdrawn from the cinematographic shows of sense and focussed on the eternal self; cf. Kath. Up. II. iv. 1. Activity now gives place to the action of the self. In this way the burden is cast off and the spiritual eye awakens to the consciousness of the absolute and the soul flies on the wings of virtue and contemplative insight to the highest level of God. The-

unitive stage marks the summit of spiritual ascent. The fetters of sense and the barriers of personality are now broken and the expansive feeling begins to emerge and this is answered by the inrush and invasion of the environing consciousness. There is a surging of the whole self towards the fulness of the infinite and the soul is soaked for ever in the ineffable and immortal bliss of the absolute. The sundered and focalized self is fused into the indivisible unitive consciousness and the insulations of individuality disappear in this integral experience. When the soul is thus swallowed up in the absolute, there is no annihilation of its essence. It is transfigured, deified and lost in the ocean pacific of God and the highest values of truth, goodness and beauty are conserved in the life of allness.

BOOK II

PART I

OTHER SCHOOLS OF *BHEDĀBHEDA*

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CHAPTER I.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF YĀDAVAPRAKĀŚA.

The *bhedābheda* of Yādavaprakāśa is so closely allied to that of Bhāskara that the one is often confounded with the other, and this confusion is further increased by the identification of *bhedābheda* with the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja. Very little is known of Yādava and his system of Vedānta; and his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras is not, at present, available. According to tradition there was one Yādavaprakāśa who lived at Conjeeveram in the eleventh century A. D. and taught Rāmānuja for some time, the latter could not accept his teaching and so he formulated his Viśiṣṭādvaitic tradition which was a clear break-away from the interpretation of Yādava. There is, however, no clear evidence to establish the identity of this Yādava with the exponent of *bhedābheda*. The philosophy of Yādava is, like other Vedānta systems, based on the authority of immemorial tradition and may be ultimately traced to the Upaniṣads. Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa, in his gloss on the *Śrī Bhāṣya* of Rāmānuja, known as *Śrutaprakāśikā*, identifies the view of Āsmarathya, summed up in the Vedānta Sūtra I. iv. 20, with the philosophy of Yādava; and Thibaut translates the comment of Bhāmatī on the same Sūtra and states that the

doctrine represented by Āsmarathya is known as *bhedābheda*. The systematic account of Yādava's teaching that is here attempted is mainly based on the critical references to it that are contained in the works of Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika. The latter devotes a brief chapter in his *Paramatabhaṅga* to the critical examination of the tenets of Bhāskara and Yādava.

The exposition of Yādava's Vedānta may be prefaced by a brief analysis of the essentials of the twin-schools of *bhedābheda*. Both Bhāskara and Yādava repudiate the theory of *Nirguṇa Brahman* and pan-illusoriness. For Bhāskara the absolute is Brahman and the *upādhi*s and the *upādhi* is a psycho-physical complex of *buddhīndriya-deha* or mind-body. It is a real limiting adjunct of the absolute and not a fictitious semblance (*satyopādhi* and not *mithyopādhi*); and it is owing to this adjunct that the unconditioned exists as the finite selves, like the one infinite space enclosed in pots and pitchers. This theory of limitation creates a dualism between Brahman and the *upādhi*; and Yādava tries to overcome the discrepancy by the concept of *Brahma pariṇāma* or the theory of transformation, by which the absolute which is the *sat* without a second by its own immanent śakti or potential energy becomes God and the universe of *cit* and *acit* like the waves and ripples of the ocean. The infinite and the finite express the eternal necessity of the absolute. Both the Vedāntins affirm the pantheistic

truth of identity in difference in their philosophy of nature. The infinite enters into and becomes the pluralistic universe and yet it is identical with itself and is not affected by its contingency and other imperfections. In their philosophy of spirit, both reject the solicitations of sense and lay stress on the dual discipline of *gñāna-karma-samuccaya* as indispensable to the attainment of *mukti*; but Bhāskara insists on the primacy of the *abheda* texts of Śāstra and the real possibility of returning to the unitive consciousness or *ekābhāva* by breaking the barriers of the *upādhis* and their accidental associations. Yādava also traces the evils of *samsāra* to the erroneous perception of difference, but defines *mukti* as the realisation of the *bhedābheda* consciousness. While for Bhāskara unity alone is the ultimate truth and difference is adventitious, for Yādava difference is as real as unity. Bhāskara is of opinion that the thinking things and material things are parallel expressions of the absolute; but Yādava denies the qualitative distinction between *cit* and *acit* and gives a spiritual interpretation of reality. *Acit* is the object which can develop into the subject and consciousness sleeps in matter and wakes up in the sentient being. From the Bhāskariya point of view, Brahman exists in the three aspects of the causal Brahman, the effected world and the *jīva*; the *acit* follows necessarily from Brahman, but the *cit* is now distinct from, though in *mukti* it is one with Brahman (*ananya*); but Yādava views both *acit* and *cit* as eternal modal expressions of the absolute conscious-

ness, and thus attempts to overcome the dualism that is inherent in Bhāskara's philosophy of Brahman and the *upādhis*.

EPISTEMOLOGY.

The epistemology of Yādava closely resembles that of Bhāskara and is deduced from the monistic principle of identity pervading difference. According to the *Vedārtha Saṅgraha* of Śrī Rāmānuja, the Bhedābheda-vādins adduce four reasons in support of this principle. In the judgment, "Man is an animal," there is co-ordination or *sāmānādhikaranyā* between the subject and the predicate ; and this co-ordination is a related movement of thought. In addition to the apparent difference between the genus and the species, there is an identity of content between the two. In the judgment of causality, cause refers to the aspect of identity and effect to that of difference, and the two are correlated and not contradictory. Owing to the identity exhibited in the difference, it is impossible to think of the species apart from the genus. Besides, it is evident that the term connoting the genus also connotes the species included therein. Even the undifferentiated judgment (*prathama pinḍa-grahaṇam*) reveals this relation of *bhedābheda*. Difference enters into the very notion of identity and makes it significant. Identity is not prior to or alien to difference; but it is its very pre-supposition and inmost character. The universal is not a formal unity of generalisation got by the abstraction

of the particular, but is a concrete universal that realises itself in the plurality of the particulars as their immanent reason. While absolute monism strives after unity by the elimination of difference and theism establishes difference by explaining away unity and insisting on the externality and self-existence of the finite, the theory of *bhedābheda* avoids the one-sidedness of both and does justice to both the aspects. Absolute unity and absolute difference are mere abstractions without any content or meaning. In the content of true knowledge, both are harmonised into a single unity. It is a concrete whole which is both self-differentiating and self-integrating and not a mere neutral unity. Necessary relation does not mean mere relativity but pre-supposes the absolute as the foundation of relational thought.

ONTOLOGY.

Reality, in the ontology of Yādava, is *bhinnā-bhinna*; it is the one that pervades the many and accounts for the manifold. It is a one-in-many and a many-in-one. The infinite finitises itself and underlies the contingency of things and yet retains its infinite possibilities. Being or *sanmātra* is the essential nature of *Brahmatva* and it is immanent in all the particulars of experience as their life and reason. As John Caird puts it, God, the finite self, and the world are not distinct entities, but are elements or moments of a single unity. Just as clay is transformed

into pots, pitchers and platters, and as the sea contains foam, waves and bubbles, Brahman, the absolute, differentiates itself into *Īśvara*, *cit* and *act*, each having its own form and function; it is the content of the constituent parts. From the generic point of view the triad is really one, it is a unity in trinity, but the specific modifications are many. All beings are but broken lights of the one shining *sat* and beyond the crests of consciousness is the infinite Pacific. As Dr. Rashdall says, the absolute is not God alone; but God and the finite centres. The infinite and the finite are related elements. Dr. Bosanquet thinks that the God of religion is an appearance of the absolute and not the whole of it. But the idea of God is not ephemeral and illusory. The finite is an appearance only in the sense that it is a partial expression of the infinite and not an illusion inherent in or superimposed on it. Individuality is not mere formal distinctness; and its content cannot be separated from its distinctness. While one part of the clay-stuff may be transformed into certain configurations, the other parts remain the same. *Īśvara*, though an element of the absolute, retains His perfections of self-consciousness (*svaprakāśa*), omnipotence (*sarva-śakti*) and bliss (*ānanda*) and the finite centres are fragmentary.

The finite and the infinite are thus seen to be correlative and not contradictory. They have no

self-contained or isolated individuality; but each involves the other and is involved in it. As moments of reality, they exist together in the *bhedābheda* relation. The absolute contains an infinity of inter-woven selves and yet it transcends the self-feeling of the finite. Royce says the absolute in its wholeness includes an infinity of inter-woven and inter-communicating selves each of which represents the totality of the absolute in its own way. The finite is neither fictitious nor formal, but is its real and rational expression. Both *cit* and *acit* are real features or factors of reality and thus reveal its infinity. *Brahmatva* is the causal unity of the universe constituted by the distinctions of *Īśvara*, the cosmic ruler, *cit*, the experiencing subject, and *acit*, the object of experience; the one *sat* appears as the many. In *pralaya* these distinctions persist in a potential state and creation is only the self-manifestation of this triune unity. Brahman is both static and dynamic and by His *pariṇāma-śakti* or energising principle, He emanates Himself into the manifold. Brahman is life, mind and speech (*prāṇamaya*, *manomaya*, and *vāñmaya*). In the first aspect, He is the vital energy immanent in *cit* and *acit*; In the second aspect, He is the creator of creators (*antarbhūta kārayita*); and in the third aspect, He emanates into the universe. *Pariṇāma-śakti* is the creative urge at the heart of reality and is therefore a vitalising function and not a vanishing

illusion. This theory of cosmology is therefore known as the *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*.

Creation is the self-expression of Brahman and is a process of successive emanation. In the *pralaya* state *mūlaprakṛti* or the primordial stuff of matter is indistinguishable from *Īśvara*, though the two are co-eternal. This state of non-differentiation is known as *tamas* or *śaktyavasthā* or the free possibility of the absolute. Its emanation is called *ādyavasthā* or *paramākāśa* and it is called *Īśvara-prabha*. This is self-determined spatially (*deśaika-rūpa*) and does not require any external determination. It is of three kinds, *gñānaprabhā*, *ānandaprabhā*, and *kriyāprabhā* in their universal and particular aspects. Of these, the second emanates into the sense-pleasures of individuality or *Puruṣa*, *kriyāprabhā* functions as life or *prāṇa*. From *gñānaprabhā* arises *sattva*, from *kriyāprabhā* *rajas*. *Rajas* evolves out of *sattva* and *tamas* out of *rajas*. *Manomaya* is the substratum of *sattva* (*adhiṣṭhātā*), *vāñmaya* of *tamas* and *prāṇamaya* of *rajas*. *Manas*, *vāk* and *prāṇa* are thus the evolutes of *sattva*, *tamas*, and *rajas* respectively. These categories function as the *manas*, speech, and *prāṇa* of the embodied self, but are helpful to the freed soul and *Īśvara* in the cosmic functioning. *Īśvara* in his threefold differentiation as *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya* and *vāñmaya* functions in all finite beings as their immanent *kartā*, *kārayitā* and *pariṇamayitā*.

The finite is an integral element of the absolute and has an infinite content ; but it identifies itself with the body, seeks the goods of earthly life and thus submits itself to the endless sins and sorrows of *samsāra*. This bondage is threefold. It is (1) *prakṛti-bandha*, or desire for the eight-fold products of *prakṛti* and includes the appetitive or animal life ; (2) *vaikārika-bandha*, or the desires of sensibility which are fugitive and fragmentary ; and (3) *dakṣiṇa-bandha* due to the moral causality of *karma*. According to Caird the consciousness of defect in our knowledge is a consciousness of union with, and at the same time separation from, a perfect intelligence. Owing to the influence of *karma*, the wheel of life goes on whirling and the self, dissatisfied with its isolation, longs to escape from the prison-house of the flesh by the inner law of its being. Spirit-life is breaking away from the three-fold bondage of the life, *viz.*, of nature, sensuality and self-consciousness, which divides us from our divine unity. Man, being both finite and infinite, is not satisfied with his finite life. The seeker after the infinite contemplates on Brahman as the very essence of his inner life and then his consciousness is suffused by the infinite and acquires the fulness and freedom of his essential nature. By transcending the limitations of finitude, the finite enters into union and communion with the absolute. In that state the freed self wills the true and the good and thus attains the seven-fold perfections mentioned in the *Dahara Vidyā*. The *jīvas* are of three kinds: the bound (*baddha*), the freed (*mukta*) and the perfect (*siddha*). The *siddhas*

are *aṇāsiddhas* and *yogasiddhas*. The first are the allies of *Īśvara* and help Him in the evolution of His cosmic purpose. As members of a spiritual society, they are the instruments of His absolute will. But the second acquire the eight yogic perfections. The freed souls pass out of the realm of restlessness and enjoy eternal bliss (*svabhoga*) and absolute self-determination (*svātantrīya*). Yādava, like Bhāskara, denies *jīvan-mukti* and refers to the transcendental at-homeness of the self in the spiritual world of Brahma.

Freedom or *mukti* is the realisation of the unity of the finite and the infinite. *Mukti* is not the extinction of the finite, but is its highest fulfilment as the essential and eternal moment or member of the infinite. A self-identical infinite in which the finite is annulled can neither be realised nor reached and has no meaning or value in *mukti*. In transcending individuality, the finitude of the private self is alone removed. But the finite remains and is identified with the universal life. In the self-feeling of the divided life, there is privateness and exclusiveness, and this leads to individualistic selfism. But when the spirit of the totality of *bhedābheda* which lives in the finite inspires it, the atomic self abandons its fragmentariness and friction, becomes the absolute and attains the stability of salvation. In the return of the finite to the infinite it loses its self and finds itself as the integral member of the infinite pulsating with the spirit of *bhedābheda*.

CHAPTER II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BHARTR-PRAPAÑCA

Prof. Hiriyanna, in an illuminating pamphlet on Bhartr-Prapañca, says that he was an old Vedāntin anterior even to Śaṅkara and he reconstructs his monistic interpretation of the Upaniṣads and the Sūtras in terms of *samuccaya-vāda* or *bhedābheda-vāda*. The following analysis, which is based on the work of that eminent scholar, brings out the similarity between the philosophy of Yādava and that of Bhartr-Prapañca. Reality, according to Bhartr-Prapañca, is *bhedābheda* or an identity in difference and both sense-perception and *Śāstra* exhibit the truth of this principle. While the dualists explain away *advaita* as mere *anuvāda* and the *advaitins*, on the other hand, treat *dvaita* as *anuvāda*, Bhartr-Prapañca makes the extremes meet in his principle of *dvaitūdwaita*. According to him, the Sūtras bring out this truth by means of the classical analogy of the snake and its coils and the sun and its radiance. The cause is, logically speaking, immanent in the effect. The whole pervades the parts and the universal is realised in and through the particulars. But the most adequate category of reality is the relation of substance and modes (*avasthāvat* and *avasthāḥ*) in which there is a pervading identity that

transfigures the parts. The same waveless ocean manifests itself as waves and ripples and yet maintains its self-identity. In the co-ordination of empirical and scriptural knowledge or *pramāṇa-samuccaya*, the claims of monism and dualism are well-balanced and harmonised in the concept of *dvaitādvaita*.

Reality or Brahman is *para* and *apara* or higher and lower. On this view, duality is not disparateness involving inner contradiction, but is a *bhedābheda* or one-many relation. It is the relation between cause and effect, or the universal and the particular ; or more accurately, like the waves arising from the waveless sea, the one undifferentiated substance or Brahman differentiates itself into the modal multiplicity of the cosmos. Brahman or the absolute is the Supreme Lord, the *jīvas* and material things in the *mūrtāmūrta* aspects. The infinite evolves into the finite and yet is identical with itself.

The cosmology of Bhartṛ-Prapañca may be traced to the theory of *pariṇāma* as opposed to the *vivartavāda* of Śaṅkara. Brahman is the one without a second and at the same time, it differentiates itself into the trinity of *Īśvara*, *jīva*, and material things. *Īśvara* is the inner ruler of all. But He is less than the absolute, and the *jīvas* or the *sūkṣins* are the next modal manifestations of Brahman of which the most important is *Hiraṇyagarbha* or the logos. In the evolution of the material

world, there are six successive modes known as *avyākṛta* or the cosmos in its causal state, *sūtra*, the adjunct of the logos, *virāj* or the visible universe, *devatā* or sense-organ, *jāti* or the type and *piṇḍa* or the particular bodies. In this way the one supreme substance of the absolute transforms itself by its own creative urge into the eight multitudinous forms of matter and soul. Reality exists as the *rūṣis* of *Īśvara*, *cit* and *acit* and they form a unity in trinity.

The *jīva* is a real *rūṣi* or mode of Brahman and not an illusory creation thereof. *Avidyā* or the principle of limitation belongs to the *jīva* and not to Brahman. Owing to the influence of beginningless *avidyā* and *karma*, the infinite partially finitises and transforms itself into the *avastha* or condition of the *jīva* functioning as a knower and enjoyer. The *sākṣin* is, like the *ekajīva* of Advaita, a single self but without the defect of subjectivism.

Bhartṛ-Prapañca, like Bhāskara, insists on *gñāna-karma-samuccaya* or the co-ordination of *gñāna* and *karma* as the only adequate means of obtaining *mokṣa* and this corresponds to the theory of *pramāṇa-samuccaya*. Influenced by *avidyā*, the attachment to the pleasures of sense and sensibility, the *jīva* forgets its unity with Brahman and wanders in the world of *samsāra* and the method of release implies both apprehension and attainment or *gñāna* and *karma*. The former is *bhāvana* or the mediate knowledge of the unity with Brahman as

revealed in the monistic texts like "Tattvamasi" and "Aham Brahmāsmi" and the latter is the *kriya* or the practice of *niṭya karma* without attachment and the realisation that Brahman alone is the doer as well as the deed. Before this consummation is reached, the seeker after *mukti* should first meditate with *bhakti* on *Hiraṇyagarbha* or the logos, become one with Him, escape from *samsāra* and then finally transcend even this limitation and attain *mukti*.

CHAPTER III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIMBĀRKA

Mr. Śrīdhara Majumdar, in his notable work on the Vedānta Philosophy, concludes that Nimbārka is the most unbiassed of the commentators on the *Brahma Sūtras* and that his comprehensive system of thought reconciles the transcendentalism of Śaṅkara with the immanent philosophy of Rāmānuja. According to Mr. Kokilesvara Sāstri, the system of Nimbārka is probably based on the tradition of Audulomi formulated by Bhāskara. Mr. V. S. Ghate, in his comparative study of the Vedānta, likewise thinks that the *bhedābheda* of Nimbārka mediating between pluralism and monism is the only system that best fits in with the Sūtras, if they at all admit of any such definite formulation. Sir R. G. Bhandarkar, in his book on Vaiṣṇavism, thinks that Nimbārka was a Trīṅga Brahmin, who lived sometime after Rāmānuja. In addition to his commentary on the Sūtras, known as *Vedānta Pūrijāta Saurabha*, he composed a small treatise called *Daśaśloki* containing the essentials of his system known as *Sanatkumāra Sampradāya*, based largely on the teaching of Rāmānuja and following a commentary or *Vṛtti* written by Audulomi. These essentials relate to the five topics, viz., the nature of god, the finite self, *bhakti*, obsta-

cles to it and *mukti* (vide "Brahma Vādin," Vol. XII, p. 629). In his translation of Śaṅkara's commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra, I. iv. 21, Thibaut refers to the theory advocated by Audulomi as *satya-bheda-vāda*. The finite self is absolutely different from Brahman; but in *mukti* it passes out of the body and becomes one with Brahman. Audulomi, Nimbārka and Bhāskara seem to represent three different traditions. Audulomi differs from Bhāskarācārya because he emphasises the absolute difference between the finite and the infinite in the state of *samsāra*, and from Nimbārka, owing to his insistence on the non-difference between the two in the state of *mukti*. The philosophy of Nimbārka seems to be midway between that of Yādava and of Rāmānuja.

According to Nimbārka, reality, both within *prapañca* and outside it, is both *bheda* and *abheda*.¹ It is an identity that persists in difference and sustains it.² Absolute identity is as unthinkable as absolute difference and both are opposed to the Upaniṣadic spirit which predicates the equal reality of difference and non-difference. Reality is the absolute *per se*, which exists in itself as the self-

¹ "Sarva-bhinna-abhinno Bhagavān Vāsudevo viśvātmaivajigñāsā viśayah." [I. i. 4.]

² "Brahma-abhinnopi kṣetragñāḥ sva-svarūpato bhinna eva." [II. i. 22.]

complete and the self-determined. Though out of relation to the world, it still enters into relation with it; but it is not a relative absolute. The absolute constitutes the relative and is its logical prius. Being is the one in the many like fire and its sparks or like water and its ripples; the relation between unity and plurality is one of co-existence and not of contradiction.¹ The Advaitic theory of pan-illusoriness explains away the manyness of reality. Bhāskara's theory of *upādhis* predicates imperfections to the absolute and the Dvaita theory posits eternal distinctions and pre-supposes their externality. The philosophy of Nimbārka is a kind of mono-dualism, which avoids the perils of radical monism and pluralism and preserves the integral experience of *bhedābheda*. The universal or the whole is immanent in the particular and yet remains beyond, without losing its wholeness.

The distinctions between *Nirguṇa* and *Saguṇa Brahman* do not arise in the system of Nimbārka, as he regards the absolute as the universal self which is both noumenal and phenomenal. Negation only denies absolute difference or bare otherness, but does not deny difference altogether. Brahman is both static and dynamic. In relation to the world, it is active and dynamic, and when out of relation to it, it is static and serene. Like the spider weaving its

¹ "Avibhāgepi samudra-taraṅgayoriva sūrya-tatprabhayoriva tayor vibhāgas syāt." [II. i. 13.]

own web, the supreme self emanates into the manifold and yet exceeds it. Reality is a unity in trinity consisting of the *jīva* or *bhokta* or the subject of experience, *bhogyā*, the object of experience, and *Īśvara*, their indwelling spirit and controller. In its *abheda* aspect, it implies the self-subsistence or self-relation (*svatantra-sadbhāva*) and the *bhedābheda* aspect connotes distinction as well as dependence (*paratantra-sadbhāva*) or *niyāmyatva*. Brahman is both the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) and the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of the universe. The cosmic order is not an illusory projection of *māyā*, but the self-actualisation of the creative potencies (or *śakti*).¹ Causality implies transcendence and immanence and neither dominates over nor destroys the other. Creation is the unfolding of that which is enfolded. Brahman, the *śakta*, is the very stuff and substance of the universe of mind and matter known as its *śakti* in a *bhedābheda* relation. There is the creative urge or *śakti* at the heart of reality which is potential in *pralaya* and evolves into the whole cosmic process or *śakti-vikṣepa*. The potency and activity of the universe are only the self-differentiations of the Brahman.² Cosmic

¹ "Kārya-ākāreṇa Brahma pariṇamate, sva-asādhāraṇa śaktimatvāt. [II. i. 23.]

² "Sarvagñam sarvaśakti Brahma svaśakti vikṣepena jagadākāram svātmānam pariṇamayya avyākṛtena svarūpaṇa śaktimatā kṛtimatā pariṇatam eva bhavati." [I. iv. 26.]

dissolution and evolution are like the closing and disclosing of a part of the snake's body. Brahman transforms itself into space-time and yet transcends its limitation.¹

While Rāmānuja attributes *śṛṣṭi* to the flux of *prakṛti* and the *karma* of the *jīva*, Nimbārka traces it to the immanent *śakti* of Brahman; but both insist on treating the absolute as a personal God. It is also worthy of note that Nimbārka interprets what is known as the *Pūñcarūtra-Adhikaraṇa* as having no reference to the *Pūñcarūtra* system but as refuting the Śākta school of thought, which refers to blind energy and not to Brahman as the supreme cosmic ground (*vide* Majumdār's "Vedānta Philosophy," pp. 281-284).²

The finite itself is essentially one with the infinite and yet it has a distinct nature of its own. It is an element or moment of the absolute though its attributive consciousness is all-pervasive. It persists in its own atomic or monadic nature both in the empirical and in the emancipated state. The *jīva* is and has consciousness and, like the sun and its luminousness, both the *dharma* and the *dharmin* are identical and different; there is identity of content.

¹ "Sarva-antar-vartinah parasya śhāna:opi doṣo na." [III. ii. 11.]

² "Puruṣam antareṇa śaktes-sakāśāt jagad-utpatti-asambhavāt na tat-kāraṇa-vādopi sādhuḥ." [II. ii. 42.]

between consciousness and its subject. It has cognition (*gñātr̥tva*), conation (*kart̥tr̥tva*) and feeling (*bhok̥tr̥tva*) as its essential qualities in all states. The term *amśatva* adequately expresses the *bhedābheda* relation between the finite and the infinite. Brahman itself has the *amśa* or *śakti* to evolve into the forms of *cit* and *acit*, and the Upaniṣad says that Brahman is the fishermen, the serfs and the knaves. The text really means that the *jīva* depends on God for its life and freedom. But this is not the spurious pantheism which says that God is equally in all things and is 'as full and whole in a hair as in the heart.' No school of Vedāntic thought identifies God and the world. The finite self is a fact or factor of reality and not a phantom of imagination. *Bhedābheda* does not sacrifice individual responsibility absolutely; nor does it accept the individualistic ethics of the isolated self.

The *jīva* thus becomes a phase or fragment of the indwelling spirit without, in any way, affecting its infinity. The unmanifested becomes the manifest and the universal self abides in and as the particular, without being tainted by the sins and sufferings of the world of *samsāra*. The sun shines with its own splendour, though its reflections are affected by the agitations of the medium. The sound that arises in *ākūṣa* does not affect the *ākūṣa* itself; likewise, when the infinite finitises itself, it is not infected by the imperfections of the finite. The inner controller that

breathes life into every soul is not contaminated by its *karma*.

Terrestrial life is isolated, inadequate and transitory. Finitude divides the self from God and thus distorts its form; but the finite has the freedom of self-transcendence and this freedom is a fact of spiritual life and not a dualistic delusion. Owing to its contact with the body, the *jīva*, which is essentially sinless, suffers from the hazards of the divided consciousness and wanders in the wilderness of *samsāra*. But the infinite in it creates a divine discontent and presses it towards unity. The chief method of attaining freedom is then realised as the ceaseless reflection on Brahman as the *ātman* of the *jīva*,¹ not in the sense of absolute identity or the inner self or *śarīrin*, but in the sense of identity in difference. | The monistic text "Thou art That" brings out the identity or the self-relation of the *Īśvara* and the *jīva*. Though the *upāsaka*, who thus contemplates on Brahman, is different from the *upāsya* or the object of contemplation, yet the subject and the object of contemplation are identical and the devotee grows into the unity of the Deity. The finite should be infinitised and not *vice versa*. The particular self (as a *prapanna*)^a should recognize the all-self as the only saviour without a second and realise his own unworthiness andⁱ

¹ "Mumukṣuṇā parama-puruṣas svasya ātmatvena dhyyehaḥ." [IV. i. 3].

helplessness, and surrender absolutely to His grace ; then Divinity reveals his Dvaita-Advaita nature to him and frees him from the sorrows of *samsāra*.

According to Nimbārka, the Advaitic distinction between the absolute and the spatialised *Saguṇa Brahman*, the higher *vidvān* and the lower *vidvān*, and *krama-mukti* and *jīvanmukti* is unknown to the *Śrūtis* and the *Sūtras*. The ideas of *gati* and *gantavya* connote the reality of spiritual aspiration and attainment and presuppose the existence of the world of Brahman as the direct goal of life, as different from that of *Brahma* or the Logos or the first evolute of the infinite. *Mukti* is the infinitising of the finite in which the finite remains without the sense of finitude. *Avibhāga* is neither absorption (*laya*) nor conjunction (*samyoga*). It is not *svarūpakya* or self-identity, nor *visiṣṭ-arkya* or organic inseparability, nor *ekībhāva* or oneness with the absolute ; but it involves identity in difference.¹ It is the realisation of Brahman as the absolute and the relative. When we refer to the deliciousness of the mango fruit (*rasaghanatva*) only, we do not deny its other sensations and the reference to *ekarasa* or a single flavour does not exclude differentiation ; it is the identity that pervades the particulars and transfigures them.

¹ " Vibhāga-avirodhinā vibhāgena anubhavati." [IV. iv. 4].

Release is a state of self-transcendence in which the particular remains without its particularity. When the wheel of *karma* runs out its course, the freed self emerges effulgently from the body and the *suṣumnā nāḍī*, which is the pathway to the perfect, and is illumined by the grace of the indwelling infinite; it then soars through the shining path and attains the infinite bliss of Brahman. Its aspiration is now changed into attainment. The nature of the destiny of the finite self is determined by the nature of the meditation.¹ The worshippers of symbols attain the spatialized infinite; but the seeker of the infinite in Dvaita-Advaita relation immediately attains the infinite. Like Rāmānuja, Nimbārka recognizes three kinds of *jīvas*, viz., the free, the freed, and those that are not yet free, and three kinds of matter known as *kāla* or time, *prakṛti* and *śuddha sattva* or *acit* without its mutations. The Nimbārka school of *bhedābheda* thus appears to have greater affinities to the system of Rāmānuja than to the schools of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa. While Bhāskara insists on the essential unity of the *jīva* and Brahman and Yādava treats *Īśvara* and *jīva* as the two essential aspects of the absolute, Nimbārka refers to the *jīva* as a distinct entity that derives its being from Brahman and depends on it; and his exposition therefore seems to be nearer Viśiṣṭādvaita than the *bhedābheda* of Bhāskara and Yādava.

¹ "Tat-kratus tathaiva prāpnoti." [IV. iii. 14.]

Among the other schools of Vedānta which adopted *bhedābheda* and its language may be mentioned the exposition of Kesava and the *acintya bhedābheda* variety of Vaiṣṇavite thought. In a learned article on Kesava, Mr. T. R. Chintamani points out that he lived later than Bhāskara and commented on the Sūtras and that, in his philosophic position, he was a follower of Bhāskara. The latter school, as described by Mr G. N. Mallick in his "Philosophy of Vaiṣṇavite Religion," explains the relation between the absolute and *māya*, the infinite and the finite in terms of difference and non-difference. The absolute as the all-in-one is the concrete reality which satisfies the demands of monism and dualism. In the *bhedābheda* relation between Brahman and the *jīva*, the *jīva* is an *amsa* of Brahman as its *jīva śukti* as distinguished from its *swa rūpa śakti*.

CHAPTER IV

ŚĀKTAISM

Sir John Woodroffe, in his masterly edition of "Mahānirvāṇatantra" and other critical expositions of Śākta philosophy, has done a signal service to this much-neglected aspect of Indian thought. Prama-
thanath Mukhopadhyaya deals with the fundamentals of Śāktaism in his terse work, "Introduction to Vedānta Philosophy." The following summary of its essential features suggests its affinities to the realistic idealism of *bhedābheda*, mainly from the point of view of Yādaṇa. Though the Vedānta is the only source of spiritual truths on account of its freedom from mistake, error and deceit, the non-dualistic *sādhana*s of *tantra* or *āgama* based on the saving grace of the *guru* alone can remedy the maladies wrought by the confusions and corruptions of *Kalī*. In seeking the unity-consciousness, the relation with the *guru* cannot be explained away as a mere illusory 'other.' The theory of *Śiva-śakti* as the indivisible aspect of reality claims to harmonise the demands of both monism and dualism. As there can be no 'unity without the universe,' the dualistic world is but a dynamic expression of pure consciousness.

The starting point of Śāktaism is the recognition of the fact of intuition or experience-whole, of which thought and things are segments or aspects and its method is therefore both realistic and idealistic. The integral experience of reality is alogical and every concept is within the circle of experience and not coincident with it. The alogical whole becomes the logical one and many. From the standpoint of the whole, experience is being and the whole in its wholeness is alogical; but it includes and exceeds the experience of the centres or sections. The many is in the one and comes out of the one. Brahman, *māya*, the self and the world are the main categories of Vedāntic thought. Brahman is the alogical fact. Logically it is the continuum-point or *Paramāṭma*. *Māya* is not the counterfeit Brahman, but the measuring stress which operates on the bosom of the fact and constitutes the manifold of centres. The whole of intuition evolves into a logical order and there is a counter-activity to regain the original state alogically. All things, when strained, react and exhibit a stress to remove the strain and expand into the infinite.

According to Śāktaism, *māyāvāda* wrongly derives its theory of knowledge from its ontology of pure æther and pan-illusoriness. The whole of intuition is undefined and unmeasured and *māya* or *śakti* is the measuring or finitising principle inherent and immanent in the fact. Experience is and changes. Being-

experience as cause and being-experience as effect, in their universal and particular aspects, are known as *Kāraṇa Brahman* and *Kārya Brahman*. The stress or *śakti* is the dynamic aspect of Brahman as distinguished from *Śiva*, the static aspect. Brahman, by its own immanent power or as power, evolves the universe of name and form. The impersonal or *nirguṇa* personalises itself in the interests of the *sādhaka* and the *saṅga* is therefore not an illusory projection of the absolute. Like milk and its whiteness, the snake and its zigzag movement, the absolute is both impersonal and personal. Fact-stress is both being-stress and becoming-stress and the whole or *pūrṇa* never loses its wholeness in the process of its becoming. Change and no change (*kṣara* and *akṣara*) are the two poles or aspects of Brahman. The alogical fact becomes the logical continuum-point. The absolute posits itself as the continuum-point; it is both *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. From one aspect or pole it is *bhūman* or the infinite; from another it is the infinitesimal. The continuum posits itself as the point without ceasing to be the continuum. The continuum condenses or involves into the point and the point evolves or swells into the all. The continuum-point is the pre-condition of *māya* and its contracting principles of time-space and is therefore its master. It is the *antaryāmin* or inner ruler and each centre is of the essence of the continuum and the whole cosmic cycle of the conti-

num-point is the spontaneous joy-sport or the *līla* of *īśvara* or *Prajāpati*. *Śāktavāda* thus does not favour *vivarta*, but asserts the reality of the finitising power of the infinite. What is here is also yonder and it is illogical to say that the cosmos is a mere *kalpana*. The one differentiates itself into the many and becomes the world of relativity.

The stress is in the fact and of the fact; it determines what is undetermined. The logical order lives, moves and has its being in the alogical. The measuring stress constitutes the manifold of centres whose varied apparatus is developed by *karma*. The seamless undivided continuum of being evolves by its own stress into the universe of veiling and moving centres and yet remains veiless and strainless. Each centre is in and of the experience-whole and not a figment thereof and this view avoids solipsism. It is a sea broken into a complexity of waves and foam. I, as a particular centre of stressing, make a cross-section of the universe and there is no disparity between my fact and the whole fact. Brahman is *bindu* or point. The continuum is the point and the point is the continuum. There are four factors in experience:—(i) the fact as experience or whole or *pūrṇa*, (ii) the æther of pure consciousness, (iii) the stress evolving the fact, and (iv) the world of concrete particulars. Every centre, whether it is a crystal, cell or self is the continuum-point at a certain phase of stressing.

and straining. In the measuring principle of *māya* there is an ascending series starting with the dew drop and ending with the highest divinity in which nothing is veiled, but all is revealed. The great æther of the continuum and the little æther of the point are one. In the unity and continuity of life there is no gap anywhere and even the so-called inert matter is animated. *Śakti* sleeps in matter, dreams in the animal and wakes up in man. Whether it is dormant, dim or distinct, consciousness is the same in all beings; what is comatose in *tāmasic* matter becomes cosmic in *samādhi*.

As the phenomenal self, each centre is a phase of the continuum-point partially determined and is partly a minus sign. The Brahman with the plus sign is the continuum and that with the minus sign is the point and *upāsana* or worship is the change of the minus sign into the plus sign. *Yoga* is the realisation of the whole of what is pragmatically a part. The point is the continuum as it is big with *Śiva-śakti* and even a block of stone is a little Brahman. There is infinite power, the serpent power coiled up even in the grain of dust; and a centre can be *en rapport* with the continuum-point and intuition, the escape from the net of cosmic determination is the lapsing back of logicity into alogicality. The logical whole is immanent in the intuitive whole. Brahman is really the unmeasured ocean of being-power in which all polarities meet. But logically the continuum-point is

the highest being-concept which is perfectly true, good and beautiful and this power is only defined but not divided. Brahman is both the seamless whole and the point-whole. The "Mahānirvāṇa" says that the end and aim of life is the realisation of *Śiva-śakti* enshrined in the Upaniṣad, "All this is Brahman." According to Sir John Woodroffe, the identity consciousness got by the elimination of difference is a weakening negation which annoys the vital western mind. Instead of repeating the formula that the world is fictitious and *samsāra* hideous, the *sādhaka* should seek Brahman in all things and regard *samsāra* as the stairway to salvation. The Vedāntin realises the unity of Brahman and sees the self in all things and loves all nature. *Māyāvāda* emphasises the continuum and regards the centre as a seamless expanse without any form or feature but it sacrifices the all-whole. Rāmānuja regards the indeterminate as a hypostatised abstraction and lays stress on the point as a separate personality; but pure consciousness is a real experience. These categories of the one and the many only define the indefinable and alogical Brahman. The alogical exceeds the logical categories but does not exclude them and the polarities of dust and deity are essentially Brahman. This is the main axis of aupaniṣadic thought and it is more satisfying than the pan-illusoriness of the *māyāvādin* and the pan-realism of the theists and has affinities to *bhedābheda*.

CHAPTER V

A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE SŪTRAS

The varieties of Vedāntic thought may be examined with a view to determining whether *bhedābheda* is a faithful systematisation of the *Śruti* and the Sūtras. The founder of every *siddhānta* claims the authority of immemorial tradition and shows his genius for argumentation and philosophic insight. Each *ācārya* appeals to the same *Śruti* and the Sūtras as the source and authority of his line of reasoning and the divergence of opinion especially on the problem of the nature of the absolute and its relation to the finite self is so marked that it is difficult for a layman, who has not intuited the soul of each system, to decide as to who is the most reliable expositor of the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara's system of Advaita is the earliest and the most popular exposition of the Sūtras and is often identified with the Vedānta philosophy itself. The *Bhāṣya* of Bhāskara, and not the *Śrī Bhāṣya* as Thibaut says, appears to be the oldest commentary extant, next to Śaṅkara's, and it was certainly written long before the time of Rāmānuja. The Sūtras themselves discuss the opinions of the ancient leaders of Vedāntic thought like Āsmarathya, Audulomi, Kāśakṛtsna, Jaimini and Bādarī (*vide* I. iv. 20, 22; IV. iii. 6-14; IV. iv. 5-7). Śaṅkara seems to accept

the tradition of Bādari. Yādava follows Āsmarathya; and Thibaut remarks that Śaṅkara is not particularly anxious to strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities (*vide* introduction, p. 20, *Vedānta Sūtras*). Rāmānuja claims to represent the teaching of Bodhāyana, Taiṅka, Dramida and other ancient teachers who had already commented on the Sūtras. The commentary of Yādavaprakāśa is not extant or available, but there are references to his views in the *Śrī Bhāṣya* and the *Vedārtha Saṅgraha* of Rāmānuja and the works of Vedānta Deśika. It is of profound interest to enquire into the systems of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and the Bhedābheda-vādins and determine their relative values. Thibaut has already attempted this method of critical investigation in his introduction to the translation of *Śaṅkara Bhāṣya* though he refers only to Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

The main teaching of Śaṅkara, the best known expositor of the Vedāntic doctrine, is summed up in the four key-concepts of Advaita, *Nirguṇa Brahman*, *vivartavāda*, *gñānayoga* and *jīvan-mukti*. Brahman is the *sat* without a second, the absolute without any determination. Brahman may be defined as *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* in a negative way. The absolute is affirmed by the denial of the relative; but it is really indefinable. The world is a riddle of contradictions and is a projection of *māya* or the principle of illusion. The finite self or the *jīva* is a reflection of Brahman in *māya* in its

individuated form of *avidyā*. But from the empirical point of view, the reality of *Saguṇa Brahman* and the world is recognized and when the mind is purified by *karma* and *bhakti*, the *mumukṣu* is initiated into the identity of *jīva* and *Īśvara* and then he has an intuition of the absolute, here and now, and attains *jīvan-mukti*. Śaṅkara's exposition is claimed by his followers to prove the orthodox view of the Upaniṣads beyond any doubt and dispute and shown on speculative grounds to be the only doctrine agreeing with tradition.

But Rāmānuja repudiates all the four theories and upholds the truths of *Saguṇa Brahman*, *sat-kārya-vūda*, *bhakti* and *videha-mukti*. The Sūtras, in Rāmānuja's opinion, do not set forth the distinction of two Brahman, they do not hold the doctrine of *māya*, and they do not proclaim the identity of *jīva* and *Īśvara*. Brahman is the single and supreme personality with an infinity of perfections and, by His redemptive will, He differentiates Himself into the manifold of *cit* and *acit*. The manifold is eternal but not external to God. The *jīva* is an attribute or *prakāra* of the absolute or the supreme self which sustains and controls the finite self and is its ultimate ground as well as its goal. By ceaseless devotion to God and absolute surrender to His will, the *jīva* offers itself to the grace of God, loses its sense of separateness and is overwhelmed with the immortal bliss of divine communion. There is thus an

unbridgable gulf between the monistic systems of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. In Rāmānuja's system of Viśiṣṭādvaita, the absolute is identified with the personal God. The finite self is not a fiction but a persistent personality; and release is secured, not by an immediate intuition of the absolute, here and now, but a gradual attainment of the positive bliss of the world of Brahman by absolute self-gift and devotion. But Bhāskara's monism comes midway between the two, both in point of time and value. Bhāskara is at one with Rāmānuja in his criticism of *Nirguṇa Brahman*, *māyāvāda* and *jīvan-mukti*. But there is an essential difference between the two in their constructive philosophy. Bhāskara's principle of *bhedābheda* is quite different from the *apṛthaksiddha* theory of the absolute as expounded by Rāmānuja. According to the former, *Saguṇa Brahman* is the supreme self with metaphysical and moral perfections but without any spiritual or *aprākṛta* form. But Rāmānuja defines *Saguṇa Brahman* as the Supreme Lord with an infinity of perfections and with a radiant transcendent form and a world of His own. Rāmānuja denies the divine emanation of the world process and attributes the evils and imperfections of life to the *karma*-ridden *jīva*. He is as emphatic as Bhāskara in the insistence on duty and detachment. Though *karma-yoga* is, on the whole, subordinated to *gñāna-yoga* there is no contradiction between the two. Bhāskara is perhaps more vehement than

Rāmānuja in the denunciation of *jīvan-mukti*. But his distinction between *sadyo-mukti* and *krama-mukti* is much more monistic than that of Rāmānuja. The other Bhedābheda-vādins posit the principle of identity and difference and insist on treating them as equal moments of reality. Before arriving at a final estimate of *bhedābheda*, we may examine a few leading and typical topics of the Sūtras which reveal the essential difference among these Vedāntins and yet lend support to the view that the Sūtrakāra himself was a Bhedābheda-vādin.

The *Adhikaraṇas*, or the topics in the Sūtras, take up a certain Upaniṣadic text and discuss its meaning and purpose; and Śaṅkara, the Bhedābheda-vādins and Rāmānuja invariably select the same texts though their expositions are entirely divergent. In commenting on the first four Sūtras and combating the conclusions of *Mīmāṃsa*, each philosopher furnishes the key-note of his own system. Śaṅkara thinks that the Vedānta teaches the knowledge of absolute identity by the sublation of the finite. According to Rāmānuja, the Vedānta teaches that the highest end of man is the attainment of Brahman with boundless bliss and other perfections. But Bhāskara and others are equally certain that the Vedānta teaches the doctrine of *bhedābheda*. The whole of the first chapter is devoted to the definition of Brahman as the supreme ground of the world-process. The second Sūtra, which deals with this.

question, refers, according to Śaṅkara, to *Saguṇa Brahman*. But Rāmānuja and the Bhedābheda-vādins deny the distinction between *Saguṇa Brahman* and *Nirguṇa Brahman* and point out that it is a direct reference to the absolute as the personal God. Mr. V. S. Ghate agrees with Thibaut in his opinion that the definition of Brahman given at the very outset of the Sūtras gives a knock to the doctrine of Śaṅkara. To Śaṅkara, the *sat* without a second is the absolute that is devoid of all determination. But the other two interpret it as *Saguṇa Brahman* or the determinate.

The *ānandamayādhikaraṇa*, (I. 1. 12—19) according to Śaṅkara, raises the problem whether Brahman is really *Saguṇa* or *Nirguṇa*. Śaṅkara, with his metaphysical formula, that determination is negation, concludes that the absolute is the indeterminate and the alogical and that *ānandamaya* is only the appearance of the absolute. The Sūtras convey the idea of *Saviśeṣa Brahman* as opposed to *Nirviśeṣa Brahman*. Therefore the other Vedāntins deny this distinction between the logical and the alogical and uphold the adjectival theory that Brahman is both bliss and the blissful (*ānanda* and *ānandamaya*). Deussen thinks that the term *ānandamaya* indicates the fulness of the bliss of Brahman and not its inmost shell or *kośa*, that Śaṅkara first gives Bādarāyaṇa's interpretation that the *ānandamaya* is Brahman and then rejects it and

that the latter view may be an interpolation. Thibaut is of opinion that Śāṅkara's view is a very forced explanation and rebuts Deussen's theory of interpolation. The relation between the finite and the infinite is discussed and determined in I. iv. 20—22. The Sūtrakāra considers the view of Āsmarathya, Audulomi and Kāsakṛtsna and regards the theory of Kāsakṛtsna, namely, *avasthiteḥ* as the *siddhānta* or the conclusion. Śāṅkara interprets the term as absolute identity, and, according to Thibaut, identifies the opinions of Āsmarathya and Audulomi with *bhedābheda* and *satyābheda* respectively; but this identity is questioned by others. Deussen thinks that Āsmarathya and Audulomi represent the exoteric understanding while Kāsakṛtsna states the esoteric view of Śāṅkara. Rāmānuja reads it as the relation of soul and body (*śarīra-śarīri sambandha*), Bhāskara as essential unity and Yādavaprakāśa and Nimbārka in terms of *bhedābheda*. Sūtra II. 1. 15 states the Vedāntic view of cosmology and the causal relation in terms of non-difference (*ananyatva*). To Śāṅkara, cause connotes the self-identity of the absolute and the effect is its illusory projection due to *avidyā*. Rāmānuja interprets causality in terms of immanent unity, organic inseparability and personal identity. Bhāskara thinks that Brahman, influenced by the *upādhis*, differentiates by his *pariṇāmaśakti* into the finite selves and the world of nature. Nimbārka says

that the effect is both different and non-different from the cause. Bhāskara, Yādaṇḍa and Nimbārka regard the term as an adequate explanation of *bhedābheda*. All these Vedāntins agree in repudiating the distinction made by Śaṅkara between *vivartavāda* and *pariṇāmavāda* and adopt *pariṇāmavāda* as the only consistent conclusion of Vedāntic cosmology. Creation is a case of *vikāra* and not *vivartana*. The analogy of clay and its products, of thread and cloth, fully brings out the truth of the unity of the creational or the self-manifesting power of God.

Section II. ii. 42—45 refers to the doctrine of the *pāñcarātra* of the Bhāgavatās. Śaṅkara refutes the account of the finite self given therein as a form of emanationism. Rāmānuja defends it in terms of the doctrine of incarnation. Bhāskara has generally no objection to it except to its theory of creationism. Nimbārka treats the whole as a criticism of the Śākta doctrine, in which creation is traced to *śakti*, external to *Īśvara*. But mere energy has no self-directive power of its own. II. iii. refers to the nature of the finite self and its exact relation to the infinite. Śaṅkara regards the finite as a reflection or appearance of the absolute and traces its atomic character (*aṇutva*) and cognition-activity to *buddhi* or the false limiting adjunct of *avidyā*. But the other commentators insist on the distinctness and distinctions relating to finite experience (cf. I. ii. 8) and assert that the roots of our being are

in the infinite. The term *amśa* is explained away by Śaṅkara as *amśa iva*. Rāmānuja rejects the theory of 'as-if' and explains the term in the light of his doctrine of *apr̥thaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa* according to which the finite is an essential attribute or *prakāra* of *Īśvara*. To Bhāskara individuation is formal distinctness and it is due not to *avidyā* but to *upādhis* or real limiting adjuncts. But Yādava and Nimbārka combine diversity with unity and regard the self as essentially different from, and, at the same time, identical with the infinite.

In III. ii. 3 occurs the baffling word *māyāmātram*. Śaṅkara explains it in the light of the theory of pan-illusoriness and degrees of reality. Bhāskara attributes the dream world to the *upādhi*-ridden *jīva* and the objective world to *Īśvara*. To Rāmānuja the dream state is a real world though it is not the world which is common to all of us, and the dream experience is conditioned morally by the *karma* of the individuals and reveals the wonderful will of God. Yādava and Nimbārka also reject the theory of illusion and sublation and give a realistic interpretation of the phenomenon. The famous *Ubhayaśiṅga Adhikaraṇa*, III. ii. 11 to 31, discusses the nature of Brahman as the object of meditation. Śaṅkara seeks in this section his authority for the distinction between the personal God or *Saguṇa Brahman* of the *vyāvahārika* state and the *Nirguṇa Brahman* or the absolute of the *pāramār-*

thika state. The negative judgment (*neti neti*) denies the relative and affirms the transcendental. The absolute is beyond predication. It is the intuitional highest and the alogical. But Rāmānuja gives a moral meaning to the negative judgment and repudiates the distinction between the metaphysical highest and the meditational highest. It would be idle to affirm the qualities of Brahman with a view to denying them. Brahman has an infinity of perfections without the slightest trace of error, evil or imperfection. To Bhāskara Brahman is without form, but not without attributes. Nimbārka employs his theory of *bhedābheda* and ascribes a two-fold nature to Brahman, namely, the static aspect of the transcendental and the dynamic aspect of the relative. III. ii. 27—30 is said to define the nature of the relation between Brahman and the *acit* or the world of nature. To Śaṅkara nature is rooted in contradiction, and is therefore a perversion of reality. To Rāmānuja, with his theory of *śarīra-śarīri-sambandha*, it is a living garment of God. To the *bhedābheda* Vedāntins, the analogies employed by the Sūtrakāra in the context, namely, the relation of the snake and its coils, and of light and its luminosity, adequately express the eternal and essential relation of difference and non-difference between Brahman and *acit* and at the same time bring out the transcendental perfection of Brahman. III. iii. dealing with the *sādhana* or the means of

attainment of Brahman, examines in detail the various kinds of meditations on Brahman and concludes that their goal is the same. Mr. Ghate thinks that the whole question dealt with so exhaustively is out of place from Śaṅkara's ultimate point of view. Śaṅkara distinguishes between *aparavidyā* and *para-vidyā*, *krama-mukti* and *jīvan-mukti* and concludes that the highest freedom is the apprehension of the self-identical absolute, here and now. But the other Vedāntins deny this distinction between two kinds of *vidyā* and *vidvān* and repudiate the theory of *jīvan-mukti*. The meditation on Brahman as the self is explained by each in the light of his own *siddhānta*. Interpreting the well-known term *avibhāga* used by the Sūtrakāra to define the content of *mukti*, Śaṅkara says it is *svarūpakya* or the absolute identity of *jīva* and *Īvara*; Rāmānuja *viśiṣṭaika* or organic inseparability; Bhāskara *ekibhāva* or the unity of the absolute, and the other Bhedābheda-vādins define it as both identity and difference. This idea of unity in difference is fatal to both self-identity and externality. The Sūtrakāra then discusses the question whether *mukti* is immediate or mediate. Is it the metaphysical knowledge of the self-identical absolute by the negation of the phenomenal and the fictitious, or is it a progressive realisation of the absolute beyond the *samsāramanḍala* or the world of space-time-causality? Śaṅkara, following Bādari, thinks that the terms *gati* and *gantavya* apply only to *Kārya Brahman* or

the spatialised infinite in a pluralistic scheme and not to the infinite which transcends all categories. *Mukti* is immediate and not a far-off divine event. Even the best infinite is only a finite, and therefore the absolute cannot be identified with the world of Brahman. Eternity is really timelessness and not a future perfection involving historic progress. The idea of fruition is the figment of false knowledge and is opposed to the self-identity of Brahman. But the other Vedāntins treat Bādarī's view as the earlier or the *prima facie* doctrine and insist on the subject-object distinction between Brahman and the *jīva* as the *upāśya* and *upāśaka* or the *prāpya* and *prāpaka*, spiritual realisation as both an apprehension and attainment and *mukti* as freedom from embodiment and not freedom in embodiment. To Rāmānuja the absolute exists in an *aprākṛta* world where space-time is under the form of eternity. But he does not accept Bhāskara's idea that the four Sūtras preceding the last one define the theistic view and his distinction between *sadyomukti* or immediate attainment of the infinite and *krama-mukti* through the world of *Kārya Brahman*.

The term *ekībhāva* used by Bhāskara connotes the ascent to the absolute and the apprehension of unity beyond the sphere of *samsāra*. The finite self is not a single individuality unrelated to other selves, but is an integral element of the cosmic whole, which is the common theatre of its transmigrating life,

and it is only when the sphere of *samsāra* is fully transcended by the attainment of the boundless bliss of Brahman that *mukti* becomes the highest consummation of the spiritual life. Yādava and Nimbārka therefore conclude that *mukti* is the upward striving of the self to the absolute and realising its essential and eternal unity as well as distinctness. But Śāṅkara treats the last Sūtra 'from whence there is no return' as referring to the lower *vidvān* who is only on the path to perfection or *Brahma* and not to the eternally existent Brahman.

Mr. V. S. Ghate, in his comparative study of the varieties of Vedāntic thought, thinks that the doctrine of Śāṅkara, as deduced from the Sūtras, is out of court, whatever be its value as a philosophic system and that the theory of the Sūtras likewise does not support the principles of *apṛthaksiddha viśeṣaṇa* and of *pāñcarātra* as held by Rāmānuja and concludes that the Sūtras are not aware of the dogmas of the later Vedāntic schools and that the system of the Sūtras, if they have any system at all, can only be of the *bhedābheda* type which affirms the equal reality of *bheda* and *abheda*. The vague terms employed by the Sūtrakāra in all crucial questions like *avasthiteḥ*, *ananyatva*, *amśa*, *ubhayaśiṅga*, *avibhāga* and *avirodha* appropriately bring out the truths of the *bhedābheda* theory alone and the simile of the serpent and its coils used in expounding the relation between the infinite and the finite exactly fits in with this doctrine.

The Bhedābhedavādins come to the same conclusion but on different grounds. They reject the modern historic view that the Sūtras mark a transition from the want of system in the *Śruti* to the systematization of the later schools and, following the tradition that the *Śruti* is the word of God and that the Sūtras only make explicit what is implicit in *Śruti*, conclude that their theory hits the intention of the Sūtrakāra.

CHAPTER VI

MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE VEDĀNTA

Though the Vedāntic systems have a well-marked individuality of their own, we find a blending of the boundary lines in their presentations by modern writers and it is of profound interest to a student of *bhedābheda* to trace its unconscious influence in their works. We may select Prof. Deussen, Thibaut and Dr. Radhakrishnan as the representatives of the types of modern Vedāntic interpreters, who base their methods on logical clearness, critical study and the canons of philosophical exposition, without being bound by literalism and scholastic pre-suppositions. Deussen detects two parallel but necessarily contradictory forms, namely, the exoteric and the esoteric, in the various provinces of the Vedānta or Advaita like theology, cosmology and the doctrine of *mukṭi*. Exoteric Vedānta refers to the *aparavidyā* or the theology of *Saguṇa Brahman*, empirical reality (*vyavahāra satya*) and *krama-mukṭi*. But esoteric Vedānta is the supreme knowledge (*paravidyā*) or the philosophy of the absolute or *Nirguṇa Brahman*, transcendental reality (*pāramārthika satya*) and *jīvan-mukṭi*. Exoterism gives an empirical dress and colouring to the metaphysics of Vedānta and is a

concession to the popular consciousness affected by *avidyā* or its innate realism. As Śaṅkara did not, owing to his theological training and faith in the letter of the Veda, attain the clearness of this distinction, Deussen, in the interests of the inner necessity of logical, philosophical and historic criticism, feels justified in making explicit what is implicit in the teaching of Śaṅkara with a view to indicating whether their originator lags behind the full scope of his thoughts. The Vedāntin has a highly developed taste for dialectic disputation finding a pro and contra for every question, but totally lacks a feeling for æsthetic form and drifts without a true insight into the systematic connection of his ideas. The Vedāntic absolute is the self-existent consciousness without any empirical or finite content, and liberation or *mukti* is a return into the being or Brahman as the inmost essence of the soul. But Deussen does not agree with the view that the absolute as the basis of being is the seer of seeing or the subject of experience beyond the subject-object relation. The interpretation of *ānandamaya* as the inmost shell of Brahman is, according to Deussen, a later interpolation opposed to the text of the Upaniṣad and the teachings of Bādarāyaṇa. This reminds us of the similar criticism by Bhāskara that the treatment of Brahman as *ānanda* and not *ānandin* is a mutilation of the *Śruti* and the Sūtras. The *Ubhayaśiṅga Adhikaraṇa* brings out the antithesis between the absolute of metaphysics and the personal god of

popular theology. The *gñāni* or the metaphysician seeks the one by sublating the many, but the *upāsaka*, who is on the empirical or lower level, personifies and phenomenalises the absolute, and worships the presentational forms. Deussen holds that Śaṅkara does not draw these sharp distinctions and that he confuses the contraries.

In explaining Vedāntic cosmology, Deussen thinks that the *upādhis* caused by *avidyā* are the apparent individualising determinations of Brahman, consisting of the objects of the outer world, the body, the *indriyas*, the *prāṇas* and the *manas*. *Avidyā* is the innate obscuration of knowledge, and is subjective and negative like hallucinations and dreams. But it is a positive factor in life which accounts for the empirical existence of the world and the individual. It is owing to *avidyā*, the hybrid being-non-being, that we ascribe to Brahman the ideas of god, the world and the soul. Deussen gathers this fundamental idea of Advaita, nowhere treated connectedly by Śaṅkara, by his own analytic study and distinguishes three phenomenal aspects:—(i) It is the *upādhis* that make the absolute of metaphysics the god of *upāsana*; (ii) the world of *nāma-rūpa* is due to the *upādhis* of Brahman; (iii) but the most frequent meaning is the idea of Brahman becoming the finite self and the best explanation of this relationship is the comparison of the complex of the *upādhis* with jars which limit cosmic space locally. They are constituted by the physical and psychic apparatus of the body, the *indriyas*, *prāṇa* and *manas*,

and the moral determinations of the migrating soul. But in the indeterminate idea of the indestructible powers of Brahman, the creative power of Brahman, the seed-force of things, and the individual souls are all confused together. In discussing the positive nature of Brahman—existence and intelligence (*satta* and *bodha*)—as one, Deussen points out that in the end both ideas are resolvable into that of force. It is force that manifests itself as existence and the activity of thought. The spiritual (*caitanya*) is a potency which lies at the root of all change in nature and which reveals itself as motion in matter and spirit in man. Empirically viewed, it is the one existent that expands into the world of the subject of experience and nature, which is the object of experience. The Sūtras employ the similes of the serpent and its coils, and the sun and its light to bring out the identity between Brahman and its phenomenal forms. But Deussen says that the division of subject and object exists here also. In the emphasis on the third meaning of the *upādhis* and the use of the word 'potency', Deussen practically adopts the language of Bhāskara and the other *bhedābheda* writers. The exoteric view of the *jīva* as an emanation of Brahman wearing the veil of time, space and causality is closely related to that of Bhāskara and both employ the similes of sparks from the glowing fire, local divisions of the cosmic space and the spider ejecting and retracting the threads. In discussing the nature of the ultimate relation of the

finite self and Brahman, Deussen rejects the rationalism of Āśmarathya who spatialises Brahman, and that of Audulomi who sets up a temporal relation, and accepts the mystic account of identity given by Kāśakṛtsna and Śaṅkara. But he feels that the fundamental want of the Vedānta system is that it lacks morality and should therefore be supplemented by the Christian idea of moral transformation which is foreign to Indian thought. Both combined give the philosophic truth. Being is not merely thought but also will, and while Christianity has the merit of emphasizing the will and its objective worth and transforming egoism into self-denial, Vedāntic thought affirms the divine reality of man and assigns metaphysical reasons for it. The third requirement in the *sādhana catuṣṭaya*, as elaborated by Śaṅkara, dealing with the need for the withdrawal of the senses from their objects and inner concentration, does not fit the picture of a true philosopher with a profound interest in life. In all this criticism Deussen betrays a profound ignorance not only of the other schools of Vedānta which are as vital as Advaita but also of the true import of the ethics of Vedānta. In the synthesis of what he calls Vedāntic metaphysics and Christian ethics, he brings to our mind the *bhedābheda* theory of *gñāna-karma-samuccaya*, which does full justice to both thought and will and reveals the self-completeness of Vedāntic theory and practice.

The Vedāntic theory of *mukti*, according to Deussen, insists on the distinction between *krama-mukti* or pro-

gressive release and *jīvan-mukti*, here and now. The soul is the absolute that transcends space-time and the idea of process and progress is only empirical. The *vidvān*, who stills his desires, realises Brahman immediately and his vital spirits do not depart. The universe is entirely his because he is the universe. The esoteric system of Vedānta does not explain the nature of the saving knowledge that comes out of the grace of God because it says that what depends on means or *sādhana* is not eternal and *mukti* is beyond the sphere of causality. But there is nothing in the esoteric system to correspond to this grace of God and it is a deviation from the logical structure of the whole system. As regards the startling fact that the body continues to exist in the state of *jīvan-mukti* (a term which we do not meet with in Śaṅkara), Śaṅkara resorts to the two analogies of the potter's wheel revolving even after the completion of the pot, and the perception of two moons in spite of the true cognition ; both the explanations are questionable. Anyhow when the seed of works is destroyed by *gñāna* and the psychic apparatus is dissolved, there is the 'unio mystica' which is best expressed by the idea of indivisibility and illustrated by the simile of the rivers losing their name and form in the ocean. Strictly speaking, there is no union because that only can become one which was one already. As Schopenhauer points out, release is indestructibility without continued existence. The man, who perceives the manifold, migrates from body to body, but the *vidvān* realises his oneness with the

absolute and is released for ever. This idea of mystic union and its analogies largely corresponds to Bhāskara's theory of *ekībhāva*. Thus, in spite of his passion for absolute monism, in which he sets up a contradiction between the philosophic and the empirical view and eliminates the empirical, Deussen drifts into practical reason and unconsciously yields to the logical, ethical and mystic demands of *bhedābheda*.

In his masterly introduction to the Vedānta Sūtras, Thibaut gives a conspectus of the contents of the Sūtras as interpreted by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and reviews their teachings in the light of modern critical investigation with a view to determining their exact philosophical position. In both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja there is a desire to read their own *siddhānta* into the Sūtras and there is not much of coherence and strictness of reasoning in their commentaries. Though the impartial critic has to depend on the scholiasts for the meaning of the details of scriptural texts, he is quite able to judge by himself so far as the general drift and spirit of the texts are concerned. In summing up the teaching of the Sūtras, Thibaut gives it as his opinion that they do not set forth the distinction that Śaṅkara makes between the two kinds of knowledge, two kinds of Brahman, two kinds of causality and two kinds of *mukti*, and that the system of Bādarāyaṇa has greater affinities to that of Rāmānuja than that of Śaṅkara. The Upaniṣads

do not constitute a systematic whole which is coherent in all its parts without any contradictions. But (if you admit the possibility) Śaṅkara's system is most probably the best that can be devised and is nearer to the Upaniṣads than the Sūtras, at least in one important point, namely, that the self, whatever its original relation to Brahman may be, is in the end completely merged and is indistinguishably lost in the universal self. As regards the original relation of the soul to the highest self, if the emission of the elements described in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad is a real process, then the finite self is a true part or emanation of Brahman itself. The soul springs from Brahman and springs back into it. The personal god of Rāmānuja does not adequately represent the Brahman of the Upaniṣads. Freedom consists in abolishing all elements of plurality and seeing everything in Brahman and Brahman in everything, and thus becoming one with it like the flowing rivers disappearing in the sea. If, as Thibaut says, these are the fundamental features of the Vedānta, they seem to fit in more with the teaching of *bhedābheda* than with that of Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja. Thibaut asks the all-important question as to who systematises the teaching of the Upaniṣads most adequately, whether it is Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja or some other commentator. The systematic expounder from Thibaut's point of view is probably the Bhedābheda-vādin, the 'other commentator' of whom he was not aware. If the *Śruti*

and the Sūtras present one system, and if Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Sūtras and Rāmānuja's interpretation of the *Śruti* are not adequate, then it follows that *bhedābheda* alone brings out the full force of the system of the *Śruti* and the Sūtras. This view is strengthened by a detailed examination of Bhāskara's *Bhāṣya* in the light of Thibaut's criticism of the *Bhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

Dr. Radhakrishnan, in his brilliant exposition of the Upaniṣads in the light of the higher ideals of philosophy and in his interpretation of Śaṅkara, dismisses Deussen's view that the illusion-theory is the fundamental doctrine of the Upaniṣads. "He seems to interpret Kant in the light of the Upaniṣads and the Upaniṣads in the light of Kant with the result that he has practically misconstrued both." The false imitators of the Upaniṣad ideal dogmatically declare with an extreme of arrogant audacity that Brahman is absolutely homogeneous. It is possible to develop a new coherent account of the Upaniṣadic wisdom by a constructive criticism of the illusion-theory of Śaṅkara's metaphysics and the personal theism of Rāmānuja. The philosophy of the Upaniṣads is more an Advaitism than an abstract idealism or monism, and even Śaṅkara says that the real is non-dual. Brahman is the basis of the world and the world of experience, with all its opposites, becomes transfigured and reinterpreted in the intuition of Brahman and not negated or sublated as the

Identity philosophers say. The world is unreal but not illusory or non-existent. Brahman is the identity that underlies all things or elements from the personal god to the telegraph post, from Deity to dust. If the world were illusory, then there would be no meaning in morality and religion. Śaṅkara's interpretation of *sadvidyā* enforces the truth that the world is substantially Brahman and depends upon it. Nowhere does he say that our life is a dream and our knowledge a phantasm. There is no absolute antagonism between Brahman and the world. God is the absolute from the cosmic point of view and, as the synthesis of being and non-being, He is the logical highest. God is over against the finite self and is therefore its 'other' as creator and saviour. But the absolute is the pre-cosmic nature of God and is the intuitional highest. The infinite dwells in the finite and is its inmost essence, implied in all experience and the operation of the infinite in the finite is the source of all philosophic and moral activity. Brahman is the thread that binds all plurality into a single unity. It is in and not as the world. It is not in time though time is in it. It is the spiritual spring that differentiates itself into the numberless finite centres. Śaṅkara steers clear of mentalism as well as materialism. A phenomenon is not a phantasm and the root of *avidyā* is logical and psychological and not metaphysical. The central fact of creation is the individualisation of the one, and things and persons are ultimately only modes of the existence of God, who is the supreme cause and

substratum of the world. The *jīva* is the particular and the psychological 'me' subject to the accidents of experience and not the metaphysical subject beyond the limits of relational thought, and its agency abides in the *upādhi* or limitation of *avidyā*, *kāma*, and *karma*. *Avidyā* causes the sense of individuality of the empirical self. *Avidyā* is the conceit that the 'I' consists in the bodily nature. The relative reality of the empirical ego arises from its false identification with the body and the senses and other *upādhis*, and spiritual life involves both *gñāna* and *karma* or metaphysical perfection and moral insight.

The self, according to this view, derives its being and sustenance from God and should therefore cease to subsist for itself. It has to overcome the contradiction of the finite-infinite and identify itself with the whole. Freedom is not sinking into a state of inertia by the abolition of desire and the sublation of the will. *Mukti* is the cessation from the separateness of *nāma-rūpa* in which the intellect fulfils itself in intuition, and moral freedom is work for the welfare of the world in a disinterested way without moralistic individualism and exclusiveness. Śaṅkara was not a dreaming idealist, but a practical philosopher. Morality is a stepping stone and not a stopping place. Freedom is not the abolition of self, but the realisation of infinity, absoluteness and bliss. It is not the abolition of plurality, but the removal of the sense of plurality. It is not the dissolution of the world, but the disappearance of a false outlook, Non-difference

does not affirm identity but only denies difference. The highest includes the rest while transcending them. When the angle of vision is thus changed, the reality of the world is seen to be Brahman itself. The *jīva*, the psychological self, becomes the ultimate self of Brahman and becomes immortal. Freedom is a state of oneness with Brahman, the universal spirit. The freed soul sees itself in all. In this integral oneness of intuition there is no vanishing into nothingness; only the limiting adjuncts are destroyed in *mokṣa* and not the *ātman* itself. The Upaniṣads are pantheistic in the sense that the universe is in God, but the universe is not God and the finite seeks self-transcendence and tries to get rid of its finiteness. Pantheism, in this sense, is the central feature of every true religion.

The Doctor's account of Vedānta based on the criticism of illusionism and theism seems to have closer kinship with *bhedābheda* than with the systems of Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja. The theory that Brahman is the identity that underlies all things, the distinction between the pre-cosmic absolute or the intuitional highest and the cosmic god or the logical highest, the co-ordination of *gñāna* and *karma* and the idea of freedom as the disappearance of a false outlook and not the dissolution of the world fits in with the exposition of Bhāskara and Yādaṇḍa. While the theory of *mukti* as the intuition of integral oneness is allied to that of Bhāskara, the idea of *Īśvara* as the real for thought which is less than the

absolute is analogous to that of Yādava. The Doctor and others like Pandit Sitānāth Tattvabhūṣan and Dr. Mahendranāth Sircār think that Rāmānuja's view, that reality is the absolute-relative or a synthetic unity, which is the logical highest, is like the absolute of Hegel. But Hegel's view is more like *bhedābheda* than the *prakāra-prakāri* theory of Rāmānuja.

Pandit Sitānāth Tattvabhūṣan adopts the critical method of exposition 'awakened', as he says, by western thought and develops a variety of Vedāntism called philosophical Brahmaism or theistic idealism, which is distinct from the schools of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Absolute monism confuses relativity with illusoriness and denies the reality of the finite. Dualism worships an external, and, therefore, limited god and thus ignores the internal relation between the infinite and the finite self. Relation is neither illusory nor external, but a real factor of reality. The absolute is the unity-in-difference of Hegel anticipated by the *Gīta* and the philosophy of Rāmānuja, but without the clearness and distinctness of the dialectic method. The *samuccayavāda* of *gñāna* cum *karma*, as expounded by the *Īśopaniṣad* and the *Gīta*, brings out the inner meaning of Vedāntic ethics and refutes the extremes of the asceticism of the *śāṅkhyas* and the *māyārādins* and the activism of the *karmakāṇḍins*. The influence of *bhedābheda* of the Yādava type is clearly discernible in this account of Vedāntism insisting on the inner unity of the infinite and the finite. As Rabīndranāth Tagore so beautifully puts it, truth is in

the harmony of the infinite and the finite and the endless many reveals the One like the multitude of notes revealing the inner music. Creation is the truth of the boundless through the reality of the bounds and *mukti* consists in freedom from the isolation of the self. This view is not a philosophy of passivity as it reconciles the ideal of perfection and the process of its revealment.

CHAPTER VII

CRITICISM OF *BHEDĀBHEDA*

In the attempt to strike a middle path between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, *bhedābheda* has antagonised both the systems and it is essential to consider their criticism of it before estimating its value in the history of Indian philosophy. The *Bhāmati*, a gloss by Vācaspati Miśra on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Vedānta Sūtras*, exposes the defects of *bhedābheda* and the following summary of this criticism is based on the excellent translation of the *Bhāmati* by Mr. S. S. Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstri. The philosophy of *bhedābheda* is founded on the principle of the causal relation as an identity in difference. In the judgment, "This ear-ring is made of gold," there is non-difference in the causal aspect and difference in the effect aspect and therefore it is an appositional cognition in which both the aspects co-exist without any contradiction.

The *Bhāmati* controverts this interpretation as follows (I. 1. 4). "What is this which is called difference, which should exist along with non-difference in one place? If it be said to be reciprocal non-existence, does this exist or not between effect and cause, bracelet and gold? If not, there is oneness alone, not difference. If it does

exist, there is difference alone, not non-difference. Nor is there no opposition between existence and non-existence, as their co-existence is impossible. Or, if it were possible, there would result non-difference in truth between the bracelet and the *vardha nāna*, difference not being opposed to non-difference. Further, the bracelet being non-different from gold, just as, in the gold-aspect, bracelets, crowns, ear-rings, etc., are not different, so even in the bracelet-aspect they should not differ, because of the non-difference of the bracelet from gold. And thus, gold alone is real, not the bracelet, etc., since of the difference there is no manifestation. Now, (it may be said) only as gold is there non-difference, not as bracelet, as that (bracelet), however, there is but difference from ear-ring, etc. (We ask in reply) If the bracelet is non-different from gold, how is it that this form does not recur in an ear-ring, etc.? And if it does not recur, how is the bracelet non-different from gold? For, those which are variable when something is recurrent, are certainly different from that, as the different flowers from the string. And though goldness is recurrent ear-ring, etc., are not recurrent; hence, they too are certainly different from gold. If, because of the recurrence of existentiality, all things were non-different, there would be no distinctions like "this is here, not that," "this is from this, not that," "this is now, not that," "this is so, not that," etc., because of the non-existence of any ground for discrimination of anything in any place, at any time, in any manner. Further, when, from a distance, it is understood to be gold, they would not be desired to be known in their particularities, as ear-ring, etc., because of

their non-difference from gold, and because of the latter being known. Since there is difference too of ear-ring, etc., from gold, even when gold is known, they are unknown.

Now, since there is non-difference too, are they not known? On the contrary, knowledge alone is appropriate in their case; for, the absence of the effect (knowledge) in the absence of the cause (non-difference) is the general rule; and that is set aside (here) by the existence of the cause. And, since in non-difference there is the existence of the cause, when gold is known, ear-ring, etc., are certainly known; hence the desire to know them and the cognitions of them would be futile. Therefore, that which on the apprehension of another is not (itself) apprehended is different from that (other); for example, when the camel is apprehended, the ass which is not apprehended (differs) from the camel. And when gold is apprehended at a distance, its particularities, ear-ring, etc., are not apprehended; there they are different from gold. "How, then, is there the apposition ear-ring (is) gold"? If this be asked, it has been said that there is no apposition where there is a relationship of supporter and supported or having the same locus. Then, how (to explain) the distinction of recurrence and variability, and the desire to know ear-ring, etc., even when gold is known? It has been said that these two, verily, are not intelligible, if there be non-difference, absolute or non-absolute (*i.e., cum* difference). Therefore, one of the two, difference and non-difference having to be abandoned, it is on the basis of non-difference that there is the positing of difference; it does not stand to reason that non-difference

is posited on a basis of difference. For, difference is dependent on what is differentiated, those which are differentiated are each one; if they were not one, there would be no difference because there would be no locus; and of unity there is no dependence on difference; the apprehension of difference in the form "not this, (but) this" has need of the apprehension of the counter-correlate, while the apprehension of unity has no need of anything else."

Following other Advaitic texts like the *Iṣṭasiddhi*, Professor Hiriyāṇṇa further brings out the self-discrepancy of the concept of identity-in-difference. If m and n be two entities between which the relation exists, neither of them can, as such, be both identical with, and different from, the other. It would mean that m is both n and $not-n$ and that n is both m and $not-m$ which is a palpable self-contradiction. To say that the principle of identity-in-difference is given in our experience puts us under no constraint to accept them always as logical verities. If m and n do not constitute an identity-in-difference directly, it may be thought they do so mediately through features in them of which some are identical and others different. But this explanation merely shifts the difficulty to another set of things and the enquiry will only lead to an infinite process. The Advaita, therefore views the relation in question as unique (*anirvacanīya*). Unity and diversity are relative to each other and it is impossible to affirm the one

while denying the other. Both of them are alike appearances and the absolute is beyond appearances. The Advaitic absolute is non-duality and not unity and Vācaspati merely denies distinction, but does not aver identity.

Dr. Mahendranāth Sircār, in his scholarly elucidation of the philosophy of Bhāskara from the epistemological, ontological and religious points of view published in the "Philosophical Quarterly," Vol. III, No. 2 (July 1927), thinks that Bhāskara does not work out the metaphysical implications of his idea of the indeterminate intuition. In the theory of knowledge, deduced from the idea of *mukti*, Bhāskara posits difference in identity as the basic principle and tries to reconcile the irreconcilable difference between realism and idealism. Knowledge refers beyond its mental self and has an objective reference even in the intuitive consciousness of *mukti* and is a dialectic process involving the three stages of indeterminate intuition, self-intuition and self-experience. In the first, the objective reference of the subject-object relation is nascent or implicit, but in the second and the third it is explicit. In the third stage, when the realistic tendency is fully evolved, the absolute limits itself by sense-activity and becomes a particular centre of experience with the duality of the 'I' and the 'not-I'. In *mukti* the realistic tendency is changed into the idealistic and the self, freed from

sense-activity, becomes the expansive consciousness. Then knowledge becomes self-knowledge and is its own evidence.

From the ontological point of view, Bhāskara may be regarded as a concrete monist maintaining the synthetic unity of the absolute with its inherent duality of the subject-object consciousness. Corresponding to the three stages of intuition in the theory of knowledge, there are three stages of being, namely, the absolute, the infinite and the finite. The absolute is the indeterminate which implicitly contains within it the determinate and becomes the concrete infinite or cosmic consciousness with its dialectic expressions of the selves and nature as its moments. In the first stage of this self-limitation the absolute becomes the infinite and in the second the infinite finitizes itself and becomes the subjects and the objects of experience. When the infinite is viewed outwardly, it becomes nature, and when it is viewed inwardly, it becomes the self. The infinite becomes concrete in the finite and the two together form the absolute reality thus comprising in it both the finite and the infinite. Vedāntism, as a philosophy of religion, does not separate the truth of metaphysics from the value of spiritual life or *mukti*. Bhāskara and Śaṅkara seem to think that the theistic association of value with activity and personality is a sign of divided life and cannot compare with the value of transcendent intui-

tion. In the philosophy of life, as expounded by Bhāskara, the highest value of life consists in the self breaking the limitations of the realistic or separatist consciousness and becoming assimilated with the infinite as its integral fact in one undivided impersonal unity. In *mukti* there is the subject-consciousness without the barriers of sense-activity; the finite self has no separate thinghood or reality. Reality is the one though not oneness. It is the identity of indiscernibles in which the finite is assimilated with the infinite and not annulled.

In estimating the value of the whole system as thus expounded, Dr. Sircār brings out the affinities between the monisms of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara and also their divergencies. But for Bhāskara's refutation of *avidyā*, which is the basic idea of Śaṅkara, the difference between the two would be more apparent than real. In defining the theory of the indeterminate as the primal reality beyond the infinite and the finite, Bhāskara seems to have been unconsciously influenced by the identity theory of Śaṅkara. But actuated by the realistic instinct, he does not fully work it out. Thus his system retains, side by side, the ideas of the absolute and the infinite, though, in his exposition, the infinite, as an all-inclusive self or person, is more prominent than the absolute. Bhāskara fails to synthesize the concept of the impersonality of the absolute with the personality of the infinite. Such a theory is self-contradictory. We

must sacrifice the one for the other and the Advaitin sacrifices the duality of *Īśvara* for the sake of the self-identity of the absolute. Thus, in the opinion of Dr. Sircār, Bhāskara has an Advaitic tendency but is not Advaitic enough.

But Bhāskara nowhere seems to admit the Advaitin's distinction between the absolute of intuition and the infinite of self-intuition and, in his polemic against Śaṅkara's theory of *māyā* and *avidyā* and the ideality of all experience, he protests against the doctrine of two Brahman and asserts the ultimate reality of *Saṅga Brahman* as the self-conscious and self-directive personality. Knowledge becomes impossible without self-consciousness and the author himself affirms that "in fact the infinite is the conception which Bhāskara reaches as the ultimate being and not the absolute." Dr. Sircār, in his criticism of Bhāskara's theory of the finite selves and nature, brings out its Spinozistic affinity and concludes that the infinite of Bhāskara is a unitary being which is more real than its modes, *viz.*, the finite selves and nature, and the distinctions of the souls and nature are not eternal. Identity and difference are contradictory and it is absurd to admit difference in the *samsāra* state and identity in *mukti*. If the absolute is one, how can there be a multiplicity of selves having their own individuality? Besides, if each self attains *Īśvara*-hood, differentiation is accentuated and

there will be many *Īśvaras* or infinite beings, which is absurd. But a Bhāskariya may say that his theory of *mukti*, deduced from the *Śruti*, is a mystic monism affirming the unity of the absolute in which the finite, freed from its finiteness caused by the *upādhis*, expands into infinity. Whatever the accurate relation between the finite self and the infinite may be, Bhāskara clearly recognizes the reality and eternity of the *bhedābheda* relation between Brahman and nature and regards the world as the self-expression of the *pariṇāma-śakti* of Brahman and this principle seems to be different from the triple dialectic movement of thought.

CHAPTER VIII

VIŚISTĀDVAITIC CRITICISM OF *BHEDĀBHEDA*

While the Advaitins regret that Bhāskara does not develop the Advaitic implication of his theory of *ekhībhāva*, the Viśistādvaitins think that he does not work out the ethical tendencies of the theory of Brahman as the eternally perfect. Rāmānuja and his followers subject the theories of *bhedābheda* to a severe and elaborate criticism with a view to proving their utter futility as a Vedāntic exposition. Rāmānuja, in his *Śrī Bhāṣya* and *Vedārtha Saṅgraha*, examines the systems in detail and exposes their fallacies. Śrī Vedānta Desika, in his *San̄kalpa Sūryodaya* and *Paramata Bhaṅga*, styles the Bhedābheda-vādins as Jainagandhi Vedāntins who belong to the Jaina type, and employ their logic of *sapta bhaṅgi*. There is a chapter devoted in the *Paramata Bhaṅga* to a criticism of Bhāskara and Yādava wherein the author says that the theory seems fascinating and seductive, but its honeyed gloss cannot deceive the seeker after the śāstraic truth. Rāmānuja starts with the common sense objection that *bheda* and *abheda* are contradictions and that no one, in his senses, would maintain the co-existence of contradictories. He then takes up the metaphysical,

moral and religious aspects of the theory and brings out their fatal defects.

The epistemology of *bhedābheda* is mainly based on the causal and generic relation of identity in difference and not on the formal law of contradiction. According to the *bhedābheda* school, reality, as a concrete experience, is neither *bheda* nor *abheda* but is both, and while a thing, viewed as cause and genus, reveals the aspect of *abheda*, the same thing viewed as effect or individual brings out the aspect of *bheda*. But this view is open to serious objections, some of which were already formulated in the Advaitic criticism of the theory. Either *bheda* belongs to one aspect of a thing and *abheda* to the other, or *bheda* and *abheda* belong to the same thing with two aspects. The first alternative is not tenable for two reasons. If the genus connotes *abheda* and the species *bheda* then these two are different and cannot therefore have a double aspect. But if the genus and individual connote one thing only, there is no difference of aspect at all. The second alternative is equally unconvincing. If the two aspects differ in kind and if there is an unknown thing which is the substrate of these aspects, then there are different things and this proves *bheda* and not *abheda*. But it may be argued that the very idea of the substrate implies the existence of aspects. But even then the objection holds good. The aspects of a thing which is their substrate

are different from the thing and therefore it is impossible to think of a thing having the contradictory qualities of *bheda* and *abheda*. Besides, if the aspects differ from one another and from the substance which is their substratum, then there would be three entities and they should belong to a substratum and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore Rāmānuja concludes that identity and difference are contradictories and cannot go together. The genus is the mode of the individual and therefore different from it. The attribute differs from the subject of which it is predicated.* The *bhedābheda* relation of all things is refuted in the *Vedārtha Saṅgraha* also of which there is a very scholarly translation in Tamil by Mr. S. Vāsudevāchāriār.† Reality cannot be *bhinnā-abhinna*. *Bheda* and *abheda* being contradictories cannot co-exist. A cloth and a pot may exist side by side in peace as different, but the same thing cannot at the same time and in the same place have being (*sadbhāva*) and non-being (*asadbhāva*). But the Bhedābheda-vādin resorts to the theory of aspects and says that in the relation between genus and species, there is non-difference from the generic point of view and difference from the specific point of view. This theory can be interpreted in three ways, genus and species may be non-different (*abhinna*) or different

* *Śrī Bhāṣya*, Thibaut, pp. 191—195.

† Vāsudevāchāriār's Tamil Translation, pp. 178-9, and English Translation in the *Brahma-vādin* series.

(*bhinna*) or both different and non-different (*bhinna* and *abhinna*). (1) If there be non-distinction between the genus and the species, then in the judgment 'the ox is broken-horned or hornless,' the genus *gotva* being the same, the species are also the same. Then the broken-horned ox is also a hornless ox, which is absurd. (2) If there be distinction between the two, then on account of the *bhinnābhinna* relation between the genus aspect and the species aspect, the broken-horned ox is at the same time identical with and different from the hornless variety, which again is absurd. (3) If the relation is both difference and non-difference, then, owing to *bheda*, the element of *gotva* is absent in the broken-horned species, and owing to *abheda*, *gotva* element is present in it.

The Bhedābheda-vādins adduce four reasons in favour of their theory of the *bhinnābhinna* relation between the infinite and the finite. In the causal and generic relations, the truth of *bhinna* and *abhinna* or identity in difference is most clearly and distinctly brought out. (1) In the judgment, 'man is an animal,' there is difference between the genus and the species but yet there is an identity of content between the two, and this unity is known as *sāmānādhikarāṇya*. (2) It is impossible to think of the species apart from the genus. (3) The term that connotes the genus also connotes all the species included in the genus; the distinction between genus and species is not apprehended. (4) Besides,

in the simple apprehension or the first perception of things, no differentiating quality is perceived and therefore there is identity. But this reasoning is fallacious. (1) *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* is *apṛthak-siddhaviśeṣana* or the inseparable relation between a thing and its attributes and not identity. (2) If the genus and species go together, it does not mean that the two are one. The idea of togetherness brings out the essential differences between the relata and not their identity. (3) It is said that the term that connotes the genus also connotes its species. This is not because the two are identical, but because the *dharmi* or the subject is the same for both.

The last argument is equally futile. The so-called undifferentiated judgment is always of the form, 'This is such and such' and it signifies the difference between the thing and its attributes. Consequently the principle of *bhedābheda* is a contradiction in terms and the relation between the finite and the infinite is that of *prakāra* and *prakār* and not *bhinna* and *abhinna*.¹

THE ABSOLUTE AND GOD.

The theory of Yādavaprakāśa that *Īśvara* is less than pure being or the absolute is wild and vicious. If being in general is the self of all and *Īśvara* only

¹ *Vedārtha Saṅgraha*: Vāsudevāchārīār's translation, pp. 96—99.

a part or fragment of being, then the authority of the Upaniṣad that the Lord is the supreme ground and goal of all beings is stultified. It may be argued that *sat* or being is fully present in all its parts, and therefore in *Īśvara* as well, that the whole is the particular, and that, from this point of view, *Īśvara* may be regarded as the self of all. But if this gross pantheistic view were true, we might infer with equal validity that, since being is fully present in a pot, the pot is the self of all and *Īśvara* is a partial manifestation of the pot! Dust and divinity would then become identical. Besides, *being* in judgments like 'the cloth is,' and 'the pot is' forms the predicate and not the subject and therefore it cannot be a cause or a substance. If *Brahmatva* or being inheres in *Īśvara*, *cit* and *acit*, as *aśvatva* or the generic nature of horses inheres in the particular horse and light in luminous bodies, Brahman becomes a mere abstract universal devoid of content. The absolute is therefore *Īśvara*, the cosmic Lord, with the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, etc., which are essential and eternal and not adventitious, nor occasioned by the contact of God with *śakti*. If there is the *sat* beyond its eternal self-differentiations of the infinite *Īśvara* and the finite *cit* and *acit* and their varying crests of consciousness, then they originate and perish and have no eternity and *Īśvara*, being a fraction of the absolute (*Brahmāmśa*), is as limited as

the finite and ceases to be *Īśvara* and *mukti* as saving grace becomes impossible. If, as Bhāskara maintains, the finite self is really one with the absolute, though in *samsāra* it is limited by the *upādhis*, there is no consistency in saying that the difference between Brahman and the *jīva* is *aupādhika* or adventitious, while that between Brahman and *acit* is *svābhāvika* or eternal, especially when the relation of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* or *bhinnābhinnatva* holds good in both cases. Since *prakṛti* is an eternal element of the self-conscious Brahman, it cannot be called *acetana* at all. Since *cit* and *acit* differ in kind, *acit* cannot be explained or explained away mechanically as the sleeping self or Brahman benumbed.

THE THEORY OF UPĀDHIS.

The Bhedābheda-vādin, as a monist, asserts the reality of Brahman and its *upādhis* or limiting adjuncts and denies the distinct existence of the finite self. But if the *jīva* is Brahman conditioned by the *upādhis*, the imperfections of the *upādhis* should then be predicated of Brahman itself. The absolute spirit cannot be spatialised and divided into parts, and it is absurd to say that the imperfections inhere only in the finite part or aspect of the infinite. On no ground can the theory of the *upādhis* infecting the infinite be maintained. It cannot be said that the atomic self is a fragment of the absolute cut off by the limiting adjunct. The absolute cannot be sundered and

the finite self, being eternal, cannot have had a beginning. If it is argued that the finite is an inherent part of Brahman connected with some atomic *upādhi*, then, since the part is infected, the whole would also be infected. Brahman would then suffer from the imperfections of the *upādhis*. Brahman is at the mercy of the *upādhis* partially or wholly. If it is the former, then every moment there would be release and bondage; if it is the latter, Brahman, as a whole, would be *upādhi*-ridden. Besides, if all the *upādhis* affected Brahman as a whole, then the *jīvas*, as mere parts of Brahman, would lose their self-identity and become non-distinct. If the *upādhis* limit the whole of Brahman, then Brahman becomes the *jīva* and there is no unconditioned absolute at all. To say that the *śakti* of Brahman alone changes and not Brahman is equally futile as Brahman and *śakti* are one. If Brahman itself is the *upādhi*, then we have to accept the view of the Cārvāka that the self is nothing but a secretion of matter. Lastly, if the *upādhis* belong to the finite self and not to the infinite, then the imperfections of life can be traced only to the *jīva* and Brahman is eternally free and perfect and Viśiṣṭādvaita is justified. *Bhedābheda* is thus condemned or corrected and re-interpreted. As Vedānta Desika points out, the spatialising of the infinite by the *upādhis* would stultify its unity and integrity and afford no guarantee for *mukti*. Brahman would be eternally employed in seeking

imprisonment and emancipation at the same time. The theory of *upādhis* creates an irreconcilable dualism between Brahman and the *upādhis* and exposes it to all the fatal objections raised by the Bhedābhedavādins against *māyāvāda*. Therefore the whole theory should be reinterpreted in terms of the *prakārin* and the *prakāra*. Time and space are modes of primordial *prakṛti*; while matter is a fleeting flux and mind conditioned by *karma* contracts and expands (*saṅkoca* and *vikāsa*), *Īśvara* is unconditioned by either and is ever free and perfect.

JĪVA.

It is false to say that the *jīva* is a part of Brahman determined by beginningless *upādhis* or the *pariṇāma śakti* of Brahman. This view is in conflict with the texts which insist on the eternal distinction between the absolute will and the finite will in terms of the creator and the creature consciousness. One and the same Devadatta cannot be a ruler on the one hand and the ruled subject on the other, because he is determined by the house in which he lives. In criticising Audulomi's theory of the self becoming one with Brahman, Rāmānuja, following Kāśakṛtsna, raises the following objections against *bhedābheda*. Before attaining its unity with Brahman the *jīva* is said to be different from Brahman. Is this difference essential or adventitious? If it is essential, then it persists even in

mukti and so there is no unity with Brahman. If the distinction comes to an end, the soul also vanishes and there is no unity or *mukti*. But if the difference is due to real limiting conditions, then the *jīva* is already Brahman and so it need not become Brahman. The difference is only in the adjuncts of the absolute and not in the absolute itself which is without parts.

BHEDĀBHEDA ETHICS.

It is the ethics of *bhedābheda* that betrays its most vulnerable spot. The immanence theory has the merit of recognizing the divineness of reality; but it does not preserve the moral eminence of God. When the absolute finitises itself, it becomes ultimately responsible for the errors, evils and other imperfections of life. The unconditioned is the conditioned and all the evils of conditionateness enter into the very heart of reality and taint it for ever. Brahman is the supreme God as well as the source of all sins. He is the deity and the dust, the saint and the sinner; and both good and evil, pleasure and pain, *mukti* and bondage, follow necessarily from the divine nature and God has to suffer from the eternal sins and sorrows of *samsāra* in His own infinite way. From the same supreme light there blazes forth a Borgia as well as a Buddha. Yādava says that, like the sage Saubhari, who, by his *yogic śakti*, assumed fifty bodies for the sake of his fifty wives, the same Brahman becomes gods, men and animals in the

bhinnābhinnatva relation and experiences their pleasures and pains. This is like saying that one and the same Devadatta with one hand scented with perfumes and adorned with jewels enjoys all the pleasures of life and with the other suffers from mallet strokes and other pains. The Upaniṣads emphatically and unequivocally affirm the absolute perfections of God in terms of truth, beauty, goodness and bliss without the slightest trace or taint of evil, error, ugliness or other imperfections. In the *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*, Rāmānuja exposes the ethical imperfections of Bhāskara's theory of Brahman determined by the *upādhis* like the internal organs, the body and the senses. The evils inhering in the *upādhis* inhere in Brahman as well and infect its nature. (1) But the Bhāskariyas justify their position by resorting to the analogical argument that the *ākāśa* is one and all-pervasive, but when it is enclosed in pots and pitchers, the indivisible (*mahākāśa*) becomes divided (*ghaṭākāśa*). Likewise is Brahman perfect, though, owing to limiting adjuncts, it takes the form of the *jīva* and suffers from conditionateness. But the analogy is unsound, as both ether and Brahman are indivisible and therefore cannot be *bhinnābhinna*, subject to the evils of the *upādhis*. If the measureless becomes the measured and the movable, then at one moment the *upādhis* move one part of Brahman and make it the *jīva* and at the next another part is conditioned. Thus every moment Brahman subjects itself to bondage and *mokṣa*. (2) The

Bhāskaraīya may amend his position by modifying the analogy as follows: Just as the all-pervading ether constitutes the organ of hearing but does not affect the other sense-organs, the absolute becomes the conditioned without losing its absoluteness. But Brahman is never affected by the *upādhis* and if one part or *aṁśa* is conditioned, the whole or the *aṁśin* is also conditioned. Besides, it is wrong to say that ether is the essence of the organ of hearing and that it evolves from *bhūtādi*. The *Śāstra* says that *ahaṅkāra* is a category like *prakṛti* and *mahat* and that it is of three kinds, *sātvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*. The first is known as *vaikārika*, the second as *taijasa*, and the third as *bhūtādi*. The five elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether, originate from *bhūtādi* and the eleven sense-organs, viz., the five cognitive and the five conative organs and *manas* originate from *vaikārika* and therefore the view of Bhāskara that the five elements constitute the *indriyas* is untenable. The *indriyas* are different from *bhūtādi* and are not the evolutes therefrom. (3) The position is not improved if it is held that Brahman is perfect and that the modifications are emanations of its *śakti*. Brahman is *śakti* or evolves into *śakti* and in either case the evils predicated of *śakti* are likewise the evils of Brahman. If Brahman is perfect and without *avidyā*, how can the *upādhis* of the *jīva* be accounted for? How, again, can the imperfect *jīva* be an emanation from the perfect Brahman? "

MUKTI.

According to Rāmānuja, the *Vedānta Sūtras* interpret the idea of *tattvamasi* in terms of the inseparability of the *prakāra* and the *prakārin* and not absolute identity or *ekībhāva* or *bhinnābhinnatva*. Vedānta Desika says that the *Rāmāyaṇa* statement about the *aikya* of Rāma and Sugrīva refers not to identity but to equality and fellowship. When a text extols a man who offers a sacrifice as being Viṣṇu, the identity is merely a figure and not a fact. The similes of oneness of ether (*ākāśa*) and pot, and of the merging of rivers in the ocean, point only to *sāmya* and not to *aikya*. The purpose of the *ākāśa* simile is to bring out the sense of separateness caused by embodiment and of the inner unity between the *jīva* and *Īśvara* by the dissolution of the obstructing material. In the same way the merging of rivers in the ocean illustrates the purified and enhanced mystic consciousness that results from the dissolution of the pluralistic ideas of name and form caused by *karma*. The *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* defines *mukti* as the Brahmanizing of the finite self. Nammālvār also refers to the divine alchemy by which the finite is infinitized without losing its distinctive existence. The Bhedābhedavādins rightly predicate moral and spiritual perfections (*guṇāṣṭaka*) to the freed self. But they deny the essential dependence of the self on the supreme will of God and consequently reduce the eight qualities of freedom to seven by omitting the attribute of right volition. But on the principle of the unity of

meaning and attributes employed by them, the seven might be reduced to one. The *Yogasiddhas* of Yādava have attained only some psychic powers and are not therefore eligible for *mukti*. The idea of expansive consciousness possessed by the freed self really belongs to its attributive consciousness. In conclusion, Vedānta Desika points out that if *bhedābheda* is accepted as true, *Īśvara* as a fraction of the absolute should be considered as having the omniscience to know the sins and sorrows of all the beings in the universe and, owing to His true relation with them, as suffering from them in infinite ways. Rāmānuja characterises the whole as a wild and vicious theory which is an outrage on the moral and religious consciousness. *Bhedābheda* is between the horns of a dilemma. If the *abheda* aspect is emphasised as in the Bhāskariya theory of *ekibhāva*, then *advaita* is the only logical conclusion of *bhedābheda*. But if the *bheda* aspect is stressed as is done by Yādava and Nimbārka, then *Viśiṣṭādvaita* alone is the inevitable conclusion.

CHAPTER IX

PARALLELS IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

The critical study of *bhedābheda* and its varieties compels comparison with parallel lines of thought in Western Philosophy. While in Western speculation, there is an inter-weaving of theistic, pantheistic and monistic motives leading more often to confusion of thought than to clarification, the Eastern systems have a well-defined individuality of their own due largely to their method of formulating a theory by the criticism of rival theories. There is a definiteness in the Vedāntic schools of Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, *bhedābheda* and Advaita, which is not clearly discernible in the corresponding Western theories of theism, pantheism and monism. Monotheism is classified by Josiah Royce under three heads, *viz.*, the ethical or voluntaristic form of Israel insisting on the quality of the righteousness of God, the intellectualistic variety of Greece emphasising rational unity, and Indic monotheism affirming, like Neo-Platonism and Spinozism, the reality of God and the unreality of the world. The last variety evidently connotes Advaita. But, as monotheism is generally defined as the belief in divine personality entering into personal relations with man to redeem him from his career of sin and thus establish a spiritual order in the world, by no

stretch of imagination can Advaita be identified with monotheism. Many Western thinkers explain the Hindu view of life as a kind of acosmic pantheism that encourages universal quietism and not moral strenuousness. This view betrays a lack of insight into the essentials of Indian thought which lays as much stress on the ethical and aesthetic values of life as on the intellectual. Ignorance lapses into prejudice when the Western thinker happens to be a theologian. In a classification of monotheism made by Mr. John Oman in his book, "The Natural and the Supernatural," into the primitive, the deistic, the nomistic and the prophetic, in which the lowest place is assigned to Hinduism and the highest to Christianity, the principle of division adopted is not fundamental. Jewish writers extol their faith as the only monotheism worth considering and criticise Christian trinitarianism as a variety of polytheism. Islam also makes a claim that it is the only monotheism in the world in the literal and logical sense of the word. Modern theism is more and more influenced by the pantheistic idea of divine immanence, and, as Sir Frederick Pollock shows, theism overlaps pantheism in Mr. Fiske's theory of cosmic theism which excludes the popular idea of a personal god. The term pantheism is equally vague as it applies, as the same author says, to philosophic speculations and theories of conduct which are diametrically opposite. It is employed as a synonym for such diver-

gent views as Neo-Platonic emanationism, Spinozistic acosmism and naturalism. If it affirms the reality of the infinite and the unreality of the finite, it is known as acosmism. The view of Spinoza that extension is an attribute of substance is often identified with a naturalistic interpretation of reality. The Hegelian variety is regarded as pan-logism. Hindu pantheism is defined by Sir Frederick as a theory which holds that all finite existence is an illusion and life a blunder and vexation as contrasted with Stoic pantheism which says that the world is the product of reason and is good. Both Hindu and Stoic pantheism, he holds, are opposed to the view of Spinoza. Sir Frederick, however, while recognising the practical value of Spinoza's philosophy, fights shy of defining it, as he considers that nomenclature is useless in such matters. Every Vedāntic school asserts not only the divineness of reality and the immanence of God in the universe, but also insists, in the interests of the moral and spiritual necessity of *mukti*, on His transcendence. God exists in the world but is not exhausted by it and it is therefore untenable to define the Vedānta as a pantheism that equates God with the world. The exact meaning of monistic idealism is likewise difficult to define. Idealism explains reality in terms of consciousness and its contents, and consciousness contains in itself the meaning of all things. Consistent idealism presses towards monism which is affirmed to be the fundamental need of thought and the general

drift of Indian Philosophy. The extreme monism of Advaita is said to have its echo in Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza and Bradley. But if the dominant tendency of monistic idealism is its subjective interest which starts with the thinking self as contrasted with the objects of thought, the trend of Vedānta is not subjectivistic, as it is interested in the 'that' as well as in the 'thou'. Owing to the overlapping of monism and pantheism, it is difficult to fix their boundary lines. Besides, the Advaitic theory of the identity between the *jīva* and *Īśvara*, whatever may be the relation between Brahman and the world, has no parallel in the absolutistic systems of the West. The Vedāntic view of the correlation of the *pramāṇas* based on its unique synthetic insight, its theory of *manas* as an internal sense-organ, its insistence on the eternity of the self, and its clear-cut expositions of Brahman and *mukti* are not accurately represented in any articulate system of the West—owing, probably, to the antagonism between its science, philosophy and theology. But no system of thought stands by itself, and philosophy seeks resemblances without breaking down the barrier of individuality. Many historians trace Neo-Platonism and Spinozism to oriental influence and these are probably more the echoes of *bhedābheda* than of Advaita or Viśiṣṭādvaita.

NEO-PLATONISM.

Neo-Platonism, the source of all later Western mysticism, is traced to oriental influence. Mr. Oman

says that most writers on Indian and Greek religions assume an Indian origin of Neo-Platonism and quotes with approval the views of Mr. Edward Caird that it could hardly be derived from Plato as it refers to the absolute unity, in which all distinction is lost and to a state of ecstasy in which thought is annihilated. Dean Inge refers to the desire of Plotinus to consult the Brahmins in their own homes but is of opinion that Plato's thought is more oriental than that of Plotinus who had Aristotle and the Stoics to keep him a good European. Whatever the origin, there is no doubt, as the Dean says, that Plotinus is the classical representative for all time of the metaphysics of mysticism.

If we follow the interpretation of Dr. Caird, Neo-Platonism is based on acosmistic pantheism, more or less similar to that propounded by Śaṅkara. God is the indeterminate absolute to which no predicates can be attached and it is by negation that we can define the indefinable and say that it is the self-identical infinite depleted of all finite content. It is the one as the formless residuum arrived at by abstraction. Plotinus, however, tries to connect the infinite and the finite by the expedients of emanation and ecstasy. The absolute streams forth in a series of emanations till its decreasing irradiation reaches the realm of darkness and negation. The process is reversed in the ascending stages by which the finite returns to the absolute and is lost in its ineffable ecstasy. In

that state of self-identity, the absolute transcends the duality of subject-object consciousness and even the self-consciousness of 'I am'. The absolute really neither descends nor ascends and the emanational series are phantasmal projections, unreal like the reflections in a mirror. Dr. Caird concludes that there is a contradiction in Neo-Platonism owing to its explanation of the one as at once the source of the many and the negation of the many, and that it is only in Hegelianism that thought proceeds from the abstract to the concrete and bridges the gulf between the one and the many. Dean Inge lays more stress on the indwelling of God and the testimony of spiritual experience than on the historic and miraculous aspects of religion and, in his appreciative exposition of the mysticism of Plotinus, remarks that Dr. Caird misinterprets the doctrine and distorts it grievously, that he stretches Plotinus on his Hegelian bed of Procrustes and fails to notice the value of the world of spirituality and its creative activity and transcendence. The Dean enters into the mystic motive of Plotinus and his interpretation, summarised below, reveals the strand of *bhedābheda* with a Viśiṣṭādvaitic tendency.

The philosophy of Plotinus is an idealistic ontology dealing with the absolute and its eternal values of truth, goodness and beauty, and bears family resemblance to the theory of *Saguṇa Brahman*, and, while it refutes materialism, it does not affirm the

unreality of the phenomenal. The intellectual, moral and aesthetic values, as the essence of reality, are supra-temporal and supra-spatial and therefore the determinations of the absolute and not the absolute itself. The absolute as the one is the first cause and as the good or the perfect is the final cause. The soul has its home yonder in the absolute; it descends into matter and finally returns to the one which is its source and centre and thus transcends itself, and the spatial and temporal ideas are metaphorical and not metaphysical.

The chief idea in the Neo-Platonic philosophy of religion is that reality is realisable. It is single and spiritual and the three divine principles are the One, Spirit and Soul, and form the triune reality as in *bhedā-bheda*. The absolute is the unconditioned One which is the source of unity and plurality and it transcends separability. As the super-conscious, it is beyond the relational form and existence and is therefore ineffable. The Spirit is the unity in duality and the spiritual transcends separability but not plurality, and both the knower and the known coalesce in the content of the absolute without being annulled. Identity and contradiction appear opposed but they are reconciled in the absolute. The whole is in every part and each part of the whole is infinite; and there is no dividing line between one world and another. The universe is a harmonious series of ascending and descending spiritual existences and values. The

spiritual world is the world of the One-many. In the spirit and the spiritual world the One and the many are reconciled in a multiple unity. The two are a unity in duality. All is each and each is all. Being and becoming are complementary and not contradictory, and therefore both staticism and evolutionism are equally true.

In the world-view of Plotinus allied to the *pari-ṇāmavāda* of *Bhedābheda*, the One overflows in a stream of creative activity and there is another current of ascent to the same One. Creation is the overflow of the One and with its power it penetrates all things like the efflux of light from the sun. Things stream forth from the original power in eternal necessity. The spiritual becomes the world of sense in the mirror of matter. All things aspire to God. Every being tends to produce an image of itself and the spiritual world becomes an actuality. When spirit overflows and irradiates matter, it becomes its broken lights in this world and finally loses itself in darkness. Spiritual power slumbers in the stone, dreams in the plant and awakes in the soul and thus spiritualises the universe. Space, as the form of externality, is a spurious substantiality, which makes the soul fugitive and obscures its sight. But it is not negation or evil posited in the absolute and perverting its nature. Matter has the promise of God, as it emanates from the powers of the One. Space accounts for our

individuality. Time is willed change or the form of the will and causation involves teleology. In God will and necessity are one. Divine creativeness is transitive activity and the outgoing life of the soul. Though God is beyond the phenomenal series of space and time, a part of His activity is transitive and the world of sense is created on the spiritual pattern though it is only a distorted picture thereof. The soul comes down and enters into bodies, but a part of it remains above and God suffers no loss in creation. Creation is not creation out of nothing at a particular point of time but is necessary for the manifestation and perfection of God and there is a cyclic process with an eternal cosmic systole and diastole. This is opposed to the Hegelian theory that God would be imperfect without the world process and that He comes to Himself in history. God does not need the world but the world needs God. This real-idealism or the dynamic pantheism of Plotinus is opposed to gnostic dualism and the view of the Indian contemplative. The former ignores the value of the world of sense and the latter treats it as vacuous existence in living death steeped in torpor. Plotinus does not fully accept the western tendency to endless irrational activity interested in bettering the world. An infinite purpose is a manifest contradiction and the world orders come and go. The cyclic theory is therefore more adequate than the theories of the apocalyptists. The world of sense with its ceaseless

flux has less reality and value than the spiritual world and the dualistic view of two worlds, in which form is opposed to matter, has therefore to be rejected. Every grade of being is the matter of the grade above it and soul is really the matter of spirit and spirit the matter of the absolute. The world of sense is half-real, a true lie and our knowledge of it is only opinion or half-knowledge. When the soul awakes, matter vanishes, but it is yet a fact as divine matter. The One overflows and becomes nature like the luminary that pours forth its light without losing its substance. In the eternal, identity and difference are reconciled in a higher unity.

The soul like the *jīva* of *Bhedābheda* is an energy thrown off by spirit; it is its effluence. Like the moon it shines with the borrowed light of the spirit and is a divine spark. It is the body that causes the illusory distinction between soul and soul and creates so much pain in life. Each soul is really universal thought. All things are endowed with soul and there is a continuity from the infra-conscious to the supra-conscious. The world-soul, the soul of the all as creator, is not in the world, though the world is in it. The soul is all in every part and, even when divided, it is indivisible. Each soul is distinct but not separate and each particular is universal. There is an inner diversity that accounts for manyness. The soul is not in the body though the body is an image of it. Pleasure and pain belong to the soul and the body is

a garment of the soul and therefore separable. The soul has a divine-human nature, related to the Here and the Yonder. What truly is never perishes and while the empirical aspect perishes, the immortal aspect is eternal. The energy of the one extends as far as matter and ensouls even things and the soul wanders from the supra-essential One to the infra-essential matter. All things are endowed with soul and the pluralism that refers to spirits in a non-spiritual environment is false. Nothing that is true comes into being nor perishes. Souls have real being but this being is derived from the One like the light of the moon ; yet it is created by God.

In the ethics of Plotinus, the good or what ought to be is not used in the mere moralistic sense but refers to self-transcendence and unity. The soul strives upward to its home in the absolute and seeks deliverance from the world of sense, and the first stage in the ladder of ascent is the process of purification. The soul is to strip off the superfluous and the spurious elements that belong to the world of sense. Goodness should be sought as an end in itself. Disinterestedness is the only rule of life and its motive is to grow into God. The practice of virtue thus prepares for contemplation and longing for union with the infinite and there is no dualism between the moral life and dialectic and disciplined thinking. Contemplation is reasoned action and this view harmonises serenity and strenuousness, the ideals of

the cloister and activistic morality, and reminds us of *gñāna-karma-samuccaya*. The finite self has the finite-infinite nature and therefore seeks self-transcendence in a super-historical state. Evil is ascribed to the false opinion arising from the spurious self of matter. Sin is a case of self-will and the separate self is only a figment. The present life is a falling away from the One. Earthly loves change and pass, but the love of God is eternal. Isolation or separation is felt to be a defect or disease of individuality, and unity is the highest condition of existence and the soul 'yonder' is undivided. The process of self-simplification is not, like the peeling of the onion, a process of abstraction and an inner repose in which time fades in eternity; nor is it the theistic idea of the eternal entering into history and working towards a spiritual community. In the self-naughting process morality is transcended in the absolute. The self loses its content and is depersonalised, but not destroyed.

The soul abandons the way of the manifold here and soars upwards from sensuous being to its home in the supra-essential absolute. It forsakes the external, fixes its gaze on the One within and longs for the vision eternal. As the One is alone, it is the flight of the alone to the alone. In the ecstatic experience of the beatific vision, the soul becomes the spirit and its soul-feeling and memory are swept out of itself. When it mounts higher it intuits the

One and resurrection is from and not with the body. Thus there is ascent from the world of soul which is one-and-many to the spirit which is one-many and then to the One. The soul-consciousness is a limiting focus implying externality and in super-consciousness these limitations are transcended. Then the spirit thinks itself and thinks the others. In this intuition which transcends discursive thinking, the seer and the seen become one. It is not attaining stability, but is stability itself. The absolute is beauty itself and not the beautiful. This mystic state is not to be identified with God-intoxication, or self-hypnotisation, but it is a living realisation of shining serenity. It is the timeless all which is not non-existent but super-existent; it is a state and not a person and the soul is immersed in the shoreless ocean of immortal bliss. In this ecstasy, the finite is taken up into or sinks into the infinite or All-one. The sense of finitude and separateness alone is abolished and not the self itself. It is not self-consciousness as the self implies a contrast with the not-self. Soul-consciousness is a limiting focus or fulcrum. But in cosmic consciousness as an achieved end, the foci are fused into the one undivided unity but not abolished. Spiritual existence is a state of formless immortality in which the infinite values of life are eternally preserved. Disincarnate souls may help the universal soul to govern the world. Time yonder is under the form of eternity and not endless duration or timelessness.

in the unity of the spirit. The disincarnate soul is absorbed in the universal ; though externality disappears, duality remains ; distinction is transcended but not destroyed.

If Dean Inge's exposition of Plotinus is accepted, it seems to suggest similar lines of thought in Rāmānuja, but it has really more points of contact with the teaching of *Bhedābheda* than that of Rāmānuja owing to its neglect of the inner worth of the individual and the world of nature. The theory of the redemptive purpose of incarnation which Augustine could not find in Plotinus is not found by Rāmānuja in *Bhedābheda*. The Dean, in contrasting the staticism of the Eastern contemplative with the dynamic spirit of the West shows, like other westerners, his ignorance of the distinction between seeking the quiet and lapsing into quietism and of the systems of Vedāntic thought which emphasise voluntarism, and simply dogmatizes when he says that Christianity is the only religion or philosophy which has drawn the sting of the world's evil by its insistence on social solidarity and suffering for others. The realistic idealism of Plotinus with its theories of emanation and ecstasy closely resembles the *Bhedābheda* doctrines of *pariṇāma-śakti* and *mukti* as spiritual unity and absorption. The view that ecstasy is an escape from the natural and evanescent order and absorption in the eternal One resembles the Bhāskariya idea of *ekibhāva*. Plotinus, like Yādava,

treats the distinction between spirit and matter as relative, and views inanimate things as endowed with souls.

Frank Thilly considers Neo-Platonism as the most thorough-going attempt to reconcile pantheism and theism and his exposition of Plotinus also exhibits a strain of *Bhedābheda*. Reality is the One or the absolute from which comes the *Nous* or the divine mind as a unity in difference like the genus in the species; from the *Nous* emanates the world-soul or the *logos* who fashions the world. Like the radiance of light, which loses nothing by communicating itself, the world emanates from the fulness of the transcendent being. Evil is traced to human freedom and cannot be attributed to God.

Mr. Paul Shorely in his analysis of Neo-Platonism in the Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics points out that it exhibits three tendencies of the human mind. The first is a thaumaturgy, a low species of mysticism; the second a higher kind of mysticism clothed in symbolism which compares the emanational process to the radiance of light from the sun and the third is an ontological exposition of the absolute One of which even the idea of oneness cannot be predicated. While the interpretation of Caird emphasises the absolute of ontology in the manner of Śaṅkara, that given by Dean Inge and Thilly approximates to the mysticism of *Bhedābheda* with a leaning towards Viśiṣṭādvaita.

CHAPTER X

SPINOZA

Hegel is said to have often remarked that if a man has no Spinozism, he has no standing in philosophy. Sir Frederick Pollock in his *Life and Philosophy of Spinoza* asserts that his theory of the eternity of the mind is one of the most brilliant endeavours of speculative philosophy and that in the theory of immortality and intellectual love of God there is perhaps a reminiscence of Neo-Platonic influence and traces the pantheistic strain in Wordsworth to Spinoza. Richard McKeon in his *Philosophy of Spinoza* extols its logical unity and unity of purpose and is of opinion that Spinoza's theory is Aristotelianism touched with Neo-Platonic ecstasy. The religions of the East were known to him only by loose report. Sir F. Pollock observes that no two philosophers have truly understood Spinoza's metaphysical principles of ethics in precisely the same way. Spinoza's view is more a habit of thought with a wealth of vital ideas than a system. He has not much faith in nomenclature and catchwords, but there is no particular harm in most people calling it pantheism, if it is not identified with Brahmanical illusionism and stoicism. Mr. J. A. Gunn likewise has no faith in labels, but he thinks that Spinoza

may be styled a pantheist in the clear view that all things are in God and are His manifestations. Spinoza relies more on clear thinking and righteous life than on theological revelation with its faith in miracles and mystery, in an extra-mundane and absentee God and in historic incarnation.

According to John Caird there is an inner contradiction in the philosophy of Spinoza owing to the conflict between the abstract method of geometrical metaphysics dealing with truth and the concrete method of ethics dealing with perfection, employed by him in his conception of substance and modes. Substance, in his ontology, excludes all determinations and is an absolutely indeterminate being and the finite beings have an individuality which is a fiction of the mind. The attributes are what the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of the substance. The self-identical absolute is purely affirmative or what is, and the essence of the finite is non-esse or bare negation. Only the infinite can follow from the infinite and the finite from the finite, and the finite is only an illusion or an evanescent mode. *Natura naturata* exists only for the imagination and has no reality. Moral distinctions are only a human way of describing things and individual freedom is the work of imagination and ignorance. When the illusion of time and the things of sense vanish, eternity is realised, here and now. This interpretation of the world as nothing and the infinite as the attri-

buteless absolute reminds us of the teaching of Śaṅkara that Brahman is real and the world false. John Caird rejects this view of reality as a moveless or barren absolute and attempts a Hegelian account of Spinoza. Spinoza is often greater than his logico-mathematical method and though he starts with substance as abstract unity devoid of content, he passes to the idea of concrete unity or the self-determining infinite. The principle of reality is neither determination nor indetermination, but self-determination in which both unity and difference are organically related. Spinoza's theory of infinite modes brings out the truth of the self-development of the infinite. The real motive of Spinoza is to trace the diversity of finite life to the infinity of God. The absolute is the one self-conscious spirit realising itself in and through finite distinctions. By its own inner impulse it goes forth from itself to objects foreign to it and then returns to itself. It is both self-differentiating and self-integrating. Negation is not bare denial but has a positive meaning and the infinite denies and affirms the finite. The negation of the natural many is the affirmation of the spiritual self by a process of self-transcendence and the eternal life negates the temporal and affirms it. The self is not lost in the unity of God but is conscious of that unity.

In the exposition of the ethico-spiritual side of Spinoza, Joachim claims to interpret it as a whole in which his mysticism is read as part and parcel of his

metaphysics and his view bears striking similarities to *Bhedābheda* of the Yādava type. The philosophy of religion is the perfect knowledge of the eternal and infinite which is beyond the contingent and the consequent attainment of spiritual freedom and felicity. Substance is self-dependent and it explains itself and also explains the world dependent on it. It is the totality or plenitude of being and the productive source of the finite. But it is not to be identified with quantitative infinitude. Substance is infinite because essence involves existence and it is self-conditioned, self-caused and absolute. It is unique, eternal and is therefore the only individual because a plurality of infinities is self-contradictory. What is self-independent is also inclusive. The more real a thing is, the more it depends upon itself and the more attributes it has, and God is, and must be, because He is self-determined. Since consciousness involves self-consciousness, God is not a characterless abstraction. Reality exists in two forms, namely, substance and modes. The former is self-conditioned and the latter is a conditioned real which derives its reality from the former and depends on it. Substance is *in se* but mode is *in alio*. God has infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, of which thought and extension are the most essential to us and equally real and co-ordinate. These attributes constitute the nature of reality; they are not illusions or emanations, but are aspects, as Sir

F. Pollock says, and each is infinite in its own kind. But thought and extension express and exhaust the whole of reality so far as it is thought and extension. Spinoza thus steers clear of mentalism and materialism in his *Energetic Synthesis*. Substance is whole in its attributes though it differs in each, and our mind or body is only a mode or fragment of its own attribute. Our mind is a fragment of God's thought and our body, of God's extension. Divine omnipotence is actual in the two lines or fields of force known humanly as thought and extension. God is conceived pantheistically as the one-and-all but is not equated with physical and mental energy. When we say that God is extended, we do not refer to God as a spatial whole because God is more than thought and extension and the anthropomorphic ideas of personality, duration and measurement do not apply to the absolute. The will and intellect of God differ from our will and intellect as the word dog connoting the star differs from the animal. As the free cause of all things, God is *Natura naturans* having infinite and eternal essence. But in the form of modes, He is *Natura naturata* but not the sum of things, and the former logically fulfils itself in the latter. Spinoza rejects the God of theology as the idea of divine design implies imperfection, but he favours the principle of immanent teleology and attributes infinite consciousness to the absolute.

The infinite intellect is produced in the attribute of thought and forms the totality of all things and the

finite world is the unfolding of the infinite. All things are perfect as they proceed from the divine nature and therefore nothing is false or bad. Mr. G. A. Gunn thinks that, in the pantheistic monism of Spinoza, the world is an emanation of the creative being of God which is infinite; it is the expression of the infinite energy of reality. The theory of infinite modes reminds us of the doctrine of the *logos* and *Brahma*, the first begotten of Brahman. Substance determines itself to modes and is the immanent cause of all things; it is not a whole of modes but is the modes. Thinking things and extended things express the divine nature in a limited way, and, as Mr. G. A. Gunn says, they are to the substance what the waves are to the sea. These modes inhere in substance and its affections and share in their infinity and eternity. The human mind is thought particularised and therefore modal and not substantial and is an element of the infinite intellect of God. God is the unconditioned and man is like a foam bubble. The soul-side of man has positive essence and is therefore eternal and the modes of matter are as divine as the modes of the mind. But its contingent side is due to its place in spatial and temporal order. The mode is a conditioned real and its essence is therefore derivative and necessary. Modal existence is finite; but its essence is eternal. A particular thing in its particularity is finite and perishing in so far as it is particular. But, since the contingent implies the self-conditioned, the mode has

its being in God and is a variety of the unity of the absolute. As part of the essence of reality it is eternal and infinite. The chief modes are thinking things and objects of thought and man is both spiritual and corporeal and from divine necessity there follows an infinite number of things in infinite ways. Therefore God is the modes and His oneness reveals itself in the multiplicity of the modes. In the unity of substance there is an infinite variety of parts as its moments.

Man is a mode of the infinite intellect of God and his idea is God's idea not in so far as He is infinite but in so far as He is the essence of the mind; but now it is imprisoned in particularity and therefore it seeks freedom from this contingency of finitude. The finite moves restlessly beyond itself for completion and is seized with the impulse of self-expansion. Since every mode is an immanent expression of the divine nature, its freedom is derived from the freedom of God and God is self-determined and exists in his own inner necessity. Spinoza admits degrees of reality and refers to its progressive realization. The more of God there is in man, the more he sees from God's point of view. Though a mouse and an angel depend equally on God, yet a mouse is not an angel. There is more of God in the saint than in storks and stones and He is the only real and the perfect. The free man sees things as they are under the form of eternity, *sub specie eternitas*. The intellectual and the moral life are ultimately one and the distinctions of

truth and falsity and good and evil arise from the distinctions in the adequacy of the idea. There are three ascending scales of knowledge and morality due to the impulse of self-realisation. The first stage in knowledge is imagination in which we perceive things existing in time and space determined externally in an arbitrary and fragmentary form. This knowledge is contingent, mutilated and inadequate. The second is ratio or the stage of the scientific knowledge of necessity and universality reached by reason. Reason is rooted in reality and in this stage we know man as such as a mode of God and not as this man or that man. Reason adequately contemplates things as they are and the accidents of imagination which we feel now become a necessary element of reality which we think. But even scientific knowledge is only abstract and external and it does not bring out the essence of things. Therefore in the third stage of *scientia intuitiva* or supra-rational insight, we go from mere body-feeling and the abstractions of sense to God-consciousness and this is not mediate but immediate and absolutely perfect knowledge of the infinite, its immanence in the finite and also of the modal being of the finite. Then the unity is seen in the differences and the differences are seen as individuations of creative unity.

Corresponding to these three stages of intellectual expansion, there are three degrees of moral perfection owing to the unity or identity of intelligence and will.

The finite self strives to persist in its own being and conation refers to this inherent divine impulse of self-maintenance or self-realization. In the first stage, man is a passive part of nature yoked to passions and lives in isolation. A passion is a confused idea, a passiveness of the soul which makes us mere play-things of the external world and it is the practical aspect of imagination. But ethics is based on metaphysics and evil is used in the Neo-Platonic sense of privation. In the higher life of reason, the passions are subdued by thinking them clearly or by a stronger contrary emotion and the self of individualistic ethic is now extinguished and replaced by the joys of disinterested love and social solidarity. In this stage, we rise from servitude to sovereignty. The passions are subdued and not swept away. Only the sense of imagination is annulled and not the modal being. But even this stoic life of reason is only a golden link and a half-way house to the supreme Good. In the last stage of the intuition of divine determinism, there is the consummation of all endeavour owing to the absence of compulsion and contingency. The finite sheds its finitude and is taken up into the infinite and is transfigured and the infinite realises itself through the self-maintaining impulse of the finite. The contemplative life and the life of activity are now reconciled in the intellectual love of God, which is at once the culmination of thought and the consummation of morality. This love is part of the infinite love

wherewith God loves Himself. In the realisation of oneness with God, God's thought is our thought and He is real in us and as our eternal self. The thing of sense in us passes away and the eternal aspect remains as an element of the divine nature and attains freedom and felicity; this deliverance from passions is salvation which is here and now and not a future reward. The finite as such ceases to be, but as a mode of God it transcends itself, shares in His substantiality and persists in its eternal actuality. The shift of things is now transcended in a state of shining serenity. In that blessed state there is no personal survival or immortality, because personality and memory perish with the body; eternity is not endless duration but is the very essence of God and there is no before and after in it, and we see all things under the form of eternity. According to Sir F. Pollock, the mind as an eternal mode of thought, which is a part of the infinite intellect of God, is in some sense individual. The accidents of sense and time now become the incidents of timeless necessity and its felicity, and the finite mode is absorbed in the unity of the absolute. The human mind cannot be destroyed with the body for there remains something of the mind that is eternal. The individual point of view is not extinguished but transformed into the intuitive experience of seeing all things in God and God in all things. The essence of Spinoza's thought is, according to Pollock, given in the perfect words of Renan: "Reason leads death in

triumph and the work done for Reason is done for eternity."

Professor Hallett, in the masterly interpretation of Spinoza, in his book *Aeternitas*, seeks to avoid the fatal defects of monistic idealism like that of Bosanquet, which refers to the merging of the finite self in the eternal absolute. The human mind as part of the infinite intellect of God constitutes the whole which alone is eternal in its right. What is loss or contradiction for the finite self is the content of the Real which integrates it; and integration is not the loss of individuality, but is the synthetic expression, in form and content, of the infinite, like the notes of the melody. The existence of a being follows from its essence and is eternal. Eternity as essential existence is neither duration nor its negation, but it appears in time under the form of conatus. It is only imagination that divides essence and existence and pulverises eternal extension. The Real is not space-time, but extended eternity. To know the eternal is to be the eternal, and in *scientia intuitiva* God has full intuition. The sectional view of the finite is corrected in the intuition of the articulated whole. This is a state of eternal blessedness which is more than the enduring joy of the drifting mind. Professor A. Wolf, in an appreciative article in "Philosophy," concludes that Spinozism presents a wholeness unsurpassed by any other system. It alone insists on a real *universe* and, unlike the modern attenuated monisms, it alone refers

to a systemic monism in which relation, rationalism and religion are integrated.

In the metaphysics of Spinoza the absolute is the self-existent and self-differentiating substance or God; the thinking things and objects of thought are phases or determinate expressions of the absolute. The manifest is only the unfolding of the immanent one and not a fictitious veiling process. The attributes are lines of force in which divine omnipotence manifests its free causality and makes its potencies actual. God as *natura naturans* is God as *natura naturata*. *Natura naturans* is God as the free dynamic cause and *natura naturata* is the same God as the self-caused existing as the universe of modes or the consequent of the free causality of God. God is the modes. Modal multiplicity has its ground in the unity of the nature of God. Man can transcend his finite humanity and become one with the absolute by moral and intellectual perfection and there is scope and hope for Spinoza in Spinozism.

Bhedābheda resembles Spinoza's view of the unity of the absolute realised in its modal multiplicity. The theory of *natura naturans* resembles the *Bhedābheda* conception of Brahman. The idea of the attributes as the lines of force of divine omnipotence is very much like the *pariṇāma-śakti* of Brahman. The unity of moral life and the life of reason can be compared to the theory of *gñāna-karma-samuccaya*

and the theory of human destiny as the oneness of its essential and eternal element with God has its analogy in the conception of *mukti* according to the *Bhedābheda* of the Yādava school.

Pollock claims to go up into the heart and citadel of Spinozism by beginning with a quotation from Śaṅkara :—

Know in thyself and the world one self-same soul,
Banish the dream that sunders part from the whole.

But his exposition fits in more with *Bhedābheda* than Advaita. Some interpreters of Śaṅkara, like Mr. Kokilesvara Śāstri, do not accept the 'illusion' theory, but bring out the realistic side of Advaita, and Mr. Modak,* following Mr. Śāstri's exposition, thinks that *māya* in the sense of the power of Brahman closely resembles the attributes of Spinoza. This world-view is more in line with the *pariṇāmavāda* of *Bhedābheda* than the *vivarta-vāda* of Śaṅkara.

The following denunciation of Spinozism by Sir Richard Blackmore in his philosophical poem on 'Creation' reminds us of a similar criticism levelled against *Bhedābheda* by Vedānta Deśika :—

The Spheres of *Ether*, which the Worlds enclose,
And all th' Apartments, which the whole compose,
The lucid Orbs, the Earth, the Air, the Main,

**Vide* article on Spinozistic Substance and Upaniṣadic Self in *Philosophy*, October, 1931.

With every diff'rent Being they contain,
Are one prodigious Aggregated God,
Of whom each Sand is part, each Stone and Clod,
Supreme Perfections in each Insect shine,
Each Shrub is Sacred, and each Weed Divine.
As much you pull Religion's altars down,
By owning all Things God, as owning none,
For should all Beings be alike Divine,
Of Worship if an object you assign,
God to himself must Veneration shew,
Must be the Idol and the Vot'ry too ;
And their assertions are alike absurd,
Who own no God, or none to be ador'd.

That Reality is alike and equally present in all, is brought out in the well-known lines of Pope:—

“All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
* * *

As full, as perfect is a hair as heart.
As full, as perfect, in vile man that mourns,
As the rapt seraph that adores and burns.”

Bradley directs his polemic against this shallow pantheism in which everything is so worthless on the one hand, so divine on the other, that nothing can be viler nor more sublime than anything else.

In defence of Spinozism, it is maintained by Mr. J. A. Picton that though God is the whole, no part by itself can be God. God is not the aggregate of finite objects but a living whole, expressing itself in

infinite variety, and all change, pain and evil are only partial. Devotion to God is the same as loyalty of the parts to the whole. The defects of pan-cosmism arise only when God is synonymous with the world. But in philosophic pantheism, God is immanent in nature and yet transcends its imperfections and this view meets the charge of acosmism. While the logic of pantheism demands immanence and the divineness of the universe, its ethical and spiritual side emphasises eminence and the main motive of Spinozism is idealistic and mystic and not naturalistic. Spinoza, in the manner of Indian mystic philosophers, accepts the reality of moral distinctions and insists on perfection as the supreme end of life. But his distinction of *natura* into its two real aspects, and the idea of the highest end as the worship of the whole do not constitute specific spiritual consciousness. The conception of the "Intellectual love of God" tends to lay more stress on rational insight than on religious ecstasy.

CHAPTER XI

HEGEL

The philosophy of Hegel is closely related to *Bhedābheda* and not to Viśiṣṭādvaita as some modern philosophers think. It is variously interpreted as pantheistic, pluralistic, and mentalistic, and therefore "there are many Hegels." Mr. H. Haldar, in his lucid exposition of Hegel and Neo-Hegelianism, claims that Hegelianism is really the meeting of extremes and is a synthesis of the pantheism of Caird and others on the one hand, and the view of McTaggart on the other. The absolute is not a substance or a unitary self, but a self-conscious and self-differentiating super-personality, or a subject of many selves. As Watson insists, reality must have two aspects, it must be absolutely one and absolutely many. If the idea of unity in Hegel is stressed, then it tends towards the pantheism of Spinoza in which differences become unsubstantial like the passing waves of the ocean. But, if, as McTaggart thinks, the absolute is a unity of persons but not itself a person, his view emphasises the element of multiplicity and leans towards pluralism. But the absolute is not a unity of selves, but the self of selves. If the whole is in and as each part and if the part is a self, the whole should also be a self. Pluralism can-

not reduce the manifold into a unity just as abstract monism cannot extract the many out of the one. Both lead to dualism and involve an endless see-saw. and Hegel bridges the gulf between naive realism and monistic idealism by his theory of the unity of opposites. The absolute is a spiritual unity of correlated selves, each of which is the whole and partakes of its perfections. Unity is particularised and yet remains undivided.

Hegelianism is the theory of the absolute as developed in the dialectic, and is characterised as panlogism by Erdmann. To Hegel, philosophy is the only perfect science in which thought thinks thought and becomes a significant and perfect whole. The absolute is spirit and reason is the highest expression of spirit. Notion seizes the whole in its singleness and controls all thought. Reason alone is the life of reality and is not only finite but absolute and the dialectic is the very soul of speculation. Reality is the notion as a self-differentiating principle or a unity of opposites. The whole is the true and is shaped by reason. Hegel distinguishes between abstract understanding and concrete reason; while the former deals with identity alone or difference alone, the latter removes these abstractions and deals with the concrete unity of opposites or contraries, in which both identity and difference as one-many are equally real and essential factors. The two are opposed and yet allied. The opposites, on Croce's view, are not

opposed to unity. Mr. M. R. Cohen thinks that it is not the identity of opposites, but the principle of polarity. Bare identity or universality is as abstract as bare difference or otherness and the dialectic with its triple moments of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, corrects these abstractions and brings out the nature of reality as self-expression or spiritual and temporal becoming. Negation is really the principle of determination and is contrasted with the view of Spinoza which regards determination as negation. Owing to the immanence of the universal in the particular, self-identity is enriched by determination or particularisation and not impoverished. Reality is a one-many and not a pure undifferentiated being robbed of all content. The many is involved in the one and evolves out of the one. As a self-contained unity, it is one; but as differentiation, it is many, and it is the essence that thus manifests itself. McTaggart says that unity has no meaning but the differentiations, and the differentiations have no meaning but the unity and in this harmony neither side is subordinated to the other.

The absolute, as a self-differentiating unity, goes out of itself to the object and yet remains as one, and, as Caird says, the self-differentiations are selves. The idea of subject implies an object. The subject is objectified and each object is an object to a self or subject and object or non-self to others and all are thus inter-related. Reality is thus an identity in

difference of the subject and the object. The so-called infinite beyond the finite is restricted by the finite and is therefore really finite. Likewise the infinite as an endless series is the false infinite. But the true infinite is immanent in the finite and is at home in itself with its other and is a positive idea. The finite as finite is contingent and contradictory; but when it is grounded in the infinite, it becomes a real phase* or element of the infinite. The finite facts exist here and now; but in the logic of religion they are transcended in the universal which is more than mere existence. When the finitude or limit of the finite is negated, then it becomes the infinite. The particular is both finite and infinite and it is finite from one point of view and infinite from another point of view. Though a specific determination of the whole, it participates in the one and is infinite. The absolute is thus the totality of selves which is completely in each constituent self and communicates its nature to them. Man is not a passing mode, but is essential to the infinite and sustained by it. As finite, he is external to other objects and excludes them; but, as infinite, he is all-inclusive. Each self is a system of selves; but the absolute is the self of all selves. In the triadic development, the notion passes over into nature, its other, and returns to itself as absolute spirit, which is the consummation of the world-process.

* Unpublished Lecture Notes on Hegel by Dr. A. G. Hogg.

It is only in the absolute of philosophy that the notion is fully articulate. The one is a unity of multiplicity. The God of religion is the self-certifying absolute and triune and yet, He goes out of Himself to nature and man and returns to Himself as the absolute spirit. Nature is the other to God and is petrified spirit and man is a link between the two. The world belongs to God and God is necessary to the world. God's will is realised in the freedom of the finite selves and the self should renounce its particularity before it unites with God. Eternal being is in and for itself and yet it posits itself as its own difference. In the triple movement of religion, natural religion, like Indian pantheism, is the first stage, and this pantheism conceives the absolute as Being or Brahman, which is an emotion-less, will-less deed-less abstract unity and vacancy, in which the finite is a vanishing accident. Pantheism easily passes into naturalism. Multiplicity is crass without unity and it gives rise to the maddest of polytheisms. The religion of spiritual individuality, like Zoroastrianism, marks the second stage, but its individuality is fragmentary. Christianity, or Revealed Religion, is the last stage in which the absolute spirit returns to itself. What is implicit becomes explicit and the philosophic mind lays hold of the absolute and participates in its perfections. Hegel's estimate of Indian religion may be ignored as it is true neither to life nor to logic and the whole classification is dogmatically imposed on reality and

not revealed by it. Hegel 'states the problem to suit the answer' and betrays the common prejudice that oriental thinking does not recognise the reality of moral distinctions. The logical order is not the same as the chronological order and Hegel's view of the absolute is not the absolute.

In some notable modern expositions of Indian thought a kinship is traced between the logical highest of Rāmānuja and of Hegel and this view is contrasted with the intuitional highest of Śaṅkara. To both Rāmānuja and Hegel, reality is a one containing many. The real is the real for thought with an element of negativity in it; but it is not the real in itself. Logic transforms the intuition of the indeterminate into a systematic organic unity. The absolute is triune unity or tripod consisting of God, soul and nature. *Īśvara* or God cast in the moulds of logic is the synthesis of being and non-being. He is a self-conscious personality with the not-self as an integral element and loses Himself to find Himself. Experience presents the two concepts of identity and difference, and *Īśvara* is the generalised concept of such experience. Nature is a real self-expression of the absolute and not a distortion of it. The absolute is God, spirit and matter and not God alone. But Hegel's theory of the identity of opposites and the nature of the absolute and its self-differentiation bears more affinity to *Bhedābheda* than to *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, and calls for similar criticism. Hegel's

panlogism seeks the fusion of the opposites and ends in confusion. He is sometimes called 'the Prince of the Confusionists' and the greatest irrationalist in the history of human thought. The theory of the unity of the opposites fails to explain the element of the contingent, the irrational and the imperfect, that is in the universal. The facts of physics and biology cannot be deduced *a priori* from the dialectic of metaphysics. Schopenhauer therefore thinks that the real is irrational. In his ethics, Hegel is inclined towards an amoralistic view of life which tends to justify Napoleon's idea that God is on the side of the heaviest artillery. Mr. Cohen concludes multiplicity and struggle, finitude and evil, contingency and imperfection are as real as anything else, and cannot be rationally deduced from, or wiped out by, any monistic idea.* Materialism follows as necessarily from the Hegelian premises of the identity of the real and the rational as spiritualism. In mounting to the higher category, the lower is not really transcended.

If the existent universe of space-time is the objectification of being and if the cosmos is a logical process in which God comes to self-consciousness and becomes perfect, then, as Swāmi Vivekānanda observes, the world is greater than the non-world and *samsāra* is greater than salvation. Such a view strikes at the very root of the ethical and

* *The Philosophical Review*, May 1932.

religious need for renunciation and therefore it is nipped in the bud in Indian thought. No *mumukṣu* or seeker after God adores an evolving and imperfect Being, and dialectics cannot prove divinity. While some say that the Hegelian absolute is a 'perpetual activity,' others maintain that it is static and the idea of change is an illusion. The logical view of the one-many lands us in vicious intellectualism. The duality of the subject-object consciousness is a dualism which cannot be solved, but can only be dissolved by the intuition of the absolute, and Rāmānuja, like Śaṅkara, relies more on the intuitions enshrined in revelation than on the primacy of reason. Dr. M. Sircar maintains that Rāmānuja's conception of reality is no synthesis of being and non-being but a concrete identity which implies distinction but not negation and that his dialectic is thus an improvement on Hegel's fusion of opposites. His construction of Viśiṣṭādvaita as an adjectival theory of the absolute fails to bring out the full import of the *prakāra-prakāri* relation.

Hegelian thought dominates diverse systems of later thought, and the expositions of Bradley, Royce and Bosanquet on the lines of Hegelian absolutism suggest certain similarities with *Bhedābheda*.

BRADLEY.

Bradley follows, in his own metaphysical way, the message of Hegel that Reality is spiritual, and that the more spiritual a thing is, the more it is real, and explains

it as the supra-relational absolute that embraces all differences in an all-inclusive harmony. Reality is one and its being is in experience and it is experience and not 'an unearthly ballot of bloodless categories.' The real is qualified by plurality while it is itself not plural. A plurality of independent reals only multiplies the metaphysical difficulty. Unlike Hegel, Bradley thinks that the infinite transcends thought. The ideas of identity and difference lead to an infinite process and cannot be ultimate. Every relational thought like time, space, causation, substance and self sunders the 'what' from the 'that' and is therefore an appearance riddled with contradictions. We do not know why and how the absolute divides itself into centres or the way in which, so divided, it still remains one. | The relating principle of togetherness is external to the relata and involves self-discrepancy. Owing to the self-discrepancy of thought, truth is not absolute, but has degrees. The relational points to a whole which is beyond relations and every appearance is somehow preserved and merged in the absolute, though in a transmuted form. The absolute is superior to partition and is in some way perfected by it. The mere intellect is puzzled by the problem of the one and the many and its endless process or infinite fission and yet the two are reconciled in the absolute. The absolute is the

highest unity of which the one and the many are aspects. Every particular asserts a superior unity and contributes to the whole and the particulars blend with one another and become absorbed in reality. Time is a false appearance of the timeless reality. Goodness is the adjective of something not itself and is superseded. Error and evil correct themselves and contribute to perfection. Every flame of passion, chaste or carnal, would still burn in the absolute unquenched and unabridged, a note absorbed in the harmony of its higher bliss. Heaven's design can realise itself as effectively in Catiline or Borgia as in the scrupulous or innocent. The absolute is the richer for every discord and diversity which it embraces and transcends. The self is only a content and my 'mine' becomes a feature in the great 'Mine' which includes all 'mines.' There is no reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness. Even the religious consciousness in which man is over against God, is a contradiction, and the God of religion is only an appearance of the absolute which is spiritual and super-personal. God is not God, till He has become all in all, and a God who is all in all is not the God of religion. Short of the absolute, God cannot rest, and having reached that goal He is lost. The absolute is related to nothing and cannot therefore be God. The relational way of thought is thus a mere makeshift and is self-discrepant. In the trans-relational unity of the absolute, all contradictions are reconciled

and in the final destiny and last truth of all things, there is one all-pervasive transfusion with a reblending of all material. Every discord is over-ruled and transmuted into harmony, and there is a balance of pleasure over pain. The absolute contains histories, but it has no history of its own as nothing perfect can move.

Bradley is not clear in expounding the relation between reality and appearance. In his negative dialectic, the appearances are stripped of reality and abolished. The final destiny of all finite things is their absorption in the absolute. The finite centres as such disappear or lose their distinctive being in the timeless and changeless absolute; they are dissolved and transcended. In the reblending of material, there is a dissipation of nature; yet he says that the appearances are revelations of the absolute and are saved by it and not lost in it. There is no identity in abstraction from diversity. As parts of the whole, they have their individual being and the content of not one of them is obliterated. "That the glory of this world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious."

Royce in his criticism of Bradley proceeds on the principle that the life of thought belongs to the realm of reality. It is self-evident that identity and diversity are conjoined and not contradictory and it is the inner law of thought to express its own unity in a multiplicity of aspects. The actually infinite is not an endless process involving self-contradiction,

but is a concrete expression of Being. To escape scepticism, Bradley takes refuge in the idea that reality is sentient experience; but he does not rely on the intuition of the absolute as different from sentient experience. The absolute is not a kind of self-absorbing sponge which endlessly sucks in its own selfhood. The self is affirmed even in denying it. Bradley's absolute really has two aspects, it absorbs the many and it is also aware of this absorption. The absolute is above the relations and it knows that it is above the relations. In seeking to escape from self-hood, it yet remains as self-existence. In other words, the absolute is self-conscious Being possessing the appearances instead of suppressing and transmuting them. Royce is, on the whole, more inclined towards the view of the personality of the absolute than Bradley.

Both Bradley and Hegel, according to Mr. Haldar, insist on the ultimate spiritual unity of all experience; but, while Hegel constructs a graded and symmetrical system of categories with the principle of the identity of opposites, Bradley connects the absolute and its appearances in an abrupt and mysterious way. He condemns relational thought and yet somehow makes it cohere with reality. The relational and the supra-relational are discontinuous. In the panlogism of Hegel, God is fully revealed in the world; but the absolutism of Bradley lays stress on the transcendental side of reality and regards the finite as the ragged edges of

the absolute. As Dr. S. K. Das observes in his thoughtful work "A Study of the Vedanta" philosophic agnosticism acts as an antidote to Hegelian gnosticism. Bradley distrusts thought and treats the self as a mere connection of content without any unity; but reality is relational and knowable and the absolute is the consummation of thought. Mr. W. James says relations relate in spite of Mr. Bradley. If reality is 'experience' it is the idea of the self as the unity in difference that is our highest experience. The content of the finite self is a fragment of the absolute; but in the form of self-consciousness it is one with it.

ROYCE.

Royce's theory of Being is both monistic and pluralistic; but it is opposed to realism, pan-psychism and mysticism, and, as Haldar points out, Royce is the only absolute idealist that identifies the absolute with Will. Truth is determinateness of idea and experience, and the world of my idea is my will determinately embodied. Reality is a totality or the complete embodiment of the internal meaning of finite ideas and is determinate. It is will in God and man that brings out the idea of individuality and the world is the absolute individual of which the finite selves are only fragments and aspects. When I uniquely will, it is I who just here am God's will and I am active and free so far. My freedom is not the whole of God's, but is a unique fact thereof. Reality as subject-object is

one as well as many. As the one, it is the whole or the individual and as the many, it is an infinite multiplicity of individuals expressing it. Reality is thus the individual of the individuals. The absolute is unique, and infinity is at best a character or a universal different from uniqueness or wholeness. The infinite is determinate and not indeterminate or endless series and the absolute is a self which exhausts an infinity in its presentations. Reality is a self-representative system of which the finite strivings for the 'other' are mere aspects or expressions. It is the absolute which, in its wholeness, comprises many selves in various inter-relations. Each self represents the totality in its own way and is an integral element of the absolute. God cannot be one except by being many. The one will of God is expressed through the many individual wills and the individual experience is identically a part of God's experience. The finite self does not repeat the absolute, but contributes its share to the infinite richness of its personality. Every finite intent taken in its wholeness is the absolute, and the most fleeting act is a part of the world's meaning.

BHEDĀBHEDA AND BOSANQUET.*

Bhāskara and Yādava, like other Vedāntins, subordinate reason to revelation and seek to discover the meaning and value of the *Śrutis* in the light of the

* Adapted from a paper submitted to the Indian Philosophical Congress at Benares.

theory of *Bhedābheda* or identity and difference. But Bhāskara posits the principle of identity and difference in the relation between *jīva* and *Īśvara*, in which identity is essential and eternal (*svābhāvika*) and difference is merely adventitious or contingent appearance (*aupādhika*). But Yādava insists on the equal reality of identity and difference and regards the finite as an element of the infinite. Appearance belongs to reality and is not opposed to it. *Śruti* only exhibits the diversity of empirical experience which changes and passes.

Bosanquet is not bound by any such *Śruti* or revelation. He intrusts the ontological thought that the best *must* be and postulates the principle of identity in difference based on non-contradiction. It is an immanent criticism that wholeness is the only test of reality in which everything is transfigured, reconciled and united. Thought is not merely discrepant, as Bradley asserts, but is also synthetic. It presses onward and seeks its stability in the concrete universal. He stakes his whole faith in the 'trueness and being of the highest mystic experience' of man in art and religion. We argue from experience to more of the same kind, from the human plane to the divine. It is the whole reality alone that can elicit the whole mind and be the subject of predication. The life of logic is the organic unity of the concrete universal implicit in experience; it is the spirit of totality which reveals itself

by transforming all values. The highest experience is the timeless whole or absolute which transforms the alien into the kindred by removing the contradictions inherent in finiteness. Error in this sense is made of the same stuff as truth. It is not an illusion abolished by the absolute, but an incident in reality riddled with contradictions, but ultimately adjusted and absorbed by the whole. The self passes into the non-self with a view to regain itself. Contradictions disappear in the absolute, but not negativity. Negation is significant and becomes a positive factor of reality and it is logical quietism to treat it as ignorance. To Bhāskara, finiteness is an *upādhi* in the empirical life of *samsāra* which disappears with the realization of Brahman. Bosanquet employs the dialectic method of Hegel and treats error as a contingency which contributes to the whole. The absolute is not an identity that is robbed of content, but is a concrete whole realized in the relative, and is an identity in difference like the *Bhedābheda* of Yādaṇa.

METAPHYSICS.

Bhāskara denies the existence of *Nirguna Brahman* devoid of determination and also repudiates the theistic idea of Divine Personality. Though Brahman or *Īśvara* is the absolute being beyond the world of *samsāra* and is impersonal and eternal (*niravayava*), He has an infinity of perfections like truth, goodness, purity, infinity and bliss as his attributes.

(*satyam, gñānam, anantam* and *ānandam* and other *kalyāṇa guṇas*). *Īśvara* is neither the effect of cosmic illusion nor a concrete universal with a "maximum of being and minimum of non-being." *Īśvara* is not a limited expression of the absolute or static Being. The absolute of thought is the God of morality and religion. Brahman is the *sat* without a second but the manifold of thinking things and material things (*cat* and *acut*) arises from the contingency of *upādhi*, that is inherent in them. Brahman is the cause of the cosmic cycle only *per accidens*. Influenced by *upādhi*, the principle of individuation, He evolves into the heterogeneity of names and forms. The *jīva* is an *amśa* of Brahman (a fraction or element of the absolute) conditioned by recurring *avidyā* and *karma*. The inner ruler of individuality Himself becomes the finite self. The absolute infected by *upādhi* becomes the finite centres of experience. Like the rays of the sun, the waves of the sea and the sparks of the fire, the *jīva* becomes an emanation or a fulguration of the all-prevailing Brahman and is identical with and also different from Him. The limitation is *in* the absolute, but not *of* it. The *anutva* or the monadic nature of the *jīva* with its contractions and expansions is *sāmsārika* arising from the contingency of its embodied state and is not therefore essential or *svābhāvika*. The finite self or *jīva* has really the oneness and the all-pervasive character of Brahman (*abhinnatva* and *vibhutva*). Like the all-pervasive ether which, while in the pot

assumes its form, and like the reflection of the sun on the surface of water, Brahman conditioned by the accident of contingency assumes the form and function of the finite self. *Prakṛti* is the material aspect of Brahman which brings about the cosmic variety of names and forms and its relation with Brahman in the form of identity and difference is, like the snake and its coils, essential as well as eternal. But Yādava, who also adopts the *Bhedābheda* view rejects the theory of *upādhi* in favour of *pariṇāma vāda* and thus insists on the reality of the finite self.

To Bosanquet, the absolute is the self-maintaining and self-complete individual free from the contradictions inherent in finiteness. It is not a numerical identity determined by spatial and temporal relations which are the incidents of terrestrial life and history. The unconditioned real alone is the whole. The finite self is a fraction or element (*aṁśa*) of the infinite and has a meaning only in it. It is really finite-infinite (*bhedābheda*) and has a double being. As a finite being, it is conditioned within the whole, riddled with the contradictions between existence and value and is therefore only an appearance of the absolute. It has a formal distinctness of its own, an exclusive self-feeling as a bodily being with a name and a terrestrial history (*upādhi*). Its range of externality which gradually elicits itself from nature. The finite as finite is a self-contradiction as its claim to reality is not fulfilled. But its law is that

of the infinite and therefore, by overcoming contradictions, it strives to transcend itself and seeks its stability in the self-contained absolute. It is a tide within the absolute life, but separate from the flood within which it moves. Bosanquet denies the existence of unrelated reals and the falsity of the finite self and treats the finite as a mere connection of content, a mere predicate of reality. It is a collection of adjectives housed in the absolute. Nature as a system in space and time is not real by itself, but is bound up with the self which elicits its content from it and transforms it into an element of the whole. Time and space are the stuff of finiteness and the absolute which manifests itself through them includes the series, but is not the series. Nature and self are complementary and form the elements of the absolute. All progress is within the whole, but not of it. The self is the living copula between nature and the absolute, and the absolute absorbs nature through the world of finite selves. Both Bhāskara and Bosanquet deny the function of intellectus or finite thought as a pernicious piecemeal view of things and affirm the monistic truth that the absolute is the integral unity with the elements of finiteness distinct from and also related to it and that individuation is a spatial and temporal limitation due to the *upādhi* of distinctness. Bosanquet, like Yādaṇḍa, posits finiteness as a different essential to identity, but Bhāskara regards it as a defect of reality which

can be finally eliminated and not self-transcended as Bosanquet thinks.

ETHICS.

According to Bhāskara, the moral life of the *mumukṣu*, who seeks freedom from *samsāra*, consists in a process of purification by which he discards his finitude and seeks to become one with the infinite. The absolute is the eternally perfect being, who is immanent in the world of contingency, but untainted by its imperfections. The *bhedābhedavādin* maintains the principle of *gñāna-karma-samuccaya* by which he reconciles the conflicting claims of *gñāna* and *karma* (intellectus and voluntus). Bhāskara avoids these extremes by co-ordinating the claims of *karma* and *gñāna* in the idea of a ceaseless meditation on *ekatva* or oneness. The desire for the objects of sense (*vṛṣaya-rāgā*) implicates the self in the wheel of time; but the same desire directed to the attainment of Brahman leads to liberation and eternal bliss. Clogged by *karma* and *avidyā*, the self is burdened with a body and subject to the ills of *samsāra*. The true means of securing freedom consists not in the entire eradication of desire but in the performance of duty and transfiguring desire into a longing for becoming Brahman.

According to Bosanquet, soul making is the function of the universe. Being finite-infinite (*bhedā-bheda*), it is a victim to the hazards and hardships of

its dual nature. There is a hostility between what it is and what it ought to be. The externality of the finite with its formal distinctness and the personal feeling of exclusiveness is in collision with the all-inclusiveness and spiritual solidarity of the infinite. The finite self is torn between existence and self-transcendence, aloofness and absorption and falls into dissatisfaction and despair. But the roots of the finite will are in the infinite. The spirit of the whole works in it and transfigures it. Contradiction by itself is a defect ; but it has a value in relation to the whole. It is a striving towards self-transcendence. Good is the appearance of perfection, but is made of the same stuff as evil. Evil is only good in the wrong place. Suffering is due to finiteness, but is transmuted in the divine life. This finiteness, with its imperfections, is riddled with contradictions ; but when it is linked with the whole, it becomes its essential element. Finiteness itself is an evil which vanishes by union with the whole which is beyond good and evil. The separate self frees itself from the world of claims and counter-claims based on individual justice and realizes the value of spiritual unity and love. The failure of the finite is only an affirmation of its spiritual membership. As the God of religion wills the good and is hostile to evil and as the human will cannot be both free and related, He is different from the absolute in which alone all extremes meet and get reconciled. Evil, suffering and finiteness are not rejected and abolished; but

they are conserved in the whole and contribute to its wholeness. They are in the whole but not of it. Imperfection is an incident of finitude but in the furnace of spiritual life it is re-cast and absorbed in the absolute.

Both Bhāskara and Bosanquet deny volition to God from its partial and personal point of view. Brahman is *satyakāma* and *satyasaṅkalpa* in the sense of completeness, in which conation and fruition are realized together. While Bosanquet regards imperfection as an element of perfection, Bhāskara and Yādhava refer to Brahman as absolutely pure without any taint of imperfection. The former traces the self to natural and social selection ; but the latter explains it as an *aṁśa* or portion of Brahman. Rāmānuja may be said to agree in a way with Bhāskara and Bosanquet in their logical view of the finite as a mode of the absolute ; but he is entirely opposed to the predication of *upādhi* and evil to the perfect being, who is absolutely free from *dhosa* and *vikāra*.

RELIGION.

The Vedānta as a religion is a realisation of the one without a second by the cessation of the idea of separateness. Release is secured by the immediate apprehension and attainment of the absolute and not by the knowledge afforded by the *mahāvākya* nor by absolute self-surrender. While rejecting the Advaitic distinction between *Saguṇa Brahman* and *Nirguṇa*

Brahman based on the doctrine of *māya*, Bhāskara recognises the relative values of meditating on *Kārya* *Brahman* as the cosmic support (*prapañca ādhāra*) and *Āraṇa Brahman* or the absolute who is *satyam*, *gñānam* and *anantam*. The former is a way of gradual release through the region of the cosmic deity known as *Brahma*; but the latter results in immediate release. Then the soul has not merely a sight of the immortal sea, but is immersed in it. Like the Ganges flowing and merging into the sea, the wise man or *vidvān* is freed from the contingency of finiteness and distinctness and becomes one with the absolute and the sorrows of *samsāra* then cease for ever. Bhāskara discards the doctrine of *jīvan-mukti* on the one hand and the theistic idea of personality and *kaiṅkarya* or service on the other, and upholds the notion of *devayāna-mārga* or the luminous pathway to Brahman who is beyond the sphere of *samsāra*. The ascent to the absolute is not opposed to the all-pervasiveness of Brahman. In the state of *mukti*, the self becomes one with Brahman and all distinction of duality entirely disappears. When the pot is broken, the ether in it (*ghatākāśa*) is no longer distinguishable from the all-pervading ether (*mahākāśa*). Likewise, *mukti* is the dissolution of distinction and the attainment of oneness with Brahman without any physical or psychical limitation (*ekībhāva*).

According to Bosanquet also, religion is the living experience of the whole. The absolute alone is the source

and standard of all values and it is only by joining the whole that one can become a whole. Religion is emancipation from the hazards and hardships of the finite-infinite nature and the attainment of stability and security in the absolute. Owing to its individualistic tendency, the self ignores its spiritual unity and at-homeness in the absolute and subjects itself to trials and tribulations. Finiteness is particular and perishing. Limited by externality and exclusion, it is sunk in sin and suffering; but the impulse of the infinite that is inherent in it drives it onward to self-transcendence and self-completion in the absolute. As its current courses through its being, it looks from itself and longs to complete itself in the whole and to be lost in it. Perfect satisfaction arises only from the possession of the absolute and absorption in it. Absorption is the denial of the reality of finiteness as such in the affirmation of the whole. In the unity of the finite will with the infinite, its solid singleness melts away, but is not abolished, and all that is valuable in the finite is conserved. *Nirvāṇa* is only a negative form of this experience. It no doubt rejects the finite as an illusion, but does not affirm its continuity with the concrete unity.

In genuine freedom the divine will is one with the finite in a single personality. The God of religion, as an isolable being, is only an appearance of the absolute, and not the absolute itself. The infinite is continuous with, and present in, the finite, and by a process of

spiritual induction, the false self of finiteness battling with the infinite is rejected and shaken off and the true self is seen to participate in the infinite riches of the spirit in one single undivided unity. When the self is lost in the absolute, it is only transformed but not annulled. Then the soul-thing persists but it has no personal content. Absorption means being at home in the absolute and sharing in its perfections here and now and not in a remote region as a far off divine event. Eternity endures through time and transcends it and eternity alone gives stability and satisfaction. The highest value of the self lies in the coalescing of its content with the whole and contributing to its life "like a perfume exhaled in the very dissolution of its private being." When selves blend with one another and become confluent, they are no longer at arm's length. Just as the quality of a sketch is discerned in the picture heightening its artistic effect, even so imperfection is an element of the absolute and is transfigured by it.

In considering the destiny of the finite self, the Bhedābheda-vādins and Bosanquet deny its distinctness and affirm its absorption in the absolute and its felicity. In that state, there is a heightening and expansion of experience in which the self loses its substantive being and gets merged in the bliss of Brahman or the satisfactoriness of the whole. Bhāskara has no faith in the cosmic life as it is tainted by *avidyā* and

clogged with previous *karma* or sin. He seeks *mukti* as the absolute freedom from the ills of *karma* and *samsāra*. But Bosanquet believes in the riches of human experience including its errors, evils and other imperfections, but in a state of self-transcendence. Contingency is to him not an evil to be avoided, but is finally a contribution to the concrete whole. Both are sustained by the monistic faith in the fulness and freedom of the absolute being ; but, while Bosanquet, like Yādava, preserves the finite by rescuing it from finiteness, Bhāskara regards *mukti* as freedom from the finite itself. God is not less than the absolute. He is the absolute. *Bhedābheda* is opposed to the idea of treating the finite as a mere figment of *māya*. Bosanquet's theory of the absolute as a concrete whole and membership in its spiritual solidarity, emphasises the social side of experience and has a theistic tendency. In the same way, Bhāskara's view of *Saguṇa Brahman* and the relative reality of the *upādhi* anticipates Yādava and Rāmānuja. If we substitute the reality of immanent or potential causality or *pariṇāma* for *upādhi*, we get the Yādava version of *Bhedābheda*. Rāmānuja replaces it by the idea of *karma* and moral responsibility and predicates evil, error and other imperfections to the finite self. In discussing the problem whether the finite self has a substantive or adjectival mode of being, Professor Pringle-Pattison controverts the adjectival theory of Bradley and Bosanquet and re-interprets their monism in terms of Personal Idealism.

Individuation is the essence of the absolute life and the finite, as a focalised unity, is a self or 'member in the Absolute,' as Bosanquet himself is inclined to admit, especially when he refers to the universe as a place of soul-making.

The negative dialectic of Bradley compels comparison with the *neti* method of Śaṅkara and the metaphysical agnosticism that sets forth the self-contradictions of the ethical and religious consciousness, opens the doorway to mystic intuition. But they seem to differ fundamentally in their positive views of the absolute. While Bradley construes it as a systematic unity, Śaṅkara relies on the intuition of the Advaitic absolute which is different from feeling. There is as much divergence in essential points between Śaṅkara and Bradley as there is between Hegel and Rāmānuja, and both Bradley and Hegel conform, on the whole, to the *Bhedābheda* type and thus invite the criticism of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin that the imperfections of life adhere to the absolute in its synthetic unity.

FICHTE.

The *Bhedābheda* drift is discernible in the fundamentals of Fichte's philosophy as expounded by E. B. Talbot, Thilly, Caird and others. While Hegel starts with the logical side of the critical philosophy of Kant, Fichte gives prominence to the ethical side and Schelling to the critique of judgment. Fichte assumes the possibility of the metaphysical knowledge of reality as a unitary principle underlying the duality

of our experience. It is not blank identity, but a unity of form and content discovered by the idealistic analysis of experience. All experience is only for a subject. It is essentially an activity ; it is more an act than a fact. The ego posits itself by opposing the non-ego, its other, and is thus conscious of its own limitations. It posits itself as determined by the non-ego. This is not an opposition to consciousness, but is an opposition within consciousness. Both the ego and the non-ego are given indissolubly in every act of consciousness. The infinite outgoing activity of the ego receives a check and is driven back on itself. Being is absolute and it has existence as self-existent Being or God. God not only is in Himself, but also exists and manifests Himself. The one divine Being manifests itself in consciousness as a manifold existence. The one becomes the manifold and the manifold is founded on the one. This speculation reconciles the extremes of realism and idealism. It is, therefore, called realistic idealism and resembles *Bhedābheda*. The absolute ego, as the true infinite, is not the indeterminate, but the self-active principle that is the source of all the particular manifestations. Fichte refers to reality in its two aspects of transcendence and immanence. In the former aspect, it is simply the absolute as Being, and every concept of it destroys the absoluteness. In the latter aspect, it is immanent in the subject-object consciousness and is a self-actualising ego. The timeless enters into the temporal process and reveals

itself in progress. The absolute and its manifestations are one and therefore becoming implies a changeless being. The absolute limits itself and overcomes its own limitations. Like the light in the prism broken up into a number of coloured rays, the divine life appears broken up into a multiplicity of things. The one life through the contraction of itself becomes the individual, though it is only contingent. It is the universal reason, the one Eternal Original Energy, that thinks and acts in us and expresses itself in nature. Man does not possess knowledge, but knowledge possesses him. Living thought is not a thinking substance. Nature is not my idea or illusion, but a self-externalisation of the absolute. Seth thinks that Fichte describes his system of the absolute ego as an inverted Spinozism and yet falls into it when he refers to the absolute as the indeterminate which wipes out self-hood.

Man is impelled by his moral and spiritual nature to overcome the non-ego, aspire towards the eternal spiritual order and lay hold on reality. Will is the essence of reason and we do not act because we know, but we know because we are called upon to act. The practical ego creates the impediment only to conquer it and realise itself. It is arrestment that stimulates activity. Fichte, unlike Spinoza, posits freedom as the principle of self-realisation and insists on the moral *ought* which involves resistance to the obstacles of nature and deliverance from the slavery of sensi-

bility. The goal of life is the progressive realisation of the divine idea by overcoming finite individuality, but it is never actually realized. The divine work is fulfilling itself in man. In true knowledge, the duality is fused into unity. Science supersedes faith and changes it into sight. When man rises to the religious point of view and abolishes himself, the subject-object opposition disappears and he passes into God. It is the paradox of personality that man loses himself to gain himself and the self dies to an isolated and insular life. In the unity of the pure spirit, sensuous individuality alone is annihilated and not the individual. The true life and its blessedness in the highest flight of thought are in the union with the eternal. Fichte illustrates his position as follows:—As the physical eye is a prism in which the pure and colourless light breaks itself into many hues, so also in the spiritual vision, the absolute is true thought, unchangeable and pure, and yet, in its reflection, it appears broken up into many shapes. By transcending appearance, the self rises to the vision of true thought.*

The pantheism of Fichte blurs the boundary line between Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita and therefore, falls into line with *Bhedābheda*. Fichte is “vaguely aware”† of the dualism of the subject-object consciousness and “gropes after”† the Advaitic intuition. With the disappearance of the non-ego, the ego also

* *Vide*, Popular Works, Volume II, pp. 361-62.

† Prof. Radhakrishnan : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 560.

would disappear. When he refers to the goal of life as the abolition of the finite consciousness, his view is "closely analogous" to that of Śaṅkara. But, still, like Hegel, he posits the self-conscious ego and the fellowship of God and man. *

SCHELLING.

The view of the absolute ego of Fichte does not escape the relentless logic of subjectivism and its charmed circle, as it tends to make nature an impediment of the ego and not its inspiration. Though Schelling's view of the absolute ego is influenced by the dialectical method of Fichte, in his "Philosophy of Nature" he lays as much stress on the reality of nature as on that of the ego. The spirit and nature are the two opposite poles of knowledge and are alike revelations of the absolute. While Fichte starts with the view that the ego is everything, Schelling makes it more comprehensive and says that everything is the ego. Nature is alive and is visible spirit and spirit is invisible nature. Nature unfolds itself gradually and comes to self-consciousness in man. The creative energy of the world-spirit pulsates in all beings and makes actual what is potential according to the dialectical principle of triplicity, which Hegel, later on, employed in his own masterly way. Like Spinoza, Schelling tries to deduce nature and mind from the absolute in which both are ultimately indistinguishable; but, unlike him, he regards them as

* *Studies in Vedānta* by V. G. Karrikar, pp. 72-73.

its stages, and not its parallel expressions. Like the two poles of the magnet and its indifference-point, the absolute divides itself into subject and object and is yet a neutrum. Hegel criticises this theory by comparing it to the night-time in which all cows are black. In his later interpretation of the absolute, Schelling was inclined towards neo-Platonic mysticism, and described the goal as the absorption of the soul in the absolute. Caird, following Hegel, refutes Schelling's philosophy as a form of Spinozism which affirms more the unity of substance than of spirit. As an intellectual intuition of the absolute, in which all distinction is lost, it is opposed to the true philosophy of reflection. But reflection, as the Vedānta insists, is only an aid to direct realisation by what the poet calls the "vision and faculty Divine."

Schelling's insistence on the unity of all beings reminds us of the Yādava idealism that all is conscious (*sarvam api cetanameva*) and that consciousness is asleep in *acit* and alive in *cit*. Wordsworth's worship of Nature is a poetic rendering of this idea that there is a spirit in the woods, an overflowing soul in nature that speaks to those that have ears to hear. Dr. J. C. Bose gives a scientific exposition of the same truth when he says that there is no barrier between the realms of life and matter. Like the thrills of life, there is the throb of things. Matter has the promise and potency of inner growth, and thus the living and the non-living exhibit an essential unity. The view of Yādava is

refuted by many other Vedāntins on the ground that the realms of *cit* and *acit* are distinct in kind, and that the two are correlative and not continuous

Western pantheism, as a philosophy, is opposed to deism, dualism and theism, and it rightly affirms the immanence of God and divineness of the universe. It avoids the ego-centric point of view, but ignores the primacy of the moral consciousness. By denying the evilness of evil and affirming the immanence of truth in error, it denies the need for salvation or *mukti*. The panlogism of Hegel, as a rationalist metaphysic, is said to be a later, and therefore, more real dialectic development than religion. It claims to synthesise the opposition between the one and the many in the absolute idea which is the true content of philosophy. It is thus opposed to the pantheism which is based on the intuition that extols unity by annulling or neutralising difference. But, in the unity got by a criticism of the categories, the last is the first and it moves in its own charmed circle and its high *à priori* road is a dogmatic assumption. No universe can be constructed out of mere universals and the logical ego is hypostatized as the absolute. No school of Vedānta accepts the finality of logic and the dialectic method. Hegel himself admits that to confute a philosophy is to surpass its limits. The influence of Hegelian thought modelled on Spinozism is said to be definitely hostile to theism. Monism is said to be the fundamental demand of thought and pantheism

presses towards monism and claims Spinoza as its best exponent. The theory of Spinoza is expounded in a naturalistic and idealistic way. When reality is identified with the world, God becomes a superfluity. This is known as pancosmism and is allied to the materialistic monism of Haeckel. The *Bhedābheda* unity of Brahman and the world, as explained by the simile of the snake and its coils, is perilously near this type of pantheism. The ethics of Spinoza has a distinct idealistic drift and is liable to the charge of acosmism, if it affirms the infinity of God and the illusoriness of the finite. An ancient type of Vedānta, now extinct, known as the *niṣprapañca-mūyoga-vāda* seems to have maintained a view similar to acosmism. In so far as Spinozism refers to degrees of truth and goodness and points to transcendental and eternal life, it cannot be construed as a pantheism that reduces reality to a numerical unity or abstract identity. When pantheistic monism develops into a mysticism, it substitutes for the worship of the external all-one, the inner joy, which results from the absorption of the finite in the absolute. In that unity the finite loses its substantiality and all distinction is absorbed, if not annulled. When Plotinus traces the world order to a series of external emanations, he may or may not be pantheistic; but, in his quest for ecstasy, he is essentially a pantheistic mystic. In mysticism, the self swoons into the absolute and its 'thought expires in enjoyment.' This experience reminds us of the *ekībhāva* of Bhāskara.

Humanism and personalism have an organic hatred for pantheism in all its forms. The 'All-One' theory is condemned as a 'God-engulfing, soul-destroying monster' which gives man a logical and moral holiday and the absolute is accused of being elastic enough to accommodate itself to any kind of incongruity and imperfection. It is compared to a lion's den into which all foot-steps lead, but from which none is seen to emerge. It is the abyss of a negative infinitude in which there is no trace of finite thought. The speculative intellect as the grammar of thought claims to envisage the absolute by unifying the opposites of abstract thought and seeing things in their wholeness. In the evolution of the triadic rhythm which, however, excludes oriental thought, we are said to think God's thought after Him and Hegelianism is spoken of as the consummation of the absolute idea. Logical thinking may be realistic or idealistic, but it cannot claim infallibility and finality. Rationalistic self-sufficiency is fatal to the spiritual craving for truth. The absolutisms of the West aim at systematic unity as contrasted with the sectional views of sensibility and science. But the finite reason has an inherent inability to grasp the absolute which is supra-logical and therefore more than the metaphysical highest. Indian philosophy as a *darśana* is not merely a systematic view of reality, but an immediate vision or divine insight. It satisfies the highest demands of logical stability and ethical and spiritual satisfaction.

As intuition is the fulfilment of reason, it is not dogmatic or uncritical or visionary. In the absolutisms of the West referring to the 'One' of Plotinus, the 'Substance' of Spinoza, the 'Absolute Idea' of Hegel, the 'Ego' of Fichte or the 'Neutrum' of Schelling, there is no clearness or distinctness in the relation between the finite and the infinite and in the value and destiny of the individual and they are on the whole more allied to *Bhedābheda* than to Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. Western absolutism will gain in definiteness by recognising the Vedāntic ideas of the moral law of causation by which the self has the freedom to become a butterfly or *Brahma*, the eternity of the self as different from its endless embodiments and the view of nature as an environment for Brahmanising the self.

Vedānta is often identified with pantheism both by its admirers and accusers. The theory of the Māyāvādīn that the finite is an aberration of the absolute in which it is ultimately annulled is criticised as acosmism *par excellence*. Advaita as a non-relational experience intuited in *samādhi* is not pantheism as in that state there is neither an "all" nor a "god." Viśiṣṭādvaita is no pantheism as its theory of *prakāra-prakāra* relation is foreign to Western speculation. *Bhedābheda* which is the nearest approach to pantheism is a presentation of Vedānta, which also thrives in the spiritual atmosphere of India. Every Vedāntic school as a philosophy of religion affirms the immanence o

Brahman and its essential transcendence. If whatever is, is right and righteous simply because it is, then there is no need for spiritual striving or salvation. The eternal Brahman is immanent in the finite in order that it may infinitise or Brahmanise it. Deussen is justified in his view that Indian pantheism has its own peculiar origin, but entirely wrong when he traces the evolution of Upaniṣadic thought and describes pantheism as a concession to empiricism made by Yāgñavalkya very much in the manner of Parmenides. "God creates the universe by transforming Himself into the universe. The latter confessedly has become God. The terms, God and the universe, become synonymous. The idea of God is only retained in order not to break the tradition."* The notion of an evolving God or emerging deity depending on the cosmos for the evolution of its purpose is entirely repugnant to Vedāntic thought as it does not inspire the hope of *śānti* or stability which the spiritual consciousness seeks. If Indian pantheism contains too much of God, it is preferable to the virile type of the West which refers more to the universe than to its God. Western absolute idealisms truly insist on the dignity of individual speculation. But in the noise that logical thinking or *tarka* makes, it misses its own inner but small voice of spirituality.

* *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, page 160.

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

Vedānta as a philosophy of religion is a rational justification of the spiritual intuitions of Brahman and is therefore a speculation on reality which becomes self-complete in spiritual realisation as the supreme end of life. Mere philosophy founded on preliminary doubt or ultimate doubts ends in dogma or agnosticism. Reasoning has no finality owing to its ill-foundedness. Mere religion often lapses into a blind faith based on the worship of words and sustained by the distrust of philosophic thinking. But Vedānta as a *darśana* affirms the ultimate knowability of Brahman that is enshrined in Śāstra and the consequent realisation of eternal blessedness and bliss. Its theory of *pramāṇas* is really 'a faith that enquires' and proceeds on the principle that Śāstra is a body of eternal and self-validating truths verified and verifiable by personal experience and thus reconciles the claims of revelationism and rationalism. Scriptural omniscience is *suigeneris* and its own *raison d'être* and the only source of the knowledge leading to *mukti*. Revelation has its meaning and value only in spiritual experimentation and experience. The proof of the being of Brahman consists in being in Brahman. But the validity of such intuitive

experience is criticised and corrected by its consistency with the objective standard of Śāstra. Reason thus comes midway between revelation and intuition and makes them intelligible. The view that the realm of Dvānta is the realm of logic and that Rāmānuja is at the logical level and does not rise to the intuitional highest of Śaṅkara creates a gulf between the two and fails to do justice to the logic of Śaṅkara and the intuition of Rāmānuja. Every school of Vedānta knows the limits of logic and ethics and also the Kantian principle that one should not make a transcendental use of an empirical category. It insists on the integral experience of Brahman which is alogical and amoral and is at the same time the fulfilment of logical thinking and moral endeavour. Likewise the statement that Buddhistic dialectic brought out the self-contradictions of religion and prepared the way for Advaitic philosophy is an emphasis on the metaphysical side of reality at the expense of its ethical and spiritual aspects. If it is historically true that Buddhism had an Advaitic leaning, it is equally true that it developed into theism. While the Buddha denied the validity of Śāstra and insisted on disciplining *buddhi*, his followers enthroned the Buddha in the place of *buddhi* and elevated him into the Personal God of theism.

Every philosophy has to formulate and solve the problems of God, Soul and Nature and their relations and thus correlate ontology, psychology and cosmology.

Vedāntic cosmology is not mythology or "primitive metaphysics" which satisfies the curiosity and credulity of the primitive mind by dealing with creation-myths and telling fairy tales; nor is it a mere philosophic speculation on the origin and structure of the universe, as the infinite that is hidden in it cannot be discovered by *tarka* or conceptual reason. The cosmos does not exist by itself, but is derived from Brahman and depends on it. The universe is a beginningless and endless cycle of evolution and involution and the theory of creation *ex nihilo* is unknown to Vedāntic cosmogony. The idea of creation at a certain time is the "root-error of all false metaphysics." Plotinus says that the origin of the Nous from the One should be approached with prayer. But the Vedānta goes a step further and says that *Brahma* by his *tapas* intuits the Veda which is with *Īśvara*, and then creates the cosmic order, as it was in previous cycles in the light of that intuition. The problem of Vedāntic cosmology is "How does this *sat* without a second, bring the pluralistic universe into existence? Is it possible to reconcile the facts of contingency and the imperfections of life with the perfect unity of the absolute?" Each Vedāntic system solves these problems in its own way. The view that God is an extra-cosmic Designer who, by a fiat of His will, fashions the world and sees it go, stresses His transcendent perfections. The theories of *upādhi* and *pariṇāmaśakti* satisfy the demand for immanent

unity. The creative and redemptive spontaneity of the divine nature is adequately expressed by the concept of *līla*. The theory of *anirvacanīya* is admittedly a confession of the failure of thought to explain the contradictions of life as the causal category is itself self-discrepant. Evil and error are beginningless, but they have an end; and the seeker after Brahman is concerned more with getting rid of them than with accounting for their origin. The thought motives of Vedāntic cosmology are therefore more religious and comprehensive than scientific and speculative. Plato observes that the Creator is good and desired that all things should be as like Himself as possible. The Vedānta clearly affirms the truth that the apprehension of Brahman as the *sat* and the source of the cosmos ends in the attainment or realisation of its eternal perfection. Cosmic evolution is mainly the unfolding of the souls or the making of the *mumukṣu*. The *mumukṣu* is more interested in knowing Brahman, which is closer than breathing, and attaining freedom than in the great Original and Its cosmic glory.

The following resumé of the *Śrī Bhaṣya* seeks to remove the cosmological difficulties of the one and the many and the problem of evil and ignorance and may be acceptable to practical Advaita or Advaita in its ethico-religious aspect.

“What makes the difference between plurality and unity is the presence or absence of differentiation through names and forms, and this truth is distinctly

declared in the text, "Now all this was undifferentiated. It became differentiated by form and name. Those who hold that the individual soul is due to Nescience and those who hold it to be due to a real limiting adjunct (*upādhī*); and those who hold that Brahman, whose essential nature is mere Being, assumes by itself the three-fold form of enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and supreme Ruler can all of them explain the unity which Scripture predicates of Brahman in the *praṭaya* state, only on the basis of the absence of differentiation by names and forms. There is, however, difference between these several views. The first-mentioned view implies that Brahman itself is under the illusive influence of beginningless *avidyā*. According to the second view, the effect of the real and beginningless limiting adjunct is that Brahman itself is in a state of bondage; for there is no other entity but Brahman and the adjunct. According to the third view, Brahman itself assumes different forms, and experiences the various unpleasant consequences of deeds. According to our view, on the other hand, Brahman, which has as its *prakāra* all sentient and non-sentient beings, whether in their subtle or their gross state, is always free from all shadow of imperfection, and is a limitless ocean, as it were, of all exalted qualities. All imperfections, and suffering, and all change belong not to Brahman, but only to the sentient and non-sentient beings which are its modes."

That the practical Advaita of Śaṅkara also affirms the reality of the ethico-religious consciousness is evident from the comments of Śaṅkara on the Sūtras. The source of all beings is the highest Lord or Person and not the *Pradhāna* and the finite self owing to their distinctive attributes and difference. That the external world exists apart from consciousness has to be accepted necessarily on the nature of consciousness itself. The waking state differs in character from the dream-world, and it cannot be inferred to be false because it is mere consciousness like dreams. Cognitions presuppose a conscious subject as is evidenced by the fact of remembrance, and personal identity. Fire cannot be proved to be cold on the ground of its having attributes in common with water. The cosmic functioning belongs to the Lord and not to the self even when it attains freedom. To the objection that, if the finite self is an eternal element of the infinite, the infinite will be affected by its *samsāra* state in infinite ways like Devadatta suffering from the pain affecting his limb, Śaṅkara following the Sūtras replies that the self alone is so affected and not the Lord whose nature is eternal, pure Intelligence. He cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty as He is bound by regards. The merit and the demerit of living creatures are traced to their *karma* and moral freedom; and the Lord is, like the giver of rain, only the common cause of finite life. Imperfections adhere not to Brahman whose essence is

eternal pure cognition and freedom, but to the embodied self which is different from it. The cosmogony of *Bhedābheda* is more monistic than that of Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara as it traces the world-order to the eternal necessity of Brahman in the form of *upādhi* or *svarūpa parīṇāma-śakti*, and though it affirms the transcendental reality and purity of Brahman, it cannot escape the charge of predicating evils and other imperfections to the divine nature. If the absolute changes, it persists partly and changes partly and thus there is a break or self-contradiction in its nature. The imperfections are therefore traced by the Sūtras to the finite self and not to Brahman.

The knowledge of the exact relation between the supreme and the finite self or the 'That' and the 'Thou' occupies a central place in Vedāntic thought. The value of *Bhedābheda* as a philosophic discipline lies mainly in its being a corrective to the subjectivistic tendencies of certain idealistic schools of Advaita and the accretions of practical Viśiṣṭādvaita and the theistic side of Vedānta due to the anthropomorphizing tendency of the human mind. Advaitic thought is studied from four standpoints, the psychological, the metaphysical, the ethico-religious and the mystical. The first is the method of mere *vicāra* or rationalistic analysis or introversion which consists in the abolition of the *ābhāsa* "I" by the affirmation of the absolute "I" or *pragñānam*. The world of space-time is the objectification of *avidyā*. It is mind-

born, mind-made and dissolved in the mind. *Eka-jīva-vāda*, which denies the many-soul theory, belongs to this type. An extreme form of the idealism of Advaita is in the formula ' *dr̥ṣṭi* is *śr̥ṣṭi* ' (*esse* is *percipi*). The universe is a here-now and exists only as my idea. *Mukti* is the arresting of the externalising tendency of the *avidyā*-ridden mind and it may be defined as the cessation of all *saṅkalpa* which occurs apparently in sleep and really in *saṁādhi*. The method may be the abolition of the "me" by analysing it away or by the dissociation of the *sākṣin* from its semblances or by the withdrawal of consciousness from its three-fold states. But the logic of mere self-analysis in practice lands us in the egocentric fallacy and lapses into the subjectivism of *viqñāna-vāda*, selfism in morals and quietism in spiritual life. The second theory is a metaphysical exposition of the inner contradictions of relational thought and the reality of the indeterminate absolute. The world-order is false like the perception of the snake in the rope. Relations, as Bradley says, separate terms, enter into them and have neither reality nor non-existence. Somehow, falsity is super-imposed on reality and *māyā* is merely the statement of the contradictions of life and is ultimately undefinable. *Māyā* exhibits itself in or as *avidyā* and it is explained in terms of the illusion theory or the limitation theory. Space-time is merely an apparition; *jīva* is the hypostatization of *avidyā* and *Īśvara* is the sum of all semblances.

The second view regards the finite as an appearance of reality and in *mukti* the finite is only transcended but not negated. The theory of *māyā* and the *māyā*-ridden *Īśvara* very often breeds a mood of intellectualism and agnosticism which is subversive of ethical and spiritual discipline. The third theory emphasises the ethico-religious aspect of life, the degrees of reality and the progressive attainment of the unity-consciousness. In refuting Buddhistic subjective idealism, Śaṅkara adopts the realistic view of the existence of the extra-mental world and the qualitative difference between the dream and the waking state, from the *vyāvahāric* point of view. The phenomenal world is not a phantasm, but is rooted in the infinite and *māyā* arises only when we think of the world as self-existent or divisive. A paraphrasing of *abheda* as identity in abstraction from diversity is the 'original sin' in Śaṅkara's interpretation of the causal relation.* *Mukti* denies two-ness or many-ness, but does not affirm identity, and it is attained by moral and religious discipline. *Niṣkāma-karma* purifies the mind and removes the taint of selfishness and *upāsana* is the meditation on the Thou, the super-excellent and by the grace of God and *guru*, the mediate knowledge of Brahman given in mere metaphysics becomes the immediacy of *mukti*. The method adopted in this spiritual culture is sublimation and not sublation. Vedānta is thus a non-dualism and should not be

* A *Systematic Study of the Vedānta* by Dr. S. K. Das, p. 146.

interpreted as monism or singularism. The fourth theory of Advaita is no theory at all. It is the mystic experience of the self-identity of the absolute in which sinless, stirless consciousness shines eternally in spaceless *ākāśa* and ineffable bliss. *Māyā* connotes the non-existence of the world like *śaśa viśāna*, the horn of the hare, or like the term, round square. But the moment you think the absolute, the eternal "is" becomes entangled in 'isms' and the riddles of thought.

To adopt a Kantian distinction, these schools of Advaita may be classed as pure and practical Advaita. The first and the second are deduced philosophically from the side of the absolute and, by their insistence on the Thou aspect, they tend towards solipsism and quietism and are subversive of the truths of moral and religious consciousness. But practical Advaita prefers the ethico-religious path and relies more on the staying and saving power of the That aspect than on mere unaided subjective introversion. The criticism of *Bhedābheda* and of other non-Advaitic schools of Vedānta are mainly directed against the intellectualistic and subjectivistic tendencies of *Māyāvāda*.

While pure Advaita starts with the subject and passes into subjectivism, the Vedāntic schools associated with the names of Rāmānuja and Madhva lay stress on the That and the absoluteness of God. They refute the distinction between the indeterminate *sat* and the determinate self, the transcendental "I" and the

empirical "me," the eternal and the phenomenal, the logical highest and the intuitional highest and the metaphysical absolute and the God of meditation. Determination or relational knowledge is a real integral experience and not an illusion. The self that Yāgñavalkya refers to is Brahman, the cosmic ground and not the individual self. The eternal is immanent in the phenomenal without losing its spiritual eminence. *Īśvara* is not the spatialised Brahman made in the moulds of logic as a concession to theistic consciousness, but is the absolute which is the reason and the destiny of all beings. The unity consciousness that is attained in *mukti* is as much a subjective intuition as a divine revelation. The conflict between philosophy and religion results in the repudiation of metaphysics by religion and the distrust of religion by metaphysics and the fatal disruption of both. God is neither an evolving entity, nor a future emergence, neither a monad among monads, nor one of the eachees, but is the absolute which alone gives reality to the eternal values of life. Every Vedāntic school affirms the truth that Brahman is not a becoming, but is self-realised and perfect and has no degrees and even Śaṅkara insists on the knowledge that the finite consciousness, as long as it lasts, involves the infinite which is the ground of its being and the home of its values.

The metaphysical monism of Advaita defines *mukṭi* as the negation of *ahaṅkāra* as *jīva* and asserts the identity of the absolute with *aḥam*. Viśiṣṭadvaita, as

an ethical monism insists on the self-noughting or the abolition of the *ahaṅkāra* of *jīva*, the non-division of *aham* from the absolute which is its source, sustenance and satisfaction, and the attainment of the being of its being, in which the self exists but its thought expures in infinite enjoyment. Philosophical theism asserts the external but eternal relations between God and the self and defines God as the one and only source and self of all existents entering into personal relations with the finite self and redeeming it from its sinfulness. All non-Advaitic schools of Vedānta refute the theory of *Nirguṇa Brahman*, but they differ in their exposition of *Saguṇa Brahman*. In the mystic monism of Bhāskara, Brahman is defined as formless, but not qualityless and *mukti* as the absorption of the finite in the absolute or *ekābhāva*. In the pluralistic monism of Yādavaprakāśa and the mono-dualism of Nimbārka, there is a transition from the predication of metaphysical attributes of the absolute to that of moral perfections. The transition is completed in Viśiṣṭādvaita which attributes æsthetic perfection also to the divine nature and according to it Brahman with the eternal will to bewitch all beings and draw them into His living love, assumes a formless form of Beauty and Bliss and becomes a *Bhuvana Sundara*. But in popular, as different from philosophical, Viśiṣṭādvaita and in theism as interpreted by the popular consciousness, the absoluteness of God and His scriptural attributes are often misinterpreted anthropomor-

* A literal understanding of the mysticism of the Kausītaki-Upaniṣad is an instance in point.

phically on the analogy of human personality. The cosmic activity of God as revealed in *Veda*, *Itihāsa*, *Purāṇa* and in the spiritual experience of man is really the revelation of the eternal love of God which is immanent in all finite beings and incarnates in their bodies with a view to redeem them from their *sāmsārīc* career of *avidyā* and *karma*. The infinite incarnates in the finite and infinitises its nature. God, in the omnipotence of His love, assumes the ways of man to arrest his waywardness, calls forth his love and recovers his self, and *mukti* is the blissful experience of this divine union and communion. The transcendental cannot be explained by means of empirical categories and Vedānta therefore resorts to analogies and pictorial representations of what is beyond thought and speech. But the anthropomorphic mind distorts the Vedāntic view and gives a physical and psychical interpretation of the metaphysical and the metapsychical. It is God that moulds the soul in His own image. But this is misunderstood as man making God in his own image. God is portrayed as possessing a bodily form and invested with human attributes like thought, feeling and will. The tendency to personify objects and project the self into them is clearly discernible in many popular forms of worship. The materialistic consciousness which arises from mistaking the perishing body for the eternal self ascribes human passions and actions to the absolute and imposes its own imperfections on it. The philosophy of Bhāskara is free from this tendency

and may, therefore, claim to be a criticism of the popular presentations of God and His Kingdom. *Bhedābheda* is logically and chronologically midway between the philosophies of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and mediates between the two systems by pointing out the subjectivistic dangers of the one and the anthropomorphic accretions of the other. Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja agree in refuting *Bhedābheda* as a philosophy of self-contradictions and Rāmānuja rightly rejects it on the additional ground that it attributes imperfections to the absolute and not to the confusions of the *karma*-ridden *jīva*. Though some of the main features of *Bhedābheda* are traceable in certain absolutisms of the West, it is not now among the living expositions of Vedāntic thought.

The study of comparative Vedānta requires a sympathetic insight into the essentials of each system and the exposition of it from its own highest point of view. Every system claims to be based on the authority of *śāstra* and immemorial tradition, logical stability and spiritual verifiability and proceeds on the principle of the establishment of truth by the elimination of all plausible and possible rival theories. At the same time, each school affirms the synthetic view that it alone mediates between extremes and reconciles the apparent contradictions of revelation. In a synthetic study of Vedānta combining the logical method of *siddhānta*, the varieties of Vedāntic thought and experience may be correlated

by emphasizing their one underlying reality.* This end may be attained by discussing the method of approach in six different ways: (i) Is Vedānta to be studied as a deductive development of scriptural authority or as an inductive verification? (ii) Are its truths personal intuitions or principles embodied in one uniform institutional creed or *sampradāya*? (iii) Does the validity of each system depend upon the historic method of justifying each system as a fulfilment of the needs of the age and the time spirit or by the method of absolutism which turns our thought as *mumukṣus* from the particulars of sense to the universal and eternal truths of spirit? (iv) How far can the pragmatic method which relies on the workability of truth be applied to reconciling conflicting Vedāntic experiences? Is a *siddhānta* acceptable if it satisfies the tests of truth, goodness and beauty? (v) What are the advantages of estimating the worth of Vedāntic systems by the psychological theory that the Advaita philosophy emphasises thought, the Viśiṣṭādvaita feeling and the Dvaita, will? (vi) Is the application of the evolutionary method like the theory that Advaita is the fulfilment of Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita an adequate test of Vedāntic synthesis?

The seeker after truth examines the various methods of Vedāntic criticism as thus formulated in

* This theme was fully elaborated in my Madras University Readership Lectures on "The Philosophy of the Upanisads" in 1929 and 1930.

the light of the immanent criterion enshrined in the ancient intuition that the *sat* is one but that its seers express it in various ways. Every school of Vedānta may accept the following truths as its basic or working principles. The Veda is a body of eternal and objective spiritual truths which are verifiable in personal experience. Brahman as the ground of all existents and the home of all values is, and has *satya*, *gñāna* and *ānanda* and the essential requisite for knowing Brahman is *mumukṣutva* or the 'hunger' for the absolute whether it is generated by *karma*, *gñāna* or *bhakti*. Reality reveals itself to every man according to his aptitude and attainments. *Mukti* is the realisation of Brahman and its eternal bliss, and the main value of this experience consists in the mahātma seeing all things with the eye of Brahman and working for cosmic solidarity and the salvation of all. Brahman is immanent in all beings and in all faiths as their life, light and love and it is this divine vision that inspires the motive for *loka saṅgraha* or universal benevolence including the love of even the sub-human species. Vedānta is the fulfilment of all religious quests. Every school or sect which has this ethical and spiritual content has a divine consummation and the *Gītā* as the essence of the Upaniṣads brings out this innate hospitality of Hindu thought in the immortal words of the Bhagavān :

“Whoever with true devotion worships any deity, in him I deepen that devotion and he ultimately reaches Me.”

APPENDIX I

DIFFERENCE OF INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN OF THE VEDĀNTA SŪTRAS BY ŚĀṆKARA, BHĀSKARA AND RĀMĀNUJA.*

1. In the following cases, Śāṅkara interprets the Sūtras like Rāmānuja, but adds at the beginning or at the end and sometimes in the middle, a note to show that the whole view is a mere *pūrvapakṣa* or that the Sūtra has to be understood in a restricted sense or that it applies to the *Saguṇa Vidyās* only.

(a) I. i. 12 to 19. At the end of the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa*, Śāṅkara adds that the whole is a *pūrvapakṣa* view referring to *Saguṇa Brahman*. Bhāskara severely condemns Śāṅkara and takes the Sūtras as they are, i.e., as *siddhānta*. Rāmānuja follows Bhāskara.

(b) 1. ii. 1 to 8. The Sūtras dwell on the difference of the individual soul and the Highest Self. So Śāṅkara adds, at the end of Sūtra 6, an explanation that the difference is to be understood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the Highest Self. Bhāskara takes the Sūtras as they are and takes this opportunity to denounce the *Māyāvādin* who degrades *Īśvara* to the level of a *samsārin* in his attempt to avoid *Bhedābheda*, which is the real philosophy of the Sūtrakāra. Rāmānuja, of course, takes the Sūtras as they are.

* I owe this to my friend, Mr. G. K. Rangaswami Aiyangar, M.A.

(c) II. i. 13 (II. i. 14 of the *Śrī Bhāṣya*). Śaṅkara interprets the Sūtra in the same way as Bhāskara, but adds at the beginning of the next Sūtra that the distinction between enjoyers and objects of enjoyment acknowledged in this Sūtra does not really exist. Bhāskara, of course, takes the Sūtras as wholly correct, the interpretation given being favourable to his *Bhedābheda* view. Rāmānuja interprets the Sūtra in terms of his theory of *śarīra-śarīra sambandha*.

(d) II. i. 22. The Sūtra plainly states, as interpreted by all, that Brahman is additional (i.e., different from the embodied self), and this is clear from the declaration of difference in the Scriptures. As this statement is opposed to Śaṅkara's monism, Śaṅkara adds that, as shown by the Advaita texts, the difference between the two, maintained in the Sūtra, is not real, but is due to the fictitious limiting adjuncts of the soul. Bhāskara reconciles this Sūtra with the Advaita texts by his *Bhedābheda* theory and asks why the co-existence of *bheda* and *abheda* should not be accepted when *pramāṇas* affirm it.

*Pramāṇataḥ cet pratiyate ko virodhoyamucyate
virodhe cāvirodhe ca pramāṇam kāraṇam matam.*

Rāmānuja, like Bhāskara, takes the text as it is and proves that the *jīva* is different from Brahman.

(e) II. i. 27. To explain how Brahman without parts can emit the world without entirely passing over into it, the Sūtra relies on *Śruti* and rules out

other arguments, as all our knowledge of Brahman is based on Scripture alone. Śaṅkara adds that, as we cannot accept plainly absurd statements such as "quench with fire" even on the authority of Scripture, the real explanation is that the world is unreal. Bhāskara points out that, as there is no worldly analogy for the creation of illusion by one without a body, Śaṅkara's effort lands us in a greater difficulty and hence it is better to accept the śakti of Brahman as defined by Scripture only. Rāmānuja merely follows the text of the Sūtras and says that Brahman has infinite power as declared by Scripture.

(f) Sūtras IV. i. 7 and IV. i. 12 prescribe meditation in a sitting posture and till death respectively. Śaṅkara adds that these Sūtras do not apply to meditations which aim at *samyagdarśana*. Bhāskara and Rāmānuja make no such addition.

(g) Sūtra IV. iv. 7, in describing the *mukta*, accepts both the view of Audulomi that it is pure *caitanya* and that of Jaimini that it has the lordly qualities of *apahatapāpma*, *satyasaṅkalpa*, etc. According to Śaṅkara, this Sūtra describes the truly released soul (*para vidyā niṣṭha*) and so the possession of lordly qualities creates a difficulty. Hence he adds that these are ascribed to it (*vyavahārāpekṣayā*). Both Bhāskara and Rāmānuja find no need for introducing any such distinction between *pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika*.

2. In one case IV. iii. 7 to 16, Śaṅkara follows an unusual procedure. Sūtras 7 to 11 give

the view of Bādari, 12 to 14 that of Jaimini and 15 and 16 that of Bādarāyaṇa. Śaṅkara divides this into two *Adhikaraṇas*, the former comprising Sūtras 7 to 14 and the other 15 and 16. In the former *Adhikaraṇa*, he treats Bādari's view as *siddhānta* and Jaimini's as *pūrvapakṣa*. This is quite opposed to the general method of the Sūtras according to which an *Adhikaraṇa* always ends with the *siddhānta* view. Śaṅkara recognises this and explains why in this case it is necessary to take Bādari's views as *siddhānta*. Bhāskara treats the whole as one *Adhikaraṇa* ending with the *siddhānta* view in Sūtras 15 and 16. Rāmānuja also takes the same view.

3. Now we shall examine other passages in which there is a difference of interpretation among the three commentators.

(a) II. i. 23. Bhāskara closely follows Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja's interpretation is quite different.

(b) II. ii. 44 (41 of the *Śrī Bhāṣya*). Bhāskara follows Śaṅkara in holding that the *Pāñcarātra* system has some defects according to this Sūtra. Rāmānuja interprets it quite differently as approving of that system wholly.

(c) II. iii. 17 (18 of the *Śrī Bhāṣya*). Both Śaṅkara and Bhāskara read the Sūtra as *Na ātmā aśruteḥ*. Rāmānuja reads it as *na ātmā śruteḥ*. Śaṅkara and Bhāskara give their own view of the *upādhis* and Rāmānuja criticises both.

(d) II. iii. 18 *Gñō ata eva*. Rāmānuja naturally interprets *ataḥ* as *śruteḥ* of the previous Sūtra. Bhāskara interprets it in terms of his *upādhi* theory, Śaṅkara takes the word differently. *Gñāḥ* according to Śaṅkara means *Gñāna*, but Bhāskara recognises the *jīva* as *Gñātṛ-svarūpa*. Rāmānuja explicitly interprets the word as *Gñātṛ*, or knowing subject.

(e) II. iii. 19 to 29, 40, 43 to 53. Bhāskara generally follows Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja strikes a different line in many places. In respect of Sūtra 50 (49 of the *Śrī Bhāṣya*) *ābhāsa eva ca* according to Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and *ābhāsa eva vā* according to Bhāskara, there is a difference. Śaṅkara interprets this Sūtra as supporting *Pratibimba Vāda*. He then adds a long note criticising the theory of many omnipresent selves of the Śāṅkhyas. Bhāskara interprets *ābhāsa* not as 'reflection' like Śaṅkara but as "*hetvābhāsa*," i.e., fallacious argument, and states that the Sūtra condemns the Śāṅkhya view of many omnipresent selves. He then criticises Śaṅkara's *Pratibimba Vāda* as, if the *jīva* be a mere reflection and therefore *avastu* like the horn of a hare, there can be no question of bondage or release nor of action to secure *mukti*. Rāmānuja interprets *ābhāsa* like Bhāskara and states that the Sūtra condemns the "*upādhi*" schools of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara. It is to be noticed that, though Bhāskara controverts Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Sūtra as involving *Pratibimba Vāda* and gives a different interpretation of the word *ābhāsa*, his final interpretation of the Sūtra is similar to that of Śaṅkara.

(f) III. ii. 1 to 6. Bhāskara generally follows Śaṅkara throughout this *adhikaraṇa*. In commenting

on Sūtra 3, however, where he takes *māyā* to mean illusion just like Śaṅkara, he anticipates Thibaut's criticism of Śaṅkara on page xcvi of his Introduction to the *Vedānta Sūtras*, that, since the Sūtrakāra calls dreams *māyā* because they do not evince the characteristics of reality, the objective world surrounding the waking soul is obviously not *māyā*. Bhāskara traces *māyā* to *jīva śṛṣṭi* as distinct from *Īśvara śṛṣṭi*. To Rāmānuja, *māyā* connotes the wonderful creations of God.

(g) III. ii. 11 to 21. This important passage is interpreted in quite a different way by each of the three commentators. It is in respect of this passage that Thibaut declares that the explanation of neither Śaṅkara nor of Rāmānuja is satisfactory throughout. Śaṅkara's procedure of starting a new *adhikarana* with Sūtra 22 and his interpretation of that Sūtra are, however, declared by him to be unsatisfactory, and in this also he is anticipated by Bhāskara. It is seen, however, that, in spite of his difference from Śaṅkara in the general interpretation, Bhāskara generally follows the verbal interpretations of Śaṅkara even here.

(h) III. iii. 29-30. In commenting on Sūtra 30, Bhāskara states that Śaṅkara's argument about *gati* being unnecessary for *Nirguṇa Vidyā* needs no refutation (*phalyutvāt nirākarāṇe na prayujyate*).

(i) III. iv. 52 (51 of the *Śrī Bhāṣya*). The interpretation of each is different.

(j) IV. i. 14. Rāmānuja construes the Sūtra differently from Śaṅkara. Bhāskara follows Śaṅkara.

(k) IV. ii. 1 to 6. Bhāskara follows Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja makes some difference.

(l) IV. ii. 7. Bhāskara interprets the words in the same manner as Śaṅkara, though, of course, he makes no difference between a superior and an inferior *vidyā*. Rāmānuja interprets slightly differently.

(m) IV. ii. 8 to 11. Rāmānuja differs completely from Śaṅkara. Bhāskara follows Śaṅkara.

(n) IV. ii. 12 to 14. In this important passage relating to *gati* where Thibaut considers Śaṅkara's explanation as altogether impossible, Bhāskara gives up Śaṅkara's lead altogether, and, treating Sūtras 12 and 13 as one, anticipates Rāmānuja in his interpretation.

(o) IV. As regards the division of the Sūtras into *adhikaraṇas* and the assignment of topics to the latter, Dr. Thibaut gives a long list of differences between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. An examination of Bhāskara's *Bhāṣya* with reference to this list shows that except in the case of Sūtra IV. ii. 12, the *adhikaraṇa* IV. iii. 7-16 and also III. iii. 29, 30 and 32 where Śaṅkara's arrangement and interpretation involve the denial of *gati* to the meditator on the Highest Self, Bhāskara generally follows Śaṅkara throughout. Rāmānuja makes several departures from Śaṅkara's procedure, e.g., in

I. iii. 22, 23

I. iii. 39

I. iii. 40

I. iii. 42-43

II. iii. 40

III. ii. 1 to 6

III. iii. 9

III. iii. 14 to 17

IV. i. 14.

This would indicate that in his readings, arrangement and interpretation of the Sūtras, Bhāskara generally follows Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja representing a different tradition altogether. It is only when questions like *Māyāvāda*, *jīvanmukti* and the falsehood of *Īśvara* and all *bheda* relations come up, that Bhāskara joins issue with Śaṅkara. This would account for Bhāskara differing from Śaṅkara in interpreting the following Sūtras :—

II. iii. 18, where he ascribes to the *jīva gñātṛ-svarūpa* and not mere *gñāna-svarūpa* ;

II. iii. 50, where he combats Śaṅkara's *Pratibimba Vāda* ;

III. ii. 11 to 22 (particularly 11, 15 and 22), as the acceptance of Śaṅkara's view would lead to the denial of all qualities to Brahman ;

III. iii. 29 and 30 and IV. ii. 12 where he opposes Śaṅkara's denial of *gati* to the meditator on the Highest Self ; and

IV. iii. 7 to 16, where Bādari's view is treated as *siddhānta*.

He also utilises III. ii. 3 to show that *māyāvāda* is not supported by the Sūtrakāra I. iv. 26, &c., to maintain *pariṇāma-vāda* and II. i. 22, II. i. 13, etc., to expound his own *Bhedābheda* view.

V. It is worthy of remark that in all the points on which Thibaut definitely criticises Śaṅkara's interpretation, Bhāskara differs from Śaṅkara and particularly in the two instances where Thibaut is unwilling to accept Rāmānuja's interpretation also, i.e., III. ii. 11 to 21 and II. iii. 50, Bhāskara's view is as different from Rāmānuja's as it is from Śaṅkara's.

APPENDIX II

GLOSSARY

Abheda : Non-difference.

Abhinna : Undifferentiated.

Abhivyakta : Manifested.

Acetana : Non-sentient.

Ādeśa : (object of) instruction.

Ādhāra : Ground ; support.

Adhikaraṇa : A set of Sūtras dealing with a single topic.

Adhikāribheda : Diversity of qualification.

Adhyāsa : Super-imposition.

Adṛṣṭa : Unseen potency.

Advaita : Non-duality ; name given to Śaṅkara's school of Vedānta.

Ādyavasthā : First state ; a technical term in Yādava's cosmology.

Agñāna : Nescience.

Ahaṅkāra : The egoistic principle.

Aikya : Oneness, identity.

Aiśvarya : Lordship.

Aja : Unborn.

Ākāśa : Ether.

Akṣara : Imperishable ; primordial matter.

Ālayavigñāna : Consciousness apparently static.

Amṛta : Immortality.

Amśa : Part or element.

Amūrta : Formless ; subtle.

Anabhivyakta : Potential, not manifest.

Anādi : Beginningless.

Ānanda : Bliss.

Ananya : Not different.

Anapekṣa : Independent.

Anavasthā : Infinite regress.

Ānga : Adjunct.

Anirmokṣaprasaṅga : Impossibility of release from *samsāra*, as the absurd result.

Aniroacanīyatva : Indefinability.

Anitya : Non-eternal.

Annamaya : (The body) composed of food; material body.

Antarbhūtakārayitā : Immanent cause of creation.

Antaryāmin . Indwelling Self.

Anumāna : Inference.

Anusmṛti : Remembrance.

Anuvāda : Mere repetition.

Ānvayika : Directly connected.

Apahatapāpma : Sinless.

Apāramārthika : Unreal.

Āpara Vidyā : Lower knowledge.

Āparokṣa : Immediate; direct.

Āpauruṣeya : Impersonal.

Āpavarga : Release from *samsāra*.

Aprākṛta : Not material.

Aprithaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa : Inseparable attribute.

Āpunarāvṛtti : Non-return.

Āpūrva : See *adrṣṭa*.

Ārāgramātra ; Point-sized; atomic.

Arcirādimārga : The path to *mokṣa*.

Ārjava : Straight-forwardness.

Āroha : Ascent.

Arthavāda . Glorificatory or condemnatory passage, not to be taken literally.

Asadbhāva : Non-being.

Asamavāyikāraṇa : Non-inherent cause.

Asatkāryavāda . The theory that the effect is created out of nothing.

Asatya . Unreal.

Asiddha : Unestablished.

Āśramas Stages in the life of a twice born.

Āśraya : Locus.

Āśrutakalpanā : Extra-textual assumption, to suit one's own ideas.

Asthūla : Not gross.

Ātivāhikapurūṣa : one who conducts the released soul to the world of Brahman.

Ativaraṇāśramin : One beyond the rules of *varṇa* (caste) and *āśrama* (stage).

Ātmagñāna : Knowledge of the self.

Ātyantabheda : Absolute difference.

Ātyantabhinna : Absolutely different.

Aupādhika : Due to *upādhis* or limiting adjuncts.

Avāptasamastakāma : One whose desires are all realised.

Āvaraṇāśakti : Capacity to conceal.

Avaroḥa : Descent.

Avasthābheda : Difference in condition.

Avastu : Non-substantial.

Avayava : Part.

Avibhāga : Inseparability.

Avidvān : One who has no *Brahma Vidyā*.

Avidyā : Nescience.

Bandha : Bondage.

Bhakti : Loving devotion to God.

Bhāṣya : Commentary, generally on the basic Sūtras.

Bhāva : Affirmation.

Bhāvanā : Thought.

Bhedābhedavāda . The theory of non-difference in difference.

Bhinna : Differentiated.

Bhogyā : Object of experience.

Bhoktā : Enjoyer, i.e., *Jīva*.

Bhoktṛtva : Feeling ; enjoyment.

Bhūtapañcaka : The five elements.

Bijāñkura Nyāya : The analogy of seed and tree, each being the cause of the other.

Brahmabhāva : State of being Brahman.

Brahmagñāna : Knowledge of Brahman or the absolute.

Brahmārpaṇam : Dedication to Brahman.

Brahma-vicāra : Inquiry into Brahman.

Buddhi : Intellect.

Caitanya : Intelligence.

Cetana : Sentient being.

Darśana : A philosophical system.

Dharma : Attribute ; duty.

Dharmabhūtagñāna : Attributive knowledge.

Dhyāna : Meditation.

Dhyātā : Meditator.

Dhyeya : Object of meditation.

Dhyānaniyogavādin : One who holds that *dhyāna* is a prescribed discipline to attain *Brahma-gñāna*.

Dhūmādimārga : The way to *svarga* or empirical heaven beginning with smoke.

Digambara : Unclothed ; free.

Drk : Seeing.

Drśya : Visible ; object seen.

Dvaita : Duality ; name given to Madhva's school of Vedānta.

Dveṣa : Hatred.

Eka-jīva-vāda : The theory that there is only one *jīva* or soul.

Ekaviśaya : Of the same subject.

Ekibhāva : Oneness with the absolute.

Gati : Path.

Gaticintana : Meditation on the path to the world of Brahman.

Gauṇa : Secondary ; implied.

Ghaṭākāśa : The ether enclosed in a pot.

Gñāna : Knowledge.

Gñāna-kāṇḍa : Parts of the Vedas dealing with knowledge of the Brahman.

Gñāna-karma-samuccaya : The co-ordination of knowledge and action.

Gñātṛtva : Being the knower.

Guṇa : Quality.

Guṇāṣṭaka : Eight-fold qualities of the liberated soul,
viz., *apahatapāpma*, *vijarah*, *vimṛtyuh*,
viśokah, *vijighatsah*, *apipāsah*, *satya-*
kāmah and *satyasankalpah*.

Hetu : Reason or cause.

Hetvābhāsa : Logical fallacy.

Indriya-nigraha : Sense-control.

Īśvara : God.

Jīva : Individual self.

Jīvanmukti : Release in embodiment.

Jyotiṣām jyotis : Light of Lights.

Kainkarya : Spiritual service.

Kali : The last of the four Yugas.

Kāma : Attachment.

Kāmya-karma : Action prompted by desire.

Karma-kāṇḍa : Parts of the Vedas dealing with rituals.

Kartṛtva : Being the agent.

Kārya-Brahman : Effected Brahman; *Hiranyagarbha*.

Kāryaparavākya : A proposition conveying what has to
be done.

Krama-mukti : Progressive attainment of release.

Kṣanika-vigñāna : Momentary cognition.

Kṣetra : Field of activity; body.

Lakṣanayā : Secondarily; by a figure of speech.

Laya . Dissolution.

Līngaśarīra : Psychic body of the self.

Lokasaṅgraha-vyāpāra : Action in the interests of world-
welfare.

Mādhyamika : The Nihilistic school of Buddhism.

Mahāpralaya : Final cosmic dissolution.

- Mahat* : Great , one of the twenty-four Śāṅkhyan principles constituting the world.
- Manana* : Thinking over.
- Mantavyah* : Should be reflected on.
- Mantradraṣṭārah* : Seers of the Vedic hymns intuiting the Vedic truths.
- Mauni* , one who silently meditates on the self.
- Māyā* : Cosmic illusion.
- Mīmāṃsaka* . A follower of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* school of Jaimini.
- Mithyā* : False.
- Mithyopādhi* : False limitation.
- Moha* Confusion.
- Mokṣa* : Release from the cycle of births and deaths.
- Mūlāvidyā* Primordial nescience.
- Mukti* : Vide *mokṣa*.
- Mumukṣu* : One who longs for *mokṣa*.
- Mūrta* : Having form ; evolved.
- Naiṣṭhika-brahmacārīn* : One vowed to celibacy.
- Nāmarūpa* : Name and form.
- Nānājīva-vāda* . Theory of plurality of selves.
- Nidīdhyāsitavyah* : Should be meditated on.
- Nimittakāraṇa* : Instrumental cause.
- Nirākāra* : Without form.
- Nirañjana* : Without blemish.
- Niravadhikaiśvarya* : Infinite glory.
- Niravadya* : Faultless.
- Nirguṇa-Brahman* : Attributeless Absolute or the Indeterminate Being.
- Nirvāṇa* : Buddhistic idea of release ; a state of relationless thought.

Nirviśeṣa : Attributeless.

Niścaya-gñāna : Determinate knowledge.

Niṣkala : Without blemish.

Niṣkāma-karma : Disinterested action.

Niṣprapañcaniyogavādin : One who believes in mukti
as cosmic dissolution being enjoined.

Nissambodha : Indeterminate consciousness.

Nitya : Eternal.

Nityakarma : Obligatory duty.

Nityaprāpta : Eternally realised.

Niyantā : Controller, Ruler.

Niyoga : See *adṛṣṭa*.

Nyāsa : Renunciation.

Nyāya : Reasoning.

Pañcāgnividyā : The eschatological doctrine of the *five*
fires taught as a form of meditation in
the fifth chapter of the Chhāndogyo-
paniṣad.

Pāñcarātra : A scriptural authority on *Śrī Vaiṣṇavism*
traced to Nārāyaṇa.

Paramāṇu : Irreducible atom.

Pāramārthika : Transcendental ; as absolutely real.

Paramātmān : }
Parameśvara : } The supreme Self.

Param-jyotis : Supreme light.

Paratantra : Dependent.

Paravidyā : The higher knowledge.

Pariṇāmavāda : The theory that the Absolute trans-
forms itself as the world.

Parivrājaka : A *sanyāsin* ; one who has renounced the
world.

Parokṣa : Mediate.

Pāśupata : The philosophical theory of a school of *Śaivism*

Phala : consummation.

Piṇḍa : Body.

Prācūrya : Abundance.

Pradhāna : Primordial matter.

Prakāra : The relation of the finite self to the supreme
Self according to Rāmānuja.

Prakaraṇa : Context.

Pralaya : Dissolution of the world.

Prāṇa : Life, the vital principle.

Prāpaka : One who attains an end.

Prapañca-nāśana : Annihilation of the world.

Prapaṇna : A person who has absolutely surrendered
himself to divine grace.

Prāpti : Attainment.

Prāpya : That which is to be attained.

Prārabdha karma : *Karma* that has begun to bear fruit.

Pratigñā : A thesis to be proved.

Pratyakṣa : Sense perception.

Prayatna : Effort.

Prayojana : End in view.

Puccha-Brahma-vādin : One who holds that Brahman
is the indeterminate bliss and
not the blissful, in the
Anandamayādhikaraṇa.

Puruṣa : One of the two categories of *Śāṅkhyas*; differ-
ent from *Prakṛt*.

Pūrvapakṣa : *Prima facie* view to be set aside by the
establishment of the *Siddhānta*.

Rāga : Desire.

Rajas : One of the three constituents of *prakṛt* indicating energy and activity, the other two being *satva* and *tamas*.

Rāśi : Mode (in Bhartṛprapañca's philosophy).

Sādhana-catustaya : Four-fold qualifications according to Śaṅkara for knowing Brahman.

Sadyo-mukti : Immediate release.

Sadvidyā : Meditation on Brahman as the *Sat* without a second as described in the Chhāndogya-panisad.

Saguṇa-Brahman : Brahman with attributes.

Sajātīya . Of the same kind.

Sākāra . With form.

Sākṣin . Witness.

Śakti : Potency.

Sāmānādhikaraṇya : Syntactic equation of terms denoting the same thing but connoting different attributes. Co-existence.

Samavāya : Inherence, a category of the Vaiśeṣikas.

Samavāyikāraṇa : Inherent cause, one of the three kinds of cause mentioned by the Vaiśeṣikas.

Samudāya-Satya : The apparent reality of the aggregate the Phenomenalistic theory of the Buddhists.

Sāmya : Similarity.

Śāṅkhya : One of the six systems of Indian philosophy traced to Kapila ; a follower of this school.

Samsāra : The world of empirical experience.

Sandhyopāsana : The daily worship of God at sun-rise and sunset prescribed for the *dvijas*.

Sanmātravādin : One who holds the theory of the Absolute as mere Being.

Śaptabhāṅgī : The Jaina theory of seven kinds of relative predication.

Saptavidhānupapatti : Seven-fold objections raised by Rāmānuja against the Advaitin's theory of *avidyā*.

Śarīrendriya The psycho-physical complex of the *jīva*.

Śarīra-śarīri-sambandha The vital relation of *body and the indwelling soul* between the finite self and the absolute, as expounded by Rāmānuja.

Sarvagata All-pervading.

Sarvagñā . Omniscient.

Sarvakarmatyāga Renunciation of all actions.

Sasambodha Determinate consciousness.

Sattva . One of the three constituents of *prakṛti*, indicating goodness or harmony.

Satya : Real.

Satyakūmaḥ : One who loves the good ; the Being with eternal perfections.

Satyasaṅkalpaḥ : One who wills the true ; One whose will is always realised.

Satyasya Satya . The true of the true, Real Reality.

Satyopādhi . True limitation as opposed to *mithyopādhi* or false limiting adjuncts.

Sāvadhika : Limited.

Siddhānta : The establishment of a theory by dialectic refutation of rival theories.

Siddhaparavākya . An assertive proposition, conveying something that is already established.

Śiva-Śakti : The twin truths of *Śāktism* affirming the static and dynamic aspects of Reality.

Śravaṇa : Hearing the spoken word of *Śāstra* through a *guru*.

Śrṣṭi : Creation.

Śruti : Divine revelation, *i.e.*, the Vedas ; a Vedic text.

Śrutahāni : Distortion of the text, giving up what is actually stated.

Śrutisāpekṣa : Dependant on *Śruti* for authoritativeness.

Sthūla-śarīra : Gross body.

Buddhādvaita : Non-duality of pure Brahman : name given to Vallabha's school of Vedānta.

Sūkṣma-śarīra : Subtle body.

Svānubhava : Self-realisation.

Svaprakāśa : Self-luminious.

Svarga : The celestial region of the devas.

Svarūpa : Essential nature.

Svasiddha : Self-established.

Svataḥ nirākāra : Formless in itself.

Svayam-jyotiḥ : Self-effulgent.

Śyena : A kind of Vedic ritual for bringing about a calamity to enemies.

Tamas : One of the three constituents of *prakṛti* which indicates ignorance or inertia.

Tantras : Ancient Hindu religious treatises which form the foundation of the various sectarian faiths.

Tāpaka : That which heats.

Tāpya : That which is heated.

Tatvāvabodha : Apprehension of reality or truth.

Timira : Darkness ; A disease of the eye producing double vision.

Tripuṭi : The triadic or subject—object relation.

Upādhi : Limiting adjunct.

Upakrama : The beginning of a topic.

Upāsaka : One who meditates on the Supreme.

Upasamhāra : The conclusion of a topic.

Upāsana : Meditation.

Uttamādhikārin : One who has the highest qualification
for vedic knowledge.

Uttamāśramin : *Sanyāsi*, a member of the highest
āśrama.

Vairāgya : Freedom from the desires of sensibility.

Vaiṣaṇya : Partiality.

Vaiśeṣika : One of the six schools of Indian philosophy.

Vāsanā : The tendencies of previous karma retained in
the psycho-physical complex of the *jīva*.

Vastu : Substance.

Videhamukti : Release only after death.

Vidhi : A vedic imperative.

Vidyā . Knowledge; various meditations described in
the *upaniṣāds*.

Vigñānavāda : An idealistic school of Buddhism.

Vikārā : Modification.

Vikṣepa Śakti : Power of *māyā* by which the manifold
of experience is projected.

Viśiṣṭādvaitā : Rāmānuja's school of Vedānta.

Viśphuliṅga nyāyā : The analogy of fire and its sparks.

Vivartavādā : The theory that the world is an illusory
appearance of the absolute.

Vyāvahārika : Pertaining to phenomenal reality.

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ERRATA

PAGE.	LINE.	FOR.	READ.
3	24	Vacaspati	Vācaspati
4	foot-note		
	3	<i>mata</i>	<i>mate</i>
	4	<i>ghatade-scaitanya</i>	<i>ghatādeścaitanya</i>
6	21	he calls	are called
	26	topic	text
10	20	deduced from	traced to
18	10	<i>mithya</i>	<i>mithyā</i>
	foot-note	<i>gñeyā-vastunassada-satyata</i>	<i>gñeyavastanussada-satyatā</i>
19	24-25	the cause.....produce	the effect was <i>asat</i> or non-existent at first and not pre-existent and is produced
24	6-7	(<i>aprthaksiddha viśe-ṣaṇa</i>)	(<i>ayuta siddha</i>)
28	24	and the	and transforms Him- self into the
31	14	<i>Śāṅkhya</i>	<i>Sāṅkhya</i>
	18	by	to
	29	secretion	semblance
32	8	<i>Kāthopaniṣad</i>	<i>Kāthopaniṣad</i>
37	15	<i>ānanda</i> is	<i>ānanda</i> in <i>mukti</i> is
40	foot-note		
	2	<i>anādarāṇīyaṇi</i>	<i>anādarāṇīyam</i>
46	foot-note		
	1	<i>Chāndogya</i>	<i>Chāndogyē</i>
51	9	mechanical process	non-sentient entity

PAGE.	LINE.	FOR.	READ.
52	23	dissimilarity	distinctness
	26	The atoms are the ultimates of matter without any secondary qualities.	The atoms are the ultimates of matter.
	last line	in	as
56	20	transient action	transcendence
62	25	<i>svarūpa-nāśana</i>	<i>svarūpa-nāśana</i>
65	10	in	as
84	7	<i>Baṣya</i>	<i>Bhāṣya</i>
	15	Bhāskara rejects	Bhāskara generally rejects
	foot-note	<i>Upādhyavaccina</i>	<i>Upādhyavaccinnasya</i>
86	7	that is inherent (<i>aupādhiḥ</i>)	that is (<i>aupādhiḥ</i>)
	17	<i>ārāgamātra</i>	<i>ārāgamātra</i>
87	26	<i>Viṣṭulinga</i>	<i>Viṣṭulinga</i>
89	12	<i>pāśana</i>	<i>pāśana</i>
90	17	<i>nīdīdhyāsitavyah</i>	<i>nīdīdhyāsitavyah</i>
96	2	<i>Āsmaratya</i>	<i>Āśmaratya</i>
	7	Yadhavaprakāśa	Yadavaprakāśa
98	9	altogether	ultimately
99	10	gods	manes
104	26	<i>daurbhagya</i>	<i>daurbhāgya</i>
105	21	exemplar	exemplar
108	foot-note		
	1	I. iv. 14	I. 1. 4
111	18	of	to
	23	IV. iv. 4-22	IV. iv. 22
120	16	waked to	attained
128	15	nature.	nature ¹ .
	23	sorrows ¹	sorrows.
129	25	omit the words 'and purpose (phala)'	
130	foot-note	<i>upanīyate</i>	<i>apanīyate</i>
132	3 & 5	bridge	bank
141	12	enter	come to
150	13	adjunt.	adjunct.

PAGE.	LINE.	FOR.	READ.
155	foot-note		
	2	<i>Yasya</i> (in both lines)	<i>yaḥ saḥ</i>
157	10	truth as	truth, as
158	28	<i>nibandanam</i>	<i>nibandhanam</i>
159	17	<i>Svātantriya</i>	<i>Svātantrya</i>
169	11	time, the	time. The
176	11	<i>Īśvara-prabhā</i>	<i>Īśvara-prabhā</i>
178	1	<i>aṇānasiddhas</i>	<i>āṇānasiddhas</i>
179	5	<i>samuccaya vada</i> or	<i>pramāṇa samuccaya</i> and
	13	<i>amvāda</i>	<i>gaṇa</i>
181	28	<i>bhāvana</i> or	<i>bhāvanā</i> based on
183	16	<i>Trīṅga</i>	<i>Trīṅga</i>
186	3	<i>bhokta</i>	<i>bhoktā</i>
187	5	<i>Śrṣṭi</i>	<i>Srṣṭi</i>
189	foot-note	<i>puruṣas</i>	<i>puruṣaḥ</i>
190	12	<i>Brahma</i>	<i>Brahmā</i>
	17	<i>Viśiṣṭaika</i>	<i>Viśiṣṭaika</i>
	21	the deliciousness	the fulness of the deli- ciousness
191	Page heading	NIMARKA	NIMBARKA
192	15	<i>amsa</i>	<i>amśa</i>
		<i>Śukti</i>	<i>Śakti</i>
196	1	<i>līla</i>	<i>līlā</i>
	6	<i>kalpana</i>	<i>kalpanā</i>
202	1	unbridgable	unbridgeable
203	3	that,	the view
	18	<i>Mīmāṃsa</i>	<i>Mīmāṃsā</i>
204	16	formula, that	formula that
	20	15	14
206	8	<i>Vivartora</i>	of <i>vivarta</i>

PAGE.	LINE.	FOR.	READ.
215	21	phenomenal aspects	meanings
216	7	<i>satta</i>	<i>sattā</i>
225	20	<i>Gīta</i>	<i>Gītā</i>
227	chapter heading	Criticism of <i>Bhedābheda</i>	Advaitic Criticism of <i>Bhedābheda</i>
228	30	n	in
236	15	<i>bhaṅgi</i>	<i>bhaṅgī</i>
312	13	relegion	religion
313	13	<i>Niṣprapañca-</i> <i>niyogavāda</i>	<i>Niṣprapañcika-</i> <i>ṇāmyogavāda</i>
315	last line	o	of
317	19	<i>suigeneris</i>	<i>sui generis</i>
319	11	<i>exnihilo</i>	<i>ex nihilo</i>
	17	<i>Brahma</i>	<i>Brahmā</i>
320	3	<i>līla</i>	<i>līlā</i>
		<i>anirvacanīya</i>	<i>anirvacanīyatva</i>
328	26	philosophical,	philosophical
	foot-note	<i>kaṇṣītāki</i>	<i>kaṇṣītaki</i>
339	15	(o) IV	4
340	26	V	5
348	5	<i>Niṣprapañca-</i> <i>niyogavādin</i>	<i>Niṣprapañcika-</i> <i>ṇāmyogavādin</i>
349	23	<i>Puccha</i>	<i>Pucca</i>
350	23 } 2 }	<i>Prakṛt</i>	<i>Prakṛti</i>
wherever they occur	}	<i>Āsmarathya</i>	<i>Āsmarathya</i>
		<i>Kāśakṛtsna</i>	<i>kāśakṛtsna</i>
		<i>māya</i>	<i>māyā</i>

